It is significant to me that I can claim I have made an advance on the very great work and interpretation of Paul Shorey; and I am glad to claim, after close study and for what my opinion is worth, that Burnet is still the greatest editor of Plato.
The list of names (B4-8) has the form A τε καὶ B καὶ δη καὶ C καὶ D καὶ E, with C representing Thrasymachus. Commentators, knowing what is coming, read an emotional tone into καὶ δὴ καὶ that it does not in itself have:
ἑωράκη (C1). The pluperfect along with καί describes how Socrates resolves his own surprise: The image that had settled in his memory was in fact (καί) an old image that envisioned a younger Cephalus.
ὀλοφύρονται συνίοντες (A4): His shift from first plural to third plural, despite ἡμῶν, draws attention to the fact that he wants to distance himself from “them.” It is already obvious that he brings them in merely as foil.
Cephalus’s list closes with ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, dismissing a tedious listing of logically coordinate items. The dismissal and closure is more often done by articulating the universal (here it would have been ἡδονή [or ἡδοναί]). ἔχεσθαι can denote the relation of the case (as subject) to the case (as verbal complement in the genitive), as here and at Gorg.494E1ff, Leg.811E1; Rep.389E7; but also the relation of the case (as subject) to the universal (as verbal complement), as at Leg.775D6-7, 859E3-4; Polit.289A; Tht.145A8. For the former relation various metaphors are used: ἀδελφά (Leg.811E4, 820C1, 956E6; Phlb.21B1; Rep.436B1, 558C3; Soph.266B2-3); ἑπόμενα (Leg.815C2-3; Phdrs.239A2; Polit.271B4(cf. ap.crit.); Rep.406D5, 544C; Tht.185D3 (literally denoting an actual sequence); Tim.24C3, 42B1; cf. συνεπόμενα, Phlb.56C5); the pregnantly logical συγγενῆ (Leg.820B9, 897A4; Phlb.11B8 (cf. σύμφωνα, B6); Polit.258D5, 260E2); συνέριθα (Leg.889D4); τὰ ἐφεξῆς (Tim.30C2). For a review of the terminology cf. Ast ad Leg.775D6-7 (VII.20, p.384), Stallb.ad Polit.289A.
Proleptic τε (C4) leaning back on the dative ταύτῃ, which recalls the dative διπλῇ and thereby indicates that τε will be meaning “both” in a both/and construction. The dative ᾗπερ below (C6) completes the construction.
ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμάχειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (E5).
δέ (A13): a connective instead of an interrogative particle at the beginning of his “question” presumes his interlocutor knows he will be asking a question, as often (335B6, 376E11, 377A1). Compare ἄν “carried forward” (cf.382D11 and n.1299) Contrast ἆρ’ οὖν which he next uses.
σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ (A8). The term is often less than approbatory in Socrates’s mouth. In the Apology it serves as a grounds for prosecuting him (23A3) and also a grounds for criticizing those who condemned him (38C3-4)! The generally approbatory εὖ λέγειν might also mean less to Socrates than it does to others (cf. n.316).
τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν (D3): With his exegesis (καί) Socrates adopts and emphasizes the association between expertise and rule that Thrasymachus had relied on above and expressed with δημιουργός at 340E4-5.
τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένος ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργούς (C9-10) scrupulously replaces the nouns ὠφελία and μισθαρνητική with verbs (nominal infinitive and participle): the event that they are better off by earning money cannot be disputed, but once it is stipulated the analysis of how it happens can only be that the ὠφελία comes from a particular art (per 346A6-8), and the action of making money (μισθοὺς ἄρνυσθαι), which since beneficial must be by art, is by the τέχνη μισθαρνητική (B10: an etymological argument), or μισθωτική for which it was substituted, from B8 and B1.
καλῶς (353A4): Finally τὸ καλόν enters the argument! Having the right tool enables the craftsman to perform his job admirably.
τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα (D4-5). I do not know what background list, if any, this triad is relying upon, nor the logical configuration of the three terms.
Given the καί before ἰάτρευσις, the τε after it is strictly redundant. Its special force is to announce there will be a connection between its own item (ἰάτρευσις) and the ensuing item that is more intimate than its item’s connection with the previous items. Compare 407B8-C1, 410D1-2, 412B3-4, 431B9-C1, 519B1-2, 568E2-3 (οἵ going with all three), 611B2-3; Crat.407E5-A2; Leg.733E1-2, 738D6-E1, 834A4-5 (cf. England ad loc.), 899B3-4, 950E5-6; Meno 75C8-9; Phdo 85E3-4; Symp.206D3-5, 213D3-4; Tht.146C8-D1, 156B2-6, 157B9-C2, 167C1-2, 176C3-4. Distinguish the force of γε, δέ, and δή in similar position, all of which distance their item from the previous rather than bringing it closer to the subsequent (Tht.149D1-3 has both τε and δή). Distinguish also non-redundant τε placed in lieu of καί, helping to effect closure, where it may or may not also indicate an intimate link (A καὶ B καὶ ... καὶ X, Y τε καὶ Z—and—A καὶ B καὶ ... καὶ X, Y1 τε καὶ Y2) as Alc.I 122B8-C2; Leg. 665C2-3, 735B1-2, 828B4, 842E1-3, 886A2-4, 896B10-C1, C9-D1, D5-7, 899B3-4; Phdo 59C1-2; Polit.288B2-4; Rep.547B3-4; Tim.24A7-8, 42E8-9, 43B2-4, 46D2-3, 87D1-2, 92C7-8. In the present case the especially intimate relation between the item (ἰάτρευσις) and its subsequent (χρηματισμός) is that of particular and universal (for which cf. the similar list at Tht.157B9-C2).
μισθῶν θ’ ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν (A5). Despite the relative ubiquity of the verb from which it is formed (εὐδοκιμεῖν), the abstract noun εὐδοκιμήσεις occurs in Greek literature in these pages only (imitated twice by Adeimantus, below: 363A2, 6), apart from one late instance in Lucian (Pisc.25: τὰ δικαστήρια (sc. ἀπολείπειν) καὶ τὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις εὐδοκιμήσεις) and once, also late, in the singular, in Themistius (Or.29.347C: εὐδοκίμησις καὶ ἀρετή). The choice of the plural makes the abstract noun designate concrete instances of rewards coming from good reputation, and therefore might best be translated with the English plural, “favors,” in its concrete sense (cf. Gildersleeve §44). With μισθῶν it forms an hendiadys, and διὰ δόξαν by an artful figura etymologica sets into relief that such rewards can be the result of mere opinion, which is the burden of Glaucon’s present remark. The term represents a specific extension of “wages,” above (D1), and – for all purposes a coinage – finds a way to collapse into a single word both the reason others pay it (*δοκ-, which needed to be spelled out with διὰ δόξαν, and specifies ὅσα γίγνεται from above) and the reason the recipient wants it (εὐ). Adeimantus will imitate the pseudo-pleonasm, below (cf.363A1-5, esp. ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης [cf. n.786, and compare Socrates at 554C12]). Indeed in the next line justice is considered harsh not only αὐτό but also δι’ αὑτό.
οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει,βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενοςἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.
ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν (C2) echoes θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς with something a little more concrete and a little less liturgical, but at the same time it is a hendiadys: placating the gods is being slanted toward pleasing them and sugaring them up. At the same time that Adeimantus aspires to voice the truth he displays an estimable facility for imitating the liars.
Iliad 9.497ff, adapted. Phoenix speaks to Achilles, persuading him to let go his rancor: ‘Even the gods show clemency to a man contrite.’ Again the poet is misused, for Phoenix makes the gods the measure of men not their servants, as in Hesiod good was the measure of toil rather than ease the measure of good. Moreover, ὑπερβαίνειν expresses contrition and even repentence in the aftermath of an error, while for Adeimantus’s argument the sin is contemplated in advance (a perverse interpretation of the subjunctives as anticipatory) and weighed against the uncertainty or manipulabiity of its consequences.
Reading μόνον (366A1) with FDM (om. A : μὲν ci. Muretus): Adeimantus is virtually quoting Thrasymachus’s καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία at 343E2-3: μηδεμία ἄλλη is tantamount to μόνον.
ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λόγος (B5-6), a pairing that would be oxymoronic anywhere else in Plato. Our young man has remembered ἄκρος in the meaning it was given 360E7, though in a very different connection, but refers immediately to the widespread belief of the cities alongside the expert testimony of the prophetic poets (B1-3), and brings forward ἰδίᾳ λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν from 363D6-4A1; moreover it recalls Aristotle’s definition of ἔνδοξα as τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις (Top.100B21-3). Insofar as Adeimantus has improved their arguments in this last section he has himself become the man to refute.
καὶ λανθάνον (E6): Omit editors’ comma before καί. λανθάνον is complementary to ἐνόν, contrasting the outer appearance to the inner fact, in a chiastic ABBA construction.