1
Indeed to the contrary it seems persons who think they have a reputation to protect, such as Protagoras or Theodorus or Gorgias, are all the harder to engage in a conversation worth having.
2
344E1-3.
3
The perils of aging, subjective and objective (both what the old man thinks and how he talks about it); What is a friend, really? Why wait around and figure out how to be just when people admire the man who takes what he wants, even if it is from themselves that you take it? The masterful expert is the servant of the person that needs him. People concocted the idea of justice merely to have great enough numbers to overwhelm the strong man they wish they were. If you had a ring that made you invisible what would you do? What if rhetoric and poetry were so powerful they could even persuade the gods to look the other way? What would we say virtue was if it weren't something we had to live up to ourselves, but we could make up a board game that shows it, with tokens and rules? Can a person be both as strong and fierce as a wolf but as loyal as Fido? What are the proper ways to talk about the gods, since they are really divine, after all? that is, what makes a god a god? And that's just the first fifth of the Republic!
4
The “care of the soul” he promises the Athenian jurors he will never let them ignore as long as he can breathe (Apol. 29D2-E3; 30A7-B4 36C5-D1, 38A1-8, 39D7-8, 41E3-7).
5
Indeed Book One is quite a lot like an aporetic dialogue, or three of them – though its particular function, I believe, is largely to serve as foil the hugely successful and extensive conversation of Books 2 thru 10, by illustrating three very different ways conversations can fail.
6
My study of this passage is included in Aglaïa – Autour de Platon: Mélanges offerts à Monique Dixsaut (Vrin 2010).
7
I find no mention of this style in the extensive studies of H. Thesleff, and have written Appendix 7 to describe it.
8
As a corollary I have resisted to explain an earlier passage in the conversation by one that occurs later unless all that is at stake is an obscure locution that becomes clearer upon repetition. The interlocutors cannot be helped understanding what they say by telling them what they will say.
9
E.g., at 370A6, 378B6, 439B4, 451A7, 460E6, 504E5, 515B4-5, 562B4, 580D4, 608A6.
10
It is significant to me that I can claim I have made an advance on the very great work and interpretation of Paul Shorey; and I am glad to claim, after close study and for what my opinion is worth, that Burnet is still the greatest editor of Plato.
11
Since Socrates is always addressing us even when reporting what he said to his interlocutors “yesterday,” I have adopted the orthographic protocol of omitting quote marks around his remarks to his interlocutors, as well as around what he says to us only.
12
κατέβην (327A1): Though the downward direction will later be used as a metaphor for descent into an inferior place (the Cave of Book Seven) one overreads to find it so here. To characterize the entire “evening” as a descent is wrong: the dialogue is a triumph. It is true that the Piraeus area is a less pleasant place than Athens for all the reasons that port towns can be, but what is downward about going there is that going to the seashore is always down just as going from shore to land is upward, as witness the title of Xenophon’s Anabasis. The visible horizon is always higher than the ground we stand on.
13
Ariston (A1) is also the father of Adeimantus (C2 and 388A) – and also of Plato. His family, as well as that of Plato's mother Perictione, trace their roots far back into Athenian history.
14
τῇ θεῷ (A2): He does not tell us which. At the end of Book One (354A11) we learn it is Bendis, about whom little is known except that perhaps she is a Thracian goddess and that the Thracians in Piraeus were encouraged by the Athenians and joined by the Piraeans to celebrate their goddess there. Socrates’s lack of specificity implies that Bendis is “the Goddess of Piraeus.”
15
τε … καί (A2) invites us to compare the two participles it links (προσευξάμενος and βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι), as if they were a pair.
16
θεάσασθαι (A3).
17
The different motives, to pay homage and to enjoy the spectacle, correspond to the different grounds for praise: beauty and propriety. By answering his μέν not with δέ but with μέντοι and a litotes Socrates both avoids the invidium of pitting the Thracians against the Athenians and also suggests that the beauty of the Athenian contribution was fitting and the propriety of the Thracian contribution was beautiful.
18
προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες (B1): Instead of saying, “When it was finished we left”, he repeats the two motives, and in the original order. The absence of chiasm—the “apodotic” chiasm of before and after if I may so style it (cf. nn.161, 1000, 1297, 2575, 2704, 2717, 4155, and 417A6-7, 464B6)—is more noteworthy than its presence would have been.
19
τὸ ἄστυ (B1), strictly the fortified part of Athens, Athens-proper as opposed to its suburbs, reminding us that Piraeus is a mere appendage of a city.
20
κελεύειν used twice (B3,4): Polemarchus will have his slave talk to Socrates and Glaucon in the same manner he talks to his slave.
21
αὐτός (B6) includes the sense ipse (your master), but also has the force of challenging the slave to point out the person told him to tell them, i.e., “Where’s the teller himself if it’s not you?” or, “And where is he?”
22
The slave’s οὗτος (B6) is cheeky.
23
The slave’s ἀλλά (B7) is impertinent and suggests if anything that he is treated harshly by Polemarchus.
24
By repeating ἀλλά (B7) Glaucon acquiesces to the slave’s command with a hint of mockery.
25
And therefore the son of Ariston and the brother of Plato. From Apol.34A2 we learn he is enough older than Plato to act as his guardian.
26
ἄστυ (C5), again, renewing the distinction between the real city and the suburb.
27
γάρ (C6).
28
τοίνυν (C9) as if to draw a conclusion Socrates could have drawn for himself. Polemarchus wishes to telescope his demand to Socrates.
29
τούτων (C9): not “us” as above (C7). The threatener exempts himself in order to diminish his responsibility for the threat.
30
Again with τοίνυν (C14) Polemarchus wishes to introduce his choice as a given fact. His addition of the redundant οὕτω is like saying “That’s that.”
31
ἆρα γε … οὐδ’ ἴστε (328A1): By his choice of particles Adeimantus effects a transition from the threat of force to an attempt to persuade, the alternative Socrates himself had suggested above. His γε feigns a touch of surprise and his δέ a touch of criticism, so as to suggest that the reason to stay is both unsurprising and unquestionably agreeable. Thus his strategy of persuasion, like Polemarchus’s threat of force, is to pre-empt disagreement. For pre-emptively critical οὐδέ cf. Cephalus’s opening remark to Socrates (328C6, infra).
32
καινόν (A3). Cf. Gildersleeve ad Justin Martyr Apologia I.15 (New York, 1877): “νέος of the organic, καινός of the inorganic; νέος of that which grows, καινός of that which is made.” Cf. Phdrs.267B1.
33
καὶ πρός γε (A6): Polemarchus chimes in with an eager adverbial use of the preposition, as in English we say, “Plus, there’ll be a vigil!” For γε adding an unexpected item cf. n.70 ad 329D2.
34
ἄξιον (A7) raises again the moral and esthetic pairings with which Socrates began, πρέπειν / καλόν and προσευξάμενος / θεάσασθαι. Polemarchus is after all trying to persuade Socrates by saying the spectacle is “worthy,” but can only say it will be entertaining. In fact as a παννυχίς it will be very costly of time.
35
ἀλλὰ μένετε (A9), another ἀλλά echoing his slave’s ἀλλά (327B7), but now warmly cajoling. Reinforcement with μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε sounds dictatorial but Greek usage is exactly the opposite, as when we say, “Don’t even think of saying No” or when we say “I insist.” It is a formula for closing an attempt at persuasion rather than strengthening it.
36
μενετέον (B2): the verbal adjective depersonalizes the compulsion, maximally.
37
Losing spirit, becoming despondent and shrinking from the task are common experiences during Socratic investigation, as are their opposites, eagerness, willingness, and sanguinity: Charm.156D; Rep.450D5-451B1; etc.
38
The list of names (B4-8) has the form A τε καὶ B καὶ δη καὶ C καὶ D καὶ E, with C representing Thrasymachus. Commentators, knowing what is coming, read an emotional tone into καὶ δὴ καὶ that it does not in itself have:
καὶ δὴ καί introduces the last item of the list at Phdrs.274C8-D2 and Leg.643B7-C2ff, as if to effect closure. At Rep.563E10-4A1 καὶ δὴ καί [καὶ δὴ om.AM] introduces the final item, which is also the target of the list. To such use of καὶ δὴ καί we may compare the addition of δή (but no second καί) again to effect closure, as at Crat.411A7-8; Leg.631C1-5 and C5-D1, 661A5-B4, 810E7-8; Lys.215D4-7; Meno 87E6-7; Phlb.50B1-4, 59C2-3; Rep.526D2-5, 544C2-7 (with ironic γενναία), 549C8-E1. καὶ δὴ καί introduces the last item before the generalization at Leg.758E4-6 (where this last item is then taken up in the sequel) and at Rep.367C7-D2 (which rehearses 357C2-3) and 419A5-10. However, it introduces the second of many items in Soph.265C1-3, where the said item is a generalization of the first item (φυτά for ζῷα: cf.Cornford ad loc., pace Campbell). At Leg.747A2-5 it effects a transition to the third of four categories of items (arithmetic, geometry, acoustics, kinetics), and at Leg.760A7-B1 it introduces what is simply the fifth of six items, and at 917A4-5 the fourth of five. For other instances of categorical transition done with δή cf. Leg.679D4-E3; Parm.155D6-8 (cf.142A3-4); Rep.373A2-4, 493D2; Tht.149D1-3, 156B2-6. Compare use of ἤδη at Soph.260C8. At Tim.82A8-B2 (καὶ κοῦφα δή) δή signals an abandonment of a balanced μέν / δέ and an extension of the δέ clause instead. At Leg.962D10-E9 it is added to an item in order to stop the flow and place an ironical spotlight on the item; and at 967D6-8A1 to cast the light of praise.
The force of καὶ δὴ καί in the present passage is simply to effect a transition from the first category of persons present at the house, who live there, to the second category, people from the outside and needing therefore further introduction by defining genitives designating their city (the first two) or their father (the last of the three).
39
We soon learn (C2) he was conducting a private sacrifice, alone, in the inner courtyard.
40
ἑωράκη (C1). The pluperfect along with καί describes how Socrates resolves his own surprise: The image that had settled in his memory was in fact (καί) an old image that envisioned a younger Cephalus.
41
παρ’αὐτόν (C3). We already know that Cephalus is isolated from the company around him, both by his absence from their gathering and by their perfect willingness to join him. I want to ask him, “What about your kith and kin?” He will tellingly raise the issue himself, when he speaks about οἰκεῖοι in two very different ways, positively at 328D6 and negatively at 329B1.
42
οὐδέ (C6) with all mss. (Burnet accepts Nitzsch’s οὐ δέ) implies some other unstated criticism that this fault will only corroborate and exacerbate. οὐδέ was used in this pre-emptive way by Adeimantus above (328A1). Cephalus’s behavior—immediately to hug Socrates and then to scold him—continues the implicitly hostile treatment of Socrates.
43
ῥᾳδίως (C8) rather undercuts Cephalus’s plea. He speaks as if the two of them have so much to talk about that of course they will get together, and that they haven’t gotten together only because of Socrates’s imperfect recognition of how Cephalus’s age isolates him.
44
καταβαίνων (C6): again the downward is still physical (cf. n. ad 325A1); but as Cephalus’s own designation of the destination it reveals his sensitivity to the fact that Piraeus is hardly a “destination.”
45
τοῖσδε (D5) the “first person” demonstrative pronoun. Cf. Stock ad Crito 44E.
46
ἀλλὰ τοῖσδε … σύνισθι (D5): again (cf.A9) an attempt to persuade Socrates by sandwiching in at the last moment the lure of youth. That Cephalus refers to his sons and their friends as youngsters (whether νεανίαις [AM] or νεανίσκοις [FD]) though they are upwards of forty is an index of his eager rhetoric.
47
μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει (D4-5): again the “Don’t do otherwise but do this” formula, with its contrapositive redundancy, to cap a wave of persuasion by revealing, or politely feigning to reveal, how desolé the requester will be if the requested fails to requite him. More eager rhetoric.
48
ὡς παρὰ φίλους τε και πάνυ οἰκείους (D6). Cephalus yearns for company, even the intimacy of family relations, and yet he spends a lot of time sacrificing alone. Why is he so preoccupied with it?
49
καὶ μήν … γε (D7).
50
πυνθάνεσθαι (E2) means both ask (for a report) and learn (from a report), having to do with the kind of knowledge one may have from hearsay rather than direct experience (cf. 344C2 [and contrast Gorg.470D9-E6], 358D3, 476E5, 491C6, 530E1; Prot.318A4). The verb therefore figures large in the “reported” dialogues (such as Symposium and Phaedo; cf. also Phdrs.227B8) where a person who could not be present for the event feels both eager to have a report and skeptical as to whether the report will be adequate. In using this word Socrates as the younger man puts himself at the disposal of the older (as he does to the Guest at Soph.216D3). He corroborates this below with ἡδέως πυθοίμην and ὅτι σοι φαίνεται and ἐξαγγέλεις (E5,7). Cephalus then acknowledges the broad berth that Socrates has given him, and indicates that he will be filling it, for he opens with ἐγώ σοι and repeats οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται (329A1-2).
51
The question (E3-4) is ready to the lips of Greeks today. A few years ago I was introduced as a “φιλόσοφος” to Antonis, an elder of the Cretan village Afrata. He greeted me thus: κιά που ἤμου εἶσαι | κιά που εἶμαι θά ’σαι (“Where you are, I one day was. Where I am, you one day will be.”) More recently I had a message from him inviting me to return to Crete and drink some wine with him sometime before he dies.
52
With the juxtaposition ἐγώ σοι … ἐρῶ (329A1) Cephalus sits his interlocutor down across from himself to listen, as it were, suggesting that he will speak at length (as when in English we start by saying, “Let me tell you about ...” or “I'm glad you asked me that question” – cf. Phdo.96A1: ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι and 96A6: ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος; also H.Maj.292C3, Meno 89D3, ), or that he will say something unexpected (Crito 44A2, Gorg.486E2, 522E5-6; Thg.130D2. The second person pronoun can be left out with small effect: Ion 537A; Leg.931B Meno 97B1; Phdo.89A9 (ἐγώ σοι var.); Tht.152D2.
53
ὀλοφύρονται συνίοντες (A4): His shift from first plural to third plural, despite ἡμῶν, draws attention to the fact that he wants to distance himself from “them.” It is already obvious that he brings them in merely as foil.
54
ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμνῃσκόμενοι (A5) is an hendiadys, or, given the two verbal complements before and after the participles, a “binary construction” (for which cf. Riddell Digest §§204-230, and cf. 378B2-4, 386A2-4, 431A7, 433E12-4A1, 451C5-6, 462B5-6, 493C4-6, 515C4-5, 615B2-5). Some are distributive (n.778) and others are non-distributive (n.2307). The present tense of the participles indicates Cephalus finds their behavior tedious.
55
περί τε τἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται (A5-7), a list interesting both for its form and its content.
The content and criterion of the list, bodily pleasure, is usually done with three items, food (F), drink (D), and sex (S), usually in that order. So 389E1-2 (D,S;F), 439D6-7 (S,F,D), 580E3-4 (D,F,S); H.Maj.298E1-2 (F,D; S) ; Leg.782E1-3A4 (F,D;S), 783C9-D1 (F,D;S), 831D8-E2 (F,D,S); Phdo 64D3-7 (F,D; S), 81B5-6 (seeing, touching; D,E; S); Phdrs.239A2-B5 (F; D; aposiopesis for S); Prot.353C6 (F,D,S). Drink and food can be done with the pair drink and feast (εὐωχία), as 420E3-4, 488C6; cf.Ep.VII 326D2-3 (F,D,S), and here. Conversely, feasting can cover both drinking and eating, as 411C4. Just so, at 436A11-B1 we have two kinds of pleasure, that of τροφή and that of γέννησις. It appears that Cephalus’s list is the only instance in the corpus besides 439D6-7 where sex is mentioned first.
As to its form, the anaphora of περί and the reiteration of preparatory τε after πότους mark sex as a category apart from drink and revelry (i.e., indicate that the items in the list have the relation A; B1,B2). But since καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα would then strictly be generalizing only the latter, we might take the anaphora of περί as having been discontinued to avoid slavish parallelism, and supply it mentally before ἐυωχίας as well as before ἄλλ’ἄττα (cf.Rep.580E3-4). Anaphora regularly marks a subdivision but not always, as a single example will suffice to reveal: Rep.389E1-2, τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν, where epanalepsis of περί militates against the implicit categorical distinction in order to effect closure.
Cephalus’s list closes with ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, dismissing a tedious listing of logically coordinate items. The dismissal and closure is more often done by articulating the universal (here it would have been ἡδονή [or ἡδοναί]). ἔχεσθαι can denote the relation of the case (as subject) to the case (as verbal complement in the genitive), as here and at Gorg.494E1ff, Leg.811E1; Rep.389E7; but also the relation of the case (as subject) to the universal (as verbal complement), as at Leg.775D6-7, 859E3-4; Polit.289A; Tht.145A8. For the former relation various metaphors are used: ἀδελφά (Leg.811E4, 820C1, 956E6; Phlb.21B1; Rep.436B1, 558C3; Soph.266B2-3); ἑπόμενα (Leg.815C2-3; Phdrs.239A2; Polit.271B4(cf. ap.crit.); Rep.406D5, 544C; Tht.185D3 (literally denoting an actual sequence); Tim.24C3, 42B1; cf. συνεπόμενα, Phlb.56C5); the pregnantly logical συγγενῆ (Leg.820B9, 897A4; Phlb.11B8 (cf. σύμφωνα, B6); Polit.258D5, 260E2); συνέριθα (Leg.889D4); τὰ ἐφεξῆς (Tim.30C2). For a review of the terminology cf. Ast ad Leg.775D6-7 (VII.20, p.384), Stallb.ad Polit.289A.
56
With τινῶν (A7)—“so they say”—Cephalus moves from the imitative and onomatopoetic ὀλοφύρονται, to a description of their thoughts, to a virtual quotation of their words.
57
ἔνιοι (B1) singles out a subgroup of the πλεῖστοι (A4) who will serve as the special target for Cephalus’s criticism. Describing the others has provided him a preamble to presenting his own view.
58
ὀδύρονται (B1), onomatopoetic like ὀλοφύρονται. Cephalus is mocking his peers for the way they act when their juniors mock them. ὑμνεῖν invokes the image of a nagging wife (cf. her litany at Rep.548C8-E1, and cf. Euthyd.297D4 [referring to 297B9-D2]; Leg.653D5ff; Prot.317A6; Rep.463D7 [approbatory]; Tht.174E5 and 176A1), and is cognate with ὗθλος (on which cf. 336D4, infra).
59
οἰκείων (B1), the term he had used, with φίλοι, when inviting Socrates to come visit (328D6).
60
With καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε (B7) we have the first of several run-on constructions by Cephalus (cf. C4-5, D5-6). At first the καί with ἄλλοις links these “others” back to Cephalus himself, who by virtue of the irreal construction above has indirectly denied that he is a οὕτως ἔχων. Then, immediately after καὶ ἄλλοις comes καὶ δὴ καί followed by a singular noun, indeed the proper name of a single person, so that καί and ἄλλοις suddenly seem proleptic: “I’ve run into people who aren’t that way, both others and in particular Sophocles.” Yet just as soon as this construction comes into view, we encounter the enclitic adverb ποτὲ leaning back on Σοφοκλεῖ and therefore linking this dative to a future verbal construction, namely παρεγενόμην which comes two words later. Cephalus is eager to get to his special instance of a προπηλακισμός τοῦ γήρως answered by Sophocles’s response, and to set it into sharp relief with the behavior of the age-peers he has just described.
61
συγγίγνεσθαι (C2), pres., of sustained activity.
62
αὐτό (C3). Greek, eschewing metaphor and embracing simile, here requires a periphrasis unneeded in English which conversely finds metaphor congenial. Thus αὐτό (which I’ve translated with the demonstrative adjective “that”) plays a strictly expletive role as antecedent to the ὥσπερ clause by which the simile is expressed. ἀποδράς (read by Burnet for ἀποφυγών though found in no ms.) is an improvement made needless by ὥσπερ, which at the same time corroborates the repetition of ἀποφυγών as the hinge of the comparison. The simile itself, ὥσπερ λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών, uses τινὰ as a sort of an indefinite article establishing λύττοντα as an attributive participle modifying δεσπότην in tandem with ἄγριον.
63
εὖ … καὶ τότε … καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἧττον (C4-5): Another run-on statement, where the first καί should be, and is, correlated with the second, but then their parallelism is broken by added words that vitiate the parallelism after all, just as the dative Σοφοκλεῖ, above, had at first appeared to correlate with καὶ ἄλλοις but then, followed by τότε, became the beginning of a new construction requiring the dative for a new reason (παρεγενόμην).
64
πολλὴ εἰρήνη … καὶ ἐλευθερία (C6-7) is meant to be a formulation of the opposite of Sophocles’s λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην, with εἰρήνη corresponding to the adjj. and ἐλευθερία corresponding to the noun. πολλή is added, as often, to magnify, or complement, quality with quantity. In formulating the opposite of what we are released from—namely, what we are released into—Cephalus perhaps unwittingly suggests the notion of a release from toils (ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων), a euphemism for dying: cf.ἀπαλλαχθῆναι below, D1.
65
τῶν γε τοιούτων (C6), another infelicity of expression which at first seems to point back but then when we encounter the asyndeton at C7 (ἐπειδάν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ..., where M and correctors of F and D as well as Stobaeus have γάρ, a lectio facilior), its reference is turned forward toward δεσποτῶν πολλῶν καὶ μαινομένων (D1).
66
Potential ἔστι (D1), incorrectly unaccented in Burnet’s text.
67
δεσποτῶν πολλῶν καὶ μαινομένων (D1) is Cephalus’s redo of Sophocles’s more interestingly binary construction, λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην, somewhat flattened by his intervening formulation of the opposite, πολλὴ εἰρήνη καὶ ἐλευθερία.
68
τοιούτῳ (D6) effects another mild change of construction in midstream: “If a person is not balanced, both age and youth treat this sort harshly.” Contrast the alternative expressions, “Both age and youth treat harshly the sort that isn’t balanced,” and “If a person is not balanced, both age and youth treat him harshly.” Cephalus speaks in his apodosis as if he had done the protasis with a relative clause.
69
εὐφήμει (C2).
70
καὶ τούτων πέρι καί τῶν γε πρός τοὺς οἰκείους (D2) where γε means “to boot.” For καί γε adding an item unexpected or different from the previous, extending the conception beyond its usual limit and to a new level, cf. Charm.168E9-9A1(καὶ ἔτι γε); Crito 47B9-10; Gorg.450D6-7; H.Maj.295D3, 300E8-301A6; H.Min.368C4; Leg.679A4-6(καὶ μήν γε), 728D8-E1, 746D7-E2(καὶ πρός γε); Phdo 82B7; Rep.328A6(καὶ πρός γε),425B1-4, 438C3(καὶ ἔτι γε), 499B2, 598E1-2, 608B5-7; Tht.156B5, 175E7; and G.Billings, Art of Transition, 69. It appears to be a stylistic affectation of Protagoras’s, e.g.Prot.334AC, 351A, et passim. The anastrophe τούτων πέρι helps to hide an almost unmeaning doubling of the prepositions (i.e., περὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους). Cephalus needs the πρός (plus accusative) in order to insinuate that the problem with the οἰκεῖοι is how to meet their attack with a counterattack.
71
E.g., Ar.Ran.82.
72
With κόσμιος (D4), a synonym for σώφρων (399E11 and 403A7 and nn. ad locc.; Charm.159B2-3; Leg.802E8-10, 831E6-7), contrast their demonstrative griping (ὀλοφύρονται) and wailing (ὀδύρεσθαι); and with εὔκολος contrast their nervous anxiety (ἀγανακτεῖν) and ceaseless complaining (ὑμνεῖν).
73
At first Cephalus seems to grant their claim, but then brings us up short and tells us he grants only Socrates’s claim that they won’t grant his claim (οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται).
74
ἀλλά (E7) baldly changing the subject.
75
τῷ (E8): the definite article indicates the story is proverbial.
76
καὶ δή (330A3) moving to the target case.
77
The dative τοῖς μὴ πλουσίοις (A3) corresponds with the dative in which the Seriphian stood as indirect object of ἀπεκρίνατο. Cephalus assumes that the person who would say he’s happy because rich says so because he’s a poor man who is bearing old age with difficulty; but Socrates has suggested that it is the many who say this, not the poor. Cephalus’s inference is based on the assumption that the criticism is driven by envy.
78
ἐπιεικής (A6).
79
εὔκολος ἑαυτῷ (A6), here the opposite of χαλεπῶς φέρων (A5).
80
The tripartition is both a philosophical and a rhetorical topic. Within the Platonic corpus, explicitly or implicitly, cf. Alc.I 130E8-1C4, 133DE; Cleit.407B1-408A9; Eryx.393C4-D6; Euthyd.279A4-C4; Gorg.467E, 477A8-C5, 503E-504B, 511D1-2, 514A5-515A1ff; Lach.195E10-196A1; Leg.631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4, 697B2-6, 717C2-3, 724A7-B3, 743E3-4A3, 726, 743E, 870B1-6; Lys.207C1-D2; Meno 70A6-B1, 71B6-7, 78C6, 87E-88B; Phdo 68C1-3; Phdrs.239A2-240A8; Phlb.26B5-7(with B1-2), 48C7-E10; Rep.362B2-C6, 366C, 432A4-6, 591C1-D10, 618C8-D5; Symp.205D1-8; Tht.144E5-145B6ff. Outside Plato, cf. Arist.EE init., EN 1098B12-15, MM 1184B1-6, Pol.1323A21-7; Bacchyl.10.35-49; Cic. de fin.3.13.43, TD 5.27.76 & 5.30.85, de off.3.6.28; D.L.3.80-1; Hdt.1.29ff; Lys.1 sub fin.; Plut.de educ.lib.5Cff; Soph.fr.329; Stob.Ecl.2.7(136W); Theogn.255-6; Xen.Oec.1.1.13, Mem.1.5.3-4; In the rhetorical treatises, cf. Arist.Rhet.1360B25-8, ad Alex.1422A4-10 (cf.1440B15-20); Cic.ad Herr.3.10, Part.Or.22.74-5, Top.23.89, and cf. Walz Rhet.Gr.4.738.14-739.1, and Cope ad Arist.Rhet.2.21.5 (2.207-8). Cf. also Thompson ad Meno 87E, Shorey WPS 629 (ad Leg.679B).
81
ποῖ’ἐπεκτησάμην; (B1): for ποῖος expressing or feigning indignant surprise cf. Charm.174B4; Euthyd.291A1, 304E7; Gorg.490D10, E4; Lach.194D10; Tht.180B8, and n.1476.
82
τις (B1) mitigating the spatial metaphor of μέσος. Once again Cephalus makes a clever comparison structured by reversing points of view.
83
νῦν οὔσης (B6), echoing (ἡ) νῦν οὐσία (B4), Cephalus’s word for wealth.
84
ἀγαπᾶν (B6), expressing moderation and therefore giving moral content to the μέσος metaphor. Presumably Cephalus views his grandfather as too concerned, and his father as too insouciant, about money. Socrates next moves to matter of his namesake’s over-concern.
85
It is noteworthy that Cephalus is never said to be rich (even 330D2-3 infra falls short of this) though this is all that one notices about him, so that this is his οὐσία. The sacrifices he is performing both before (328C2) and after (331D6-9) this brief conversation are an extravagance that speaks louder than words.
86
Proleptic τε (C4) leaning back on the dative ταύτῃ, which recalls the dative διπλῇ and thereby indicates that τε will be meaning “both” in a both/and construction. The dative ᾗπερ below (C6) completes the construction.
87
σπουδάζουσιν (C5) goes beyond ἀσπάζειν and ἀγαπᾶν and suggests that a man like Cephalus’s grandfather, who loves to make money, may neglect his sons. A spendthrift like Cephalus’s father might likewise be faulted for neglecting his sons since he’s wasting the substance they would inherit. Socrates has perhaps revealed the reason why Cephalus wants to be in the middle between these two extremes. The conjecture by Groen van Prinsterer reported by Adam ad loc. (Platon.Prosopog.,111) and the emendation by Hemsterhuis cited in the ap.crit. by Burnet (i.e. Λυσίας for Λυσανίας at 330B5) is unnecessary ingenuity. From what Cephalus here tells us it is unlikely he would name any of his three sons after his father!
88
ποιήματα (C3): English has forgotten that the poet is etymologically a “maker,” and so the connection between making poems, making children and making money is less obvious; but to a Greek it is right beneath the surface. Thus the joke at Charm.162D2-3, in the context of Charmides’s defense of Critias’s definition of σωφροσύνη as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.
89
κατὰ τὴν χρείαν (C6) introduces the issue of money’s usefulness which is Socrates’s next topic.
90
συγγενέσθαι (C7), aorist rather than present. Contrast 329C2 above.
91
πάνυ μὲν οὖν (D1).
92
τοσόνδε (D1) the “first person” demonstrative adjective of quantity (contrast “second person” τοσοῦτον). Socrates is apologizing for asking one more question about money as if the question were bothering only himself.
93
ἀπολελαυκέναι (D2) perfect.
94
Thirty lines (330D4-331B7): cf. 329A1-D6.
95
ἐγγύς (D5) must go with οἴεσθαι rather than τελευτήσειν, despite the proximity to the afterworld that makes it more visible (below, E3). What the expression loses in logic it gains back in psychological verisimilitude, much like our expression, “death staring him in the face.”
96
οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι (D7), with proleptic τε, as above (C4) purchasing in advance a berth for a second step (here begun with καὶ αὐτός, E2). Though τε … καί usually links intimately related things, it may link unlikes also, including pure opposites which are after all two sides of one coin (H.Min.366A5, 369B3-4; Leg.885B1; Tht.199B8); complements (Prot.313D); alternatives (Leg.732C4); subject and object (Phdo 66A6); process and result (Gorg.478C2, Rep.341D8); ground and inference (Phdrs.254A2; Rep.334D3, 335B4); action and purpose (Rep.573B3); example and universal (Phdo 74D4-5; Rep.339E2, 362E5f, 374D1-2, 381A4); abstract and concrete (Phdo 87C2); metaphor and its meaning (Rep.472A5, 555D7-8, 564D10, 609A3-4); meaning and metaphor (Rep.509D2) act and evaluation of act (Gorg.460D2: an hendiadys, really); statement and explanation (Leg.867E6, 868D5; Rep.380C7 [cf. n. ad loc.]); and even strongly contrasting items where we might expect μέν / δέ (Euthyph.6D5 [satirizing perhaps a blind spot of Euthyphro’s]; Leg.687C10-11, 881A5-7; Rep.527A6).
97
στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν (E1-2). Placement of αὐτοῦ emphasizes τὴν ψυχήν as specifying the inward location of the tortured feeling. Two hundred Stephanus pages from now we will again be reading about a painful twisting of the soul, but there it will be τρέπειν rather than στρέφειν (περιτροπή, Book Seven).
98
δ’οὖν (E4) emphasizing the result by declaring moot any further controversy about the cause.
99
καὶ αὐτός (E2), in contrast with οἵ τε λεγόμενοι μῦθοι, the widely public stories. αὐτός stresses the solitary aspect of the experience. For the first time Cephalus talks about himself without a comparison to others, for a moment at least (cf. 331B6-7 and n.114, infra).
100
ὑποψίας … καὶ δείματος (E4) redoes δέος και φροντίς above (D6) in reverse order.
101
ἑαυτοῦ (E6), subjective genitive with ἀδικήματα. Its early placement again stresses the inward and meditative aspect of the experience that Cephalus is stressing.
102
Proleptic καί (E6) before ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων corresponds to καί before ζῇ, suggesting that ζῇ is a metonymy for daytime life as opposed to nighttime, when we sleep.
103
μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος (331A1), poetic: cf. συναορεῖ, 331A7. Cephalus is, and has been, working his language into the idiom of the Pindaric passage he is about to quote: στρέφουσι 330E1 / πολύστροφον, 331A8; ἐλπίδος, 331A1 / ἐλπίς, A8; ἡδεῖα, 331A2 / γλυκεῖα, A6; ἀεὶ πάρεστι, 331A2 / συναορεῖ, A7; μεστὸς γίγνεται, like being flooded at sea, 330E4 / κυβερνᾷ, 331A9. The double agenda, to make his own argument and to create a segue to the quote from Pindar, results in the run-on locution, ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, where he needs ἀγαθὴ to make the contrast with κακῆς above but also wants γηροτρόφος to anticipate the quotation below. Commentators not realizing Cephalus is painting himself into a corner, disagree whether to take ἀγαθὴ with γηροτρόφος or with ἐλπίς.
104
Pindar, frg.214 Bergk, Loeb edd. (both Sandys's and Race's) = 233Boeck = 256Turyn. ἐλπίς is perhaps hypostatized in Pindar’s hymnal manner (Synesius, de insomniis 17: ὕμνησε τὴν Ἐλπίδα ὁ Πίνδαρος). καί with a relative (ὡς) introducing an illustration, is otiose.
105
δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως (A4), terms of moral approbation much more distinct in meaning than the terms he has used up until now, since they represent cardinal virtues.
The cardinal virtues are traditionally four: δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ανδρεία, σοφία (e.g. Pindar N.3.76; Xen.Mem.3.9.1-5, 4.6.1-12; and, in non-speculative passages in Plato, Crat.411-414, passim; Euthyd.279B4; Gorg.507AC; Leg.630A8-B2, 631C5-D1, 957E2-3, 964B5-6, 965D1-2; Phdo 69C1-2; Rep.427E10-11, 443E5-4A2, 500D7-8). Sometimes other virtues, particularly ὁσιότης, appear instead of in addition to these four (Gorg.505B2-3, 507AC; Leg.837C6-7; Meno 74A4-6, 88A6ff; Phdo 114E5-5A1; Prot.330B4-6, 349B1-2, cf.359B2-4; Rep.395C4-5), but the quaternion is authoritative enough to support Socrates’s argument for the eliminative argument of Bk 4 below (427E6-432B5ff).
It is of course the burden of much Socratic investigation whether the several traditional virtues constitute a spectrum, a range, a plurality or a unity (cf. e.g. Prot.329B5-E2); but natural usage appears to allow one of them, δικαιοσύνη, to refer to virtue as a whole (Euthyphr.11E4-12D4; Gorg.477C2 (vs.B7-8); Leg.630C6, 957E2-3 (where it is treated as the virtual genus of the other three!); Meno 78D5; Phdrs.276C3, 277D10-E, 278A3-4; Polit.295E4-5; Prot.327B2; and cf. Theogn.147). Sometimes σοφία can be used in this way (e.g., Gorg.467E4; Leg.688B; Rep.585B13-C1), and sometimes the whole group of virtues might be referred to by the pair of these, as Lys.207CD, Soph.247B1-2. By far the commonest way to refer to the whole by a pair is, however, by the pair δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης: Gorg.479B8-C1,481A5, 507B2-4, 523A7-B1 (and B2); Meno 78D4; Phdo 75C9-D2; Phlb.39E10-11; Rep.458D8-E2, 461A4, 463D5, 479A5-8, 496D9-E1, 610B6 (cf.615B7), and cf.391A1-2; Tht.172A1-2 (cf.172B2-3). Cf. also the speech of Protagoras, Prot.322C7 (δίκη καὶ αἰδώς), Hes.WD 192, Tyrt.12.39f (=Theogn.937)], and Theogn. 291-2. This seems to be the function and meaning of Cephalus’s pair in the present text. It means what we mean when we say somebody is “decent and god-fearing,” but if we translate this way Socrates will not so easily be able to pick out δικαιοσύνη at 331C2.
106
δή (A10) moving to the target idea.
107
τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ (B1) Burnet needlessly reads καὶ κόσμιοι in addition, on very weak authority (one of three mss. of Stobaeus).
108
ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι (B2) denotes fraud, since deception and lying barely qualify as ἀδικήματα unless one profits from them. In law the elements of fraud are three: (1) intentional (2) deception for (3) gain.
109
The position of ἄκοντα (B2) indicates that the first μηδέ is not corresponsive with the second but emphatic. The point of this detail is not that one might have done the misdeed unwittingly—for such an error conscience is blind and wealth therefore useless—but that one can always afford to “err on the side of caution.” Looking back over one’s life one might recall an incident where he was “forced” to tell a “white lie” that, because white, was not justiciable. Now he can clear his conscience by making reparation for it. For ἄκων meaning against the will rather than unwittingly, cf. Arist.NE 1110B18,ff.
110
The construction (B1-4) is somewhat telescoped. According to the syntactical order, the coordinate conjunction μηδ’αὖ links the infinitive ἀπιέναι with the infinitives ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, but in terms of sense the latter infinitives, describing unjust acts, are continued by the participle ὀφείλοντα as if in analepsis (though in all strictness it is not unjust to owe, but to leave never having paid). The αὖ is therefore mildly illative.
111
ἔπειτα (B3) can be used (as also εἶτα) to link a circumstantial participle to an ordinate verb (here, ἀπιέναι), to stress that regardless of the nature of the participial circumstance the action of the participle precedes that of the ordinate verb (‘having done this he then [ἔπειτα] does that:’ cf. Phdo 70E7, 82C8). The reason for making the temporal sequence explicit is often that the occurrence of the first event should have or might have obviated the occurrence of the second, in which case the circumstantial participle is concessive and ἔπειτα means “still” instead of “then,” as at Apol.20C7; Charm.163A7; Gorg.456D7, 457B1 (remembered by Socrates at 460D3), 461E3, 519E5, 527D6; Lach.192B7; Phdo 90D1 (cf. Burnet ad loc.); Prot.341E4, 343D1, 358C1; Rep.336E8, 337E5 [and n.302 ad loc.], 434B1). My explanation is based on Stallbaum’s remarks ad Phdo.70E.
112
θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα (B2-3): Dividing the debt into debts to gods and debts to men (sacrifices and money) continues the dyadic representation of virtuous living that Cephalus had begun with δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως above, 331A4.
113
συμβάλλεται (B5) has mercantile overtones (cf. συμβόλαια, 333A12, infra).
114
From χρησιμώτατον (B7) it is clear that Cephalus is talking about buying one’s way out of injustices in this world in order to avoid the more heinous penalties fabled to take place in the other. The range of injustices that can be so recompensed, namely, fraud and forfeiture, is however severely narrow. Cephalus is groping to extend the importance of what he has—wealth—to buy off the one thing he cannot manage to accept—his own demise. Beneath the surface old age has deprived him of his composure after all. He closes by contrasting himself with a rich man without his wits about him, who would presumably keep the money he owes or stole.
115
πάγκαλως … λέγεις (C1).
116
τοῦτο δ’αὐτό (C1) undercuts his general praise of the speech in a way we recognize as Socratic. He introduces his objection gently, by isolating (αὐτό, 331C1) a part of what Cephalus has said; but just as in the case of the σμικρόν τι of the Protagoras (329B6), to answer the question he asks will require, motivate, structure and constitute the entirety of the ensuing conversation.
117
τὴν δικαιοσύνην (C2): Without apology Socrates chooses only δικαίως from Cephalus’s (perhaps loosely intended) doublet, δίκαίως καὶ ὁσίως (A4: cf. n. ad loc.), and then isolates it so as to make it a topic for discussion (using τοῦτο δ’ἀυτό: cf. Gorg.453B2 for the expression and the idea, and cf. n.273 ad 336C6-D2, infra). Cephalus is more interested in piety, however, and perhaps more interested in acting piously than talking about it, and so he takes the first opportunity to depart πρὸς τὰ ἱερά (331D9).
118
αὐτὰ ταῦτα (C4), without further qualification, in and by themselves.
119
δικαίως / ἀδίκως (C4): The alternatives as usual in moral contexts ignore the tertium. Cf. n.164, infra.
120
τοιόνδε (C5), “first person” demonstrative adjective of quality: cf. τοσόνδε, 330D1.
121
φίλου ἀνδρός (C6), here a natural and unexceptional specification, will soon (332A9) have a dispositive role.
122
ἀπαιτοῖ (C6).
123
μανείς (C6) suggests only a passing emotional state, not the permanent insanity one often finds in translations. μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι (E9 and 332A4-5) is even more circumstantial since it dispenses with etiology. What is at stake in the distinction is Socrates’s stress on the essentially transient or “situational” aspect of human affairs.
124
οὐδ’αὖ (C8): being a friend he would neither give it back nor tell him the truth about where it is, unlike the proverbial whistle-blower whose moral scrupulosity requires him to ruin his associates. οὐδ’αὖ echoes μηδ’αὖ at B2: Socrates’s responses characteristically reveal him to be a good listener. Cf. 340C9 and n.
125
πάντα ἐθέλων τἀληθῆ λέγειν (C8-9) redoes μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι (B1-2).
126
Socrates’s term is ὅρος (D2). The metaphor is that of a boundary line, by lying within which something would be just.
127
παραδιδόναι (D6), one converse of παραλαμβάνειν (330A8, B4). The other is καταλείπειν (330B6), which conceives of the subject having died.
128
ὑμῖν (D6) may address the whole group and not just the two to whom he is talking.
129
ἤδη (D7).
130
τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι (D7). It would seem unlikely that, but would be quite significant if, Cephalus intends now to perform another sacrifice having completed one just moments before (328C2). Nobody asks.
131
γε (D8) jokingly asserts or acknowledges his rights to this dubious inheritance.
132
ἅμα (D9).
133
κληρονόμος (D8): the conceit of inheritance nicely fits the usual protocol of Socratic discourse whereby the role of answerer can be passed on to another. Cf.Charm.162E; Phlb.12A; Prot.331A. Cf. also the notion of paying interest on an account deferred: 504B, infra.
134
τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιον (E3-4). No extant line of Simonides says this, in these or so many words. Adam’s inferences (ad.loc.) from the absence of such are therefore baseless.
135
μέντοι (E6) heaped on μέντοι (E5).
136
ὁτῳοῦν (E9) is a strong asseveration.
137
μή (E9) makes the circumstantial participle conditional, so that together with ὁτῳοῦν we have the protasis of a present general condition (ἀποδιδόναι representing a present indicative in the apodosis).
138
καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν που (332A1): The intimate relationship between “ought” and “own” is a blind spot that goes back to the I.E. root *εικ, whence Eigentum, for which compare the Latinate calque, “property.”
139
δέ γε (A4) introducing a minor premise. The bare optative may be understood either as representing subjunctive with ἄν in a present general condition (note generalizing ὁπωστιοῦν, echoing ὁτῳοῦν, 331E9) in virtual past tense oratio obliqua (referring to the time “we asserted” this denial [i.e., 331C5-8: cf.331E8]), or more easily as the protasis of a past general condition (ἦν to be understood with ἀποδοτέον), Socrates treating the present general version of the assertion just above (331E9f) as equivalent to the future less vivid version he had used in 331C5-9, and then casting it into the past because when he asserted it.
Placing the propositional contents of a premise into the past in order to indicate that it was agreed to earlier (Smyth’s “philosophical imperfect,” §1903) is the usual dialogic shorthand when the “questioner” is re-adducing what the “answerer” has already agreed to (cf.n.586 ad 350C7). The tense, that is, reminds the “answerer” that he must agree or grant the point, or else change his position. Adam’s “oratio obliqua of self-quotation” (ad loc.) is a misleading portrayal of the idiom, and Goodwin’s converting the sentence into a future less vivid condition (GMT §555) misses it entirely.
140
τὰ ὀφειλόμενα (A8): The proleptic placement suggests that the controversial aspect of Simonides’s assertion might lie in these words; and Polemarchus picks up the suggestion by telling us what Simonides thinks ὀφείλειν ought to mean in this connection (A9-10).
141
μηδέν (A10) is emphatic: “οὐ denies the fact, μή the conception” (Gildersleeve).
142
μανθάνω (A11), idiomatic: “I get it.” The speaker announces he has perceived why or with what warrant his interlocutor has said what he has just said, and then (with ὅτι) states what this is (cf. 372E2 and n.1054).Always included is a more or less voluntary indication to the interlocutor that his meaning was not immediately evident, but now is perhaps too evident: Polemarchus has foisted conventional morality onto the wisdom poet!
143
χρυσίον (A12): the weapon has been replaced by an item one more usually places into another’s custody.
144
ἐάνπερ (A12).
145
ὅ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς (B6): With limitative γε he acknowledges that the term ὀφειλόμενον needs to be newly delimited, and then, with δέ and repeated γε, he gives the new delimitation. Against the δέ γε of all the mss., Adam and Shorey read δέ (a scribitur in Ven.184 preferred by Bekker, though Burnet and Chambry do not even place it into their app.critt.) arguing that the collocation δέ γε is inappropriate here, but the second γε, like the third one Polemarchus adds two words later, merely continues the force of the first one.
146
The suddenness is in ἄρα (B9); the feigning is in αἰνίττεσθαι, which like μανθάνειν above provides Socrates a means to show the answerer what he is freighted with defending (“answering for”). After all, Polemarchus has advocated the position of Simonides on the poet’s authority (cf. πείθεσθαι, 331D5). He is arguing Simonides’s position and Socrates has made Polemarchus responsible for the position himself only to the extent that Polemarchus is telling what about Simonides’s statement he approves of. When Polemarchus under the force of the ἔλεγχος has to modify Simonides’s position, in all likelihood he is improvising a solution without owning up that the solution is his own. If so, attempts to find lines in Simonides that represent this second position (e.g. Adam [who had helped Polemarchus by treating even his first citation of Simonides’s position as being this second one despite the words in Plato’s text {n.ad 331E31}] citing Xen.Hiero 2.2) are unneeded.
147
διενοεῖτο (C1).
148
τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι (C2): Socrates carefully repeats Polemarchus’s quotation of Simonides verbatim (331E3-4), changing only this one word, as if it were mere semantics (ὠνόμασεν, C3).
149
ἀλλὰ τί οἴει (C4). The emendations don’t help. Polemarchus seems to mean, “Obviously—what else do you think?” boasting that he himself understood all along when certainly he did not. Socrates in his usual manner ignores the bait and takes his interlocutor seriously (here, literally), and tells him what he thinks by starting an imaginary elenchus of Simonides.
150
Solitary as before, and self-fulfilling as we now know.
151
ἐξαγγέλλεις, 328E7; πυθοίμην, 328E4; πυνθάνεσθαι, 328E2.
152
ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; (C6-7). The καί in ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον is exegetical: “what’s ‘owed,’ i.e., what’s appropriate, which is what he meant.” Socrates re-uses this formula below (C11). The question introduces a matrix to be filled in with examples.
153
δῆλον ὅτι (C9). More often Socrates’s interlocutor does not understand how to fill in the matrix: e.g. 382A7-9, 602C1-5. Cf. also 353C5-6, 510C2, 597D13, 601E5, 618C8-D5.
154
I.e, the προσῆκον.
155
ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα (D1). The exact meaning of ὄψον will become important below (372C2).
156
οὖν δή (D2): That he has moved on to the target is not only revealed by the content of the question but is also announced by formal “discourse markers,” here the connective particle ον and the δή that indicates a before-and-after point in the discourse (for which compare ἤδη). For δή used in this way with connective particle δέ, cf. Alc.I 111E11; Charm.169E4; Leg.963B4; Phdo 65A9; Prot.311D1, 312A1, 312E2; Rep.333A10, 342A1, 349C4, 439A1, 470E4, 523E3; Soph.221D1; Thg.123C6, 123D15, 126C3; Tht.185C4 (returning to true subject after an irreal warmup), 189A6. With connective ἀλλὰ, Rep.335C14; with connective τε, Rep.439D2-3; without connective, Charm.166B5; Symp.199E6.
For δή announcing the conclusion of an argument ex contrariis, Rep.374C2; of a sorites, Rep.351E6; of an analogy (which is tantamount to induction from one case), Leg.808D3, 962A9, cf.899B3; Polit.294E4, 296C4, 296C8. The strength of this particle to indicate the move to the target is shown in Rep.427D1, where it resumes a topic that has not been mentioned for pages. Contrast δὲ δή introducing surprised question, Gorg. 452B4, 452C3 (and Denniston ad loc., 59); and marking a transition not to the target but (like δή infixed in lists [supra, n.38]) to a new class of examples: Crito 49C2.
157
N.b., εἰ … δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν … τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις (D4-5).
158
Re-use of an exemplary case as a stepping stone to a new or higher level is a common pedagogical technique in real life and in the Socratic epagoge. Crat.387-8 (τέμνειν); Leg.631C1-D1 (dovetailing by means of πλοῦτος), 694E6-7 (ποίμνια / πρόβατα), 906C4-6 (adapting material from the list of ἄρχοντες at 905E); Minos 313B-314,ff (re-use of Phoenix); Phdrs.268A8-269D8 (re-use of Pericles); Tht.184D7ff and 185A4ff (eyes and ears); Symp.199D (re-use of πατήρ).
159
Note also that though he repeats the doctor he does not repeat the cook (μάγειρος, C11-12). The teacher must always move on to new illustrative examples lest a single example begin to accrue the dignity of the precept. By far the most natural pattern in the use of exemplary material as the argument proceeds forward is therefore “overlapping substitution:” 352D8-353E11(eyes/ears are repeated but the knife is dropped), 419A5-6 (redone at 420E1-421A2), 444C5-E6ff, 479A1-8 (cf.475E9-6A5); Charm.165E-166B (AB in question and AC in answer), 170AC (sim.); Gorg.450D6-7 redone at 451B1ff (where πεττευτική is dropped); Leg.643B7-C2, 709A3-7 and B2-3, 961D1-962A9; Phdo 70E4-71A10 (redone with overlap substitution at 71B2); Prot.311B5-C7 (cf.E2-3), 319BD; Symp.200BD; Tht.147B (and Campbell, with more examples, ad loc., defended the manuscripts against a streamlining emendation: “It is in Plato’s manner to surprise us with a fresh example at each step of the argument instead of dwelling upon one already adduced”). Leg.889B6-8 and 892B3-4 is noteworthy since the latter passage purports to refer back to the former but alters the contents with overlapping substitution.
160
ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμάχειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (E5).
161
Reading προσπολεμεῖν (E5) with mss. ADM rather than the προπολεμεῖν of F (which would be an exegetical synonym for συμμάχειν and like κάμνοντας above [D10] would specify only the treatment of friends). Chiastic order between question and answer (AB,BA) is just as natural as, but more common than, repetition of the order of the question in the answer (AB,AB). It is a case of the chiasm of before and after (cf. n.18). Adam’s note reveals a presumption that epagogic word order must observe the niceties of symmetry, which we are taking pains herewith to disprove.
162
ἆρα (E11) marking the target by making it a question, the two examples being presented as statements. The καὶ (ibid.) is correlative.
163
The single expression πολεμοῦσι (E11) covers both συμμάχειν and προσπολεμεῖν, just as κίνδυνος above had covered both salvation and wreckage.
164
ἄχρηστος (E11) had been used in the two example-statements (explicit in E7; understood in E9), but when it is used with ὁ δίκαιος it suddenly sounds different and has a new connotation of failing to be a χρήσιμος ἀνήρ. χρήσιμος, like δίκαιος, and like Cephalus’s terms κόσμιος (329D4) and ἐπιεικής (330A5, 331B1), are terms widely used in causal speech. Although their users might not be able to define justice or usefulness, the terms fall easily from their lips as terms of approbation (just as the of them is merely an insult). In the vocabulary of moral valuation the tertium is often ignored in this way (viz. when one says a man is not moral he most often means by a litotes to say that he is immoral).
165
τοῦτο (E12) referring to the proximate question, in contrast to the ones that came before. It is narrow but true to say that the questioner’s job in a dialectical conversation is to secure yes-answers (so Arist.Topics: cf. B.Einarson AJP 57[1936]33-54 and 151-72), since yes answers (and, of course, no-answers to questions that expect no) allow him to continue accumulating the propositions that will constitute a συμπέρασμα. At the same time, the answerer expects to say yes—that is, he expects to be asked questions whose answer is obvious, and indeed must give the obvious answer (H.Maj.304A3, cf. Erastae 138DE)—and then he suddenly discovers he has granted enough to be refuted; he must answer yes if the proposition is a correct one. Dialectical questioning fails when the answerer says no, and it turns to eristic when the answerer tries to say no.
166
Cf. 333E1ff. Many of Socrates’s elenchi end, as this one does, in a reductio ad absurdum. The result is absurd not because it contradicts another of the answerer’s premises (in this case he will have a choice which one to rescind or modify) but because it contradicts a proposition absurd to deny. Since it is never necessary to assert a proposition that “goes without saying” such propositions remain implicit until as here an argument leads to their contradictory.
167
ἄρα (E13).
168
The force of καὶ γάρ (333A2), as at 340A9 and Euthyph.14A1, is to concede the truth of the answer only to deny its value as an answer: “To say justice is useful in peace tells me little, since farming is also useful—useful in its case at least (γε) for the acquisition of food.”
169
πρός γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν (A4) Socrates gently indicates the connection by using πρός plus accusative again, emphasized by γε.
170
Note δὲ δή (A10).
171
In using πρός in his answer (A12) he follows suit with the form of the question.
172
δέ (A13): a connective instead of an interrogative particle at the beginning of his “question” presumes his interlocutor knows he will be asking a question, as often (335B6, 376E11, 377A1). Compare ἄν carried forward” (cf.382D11 and n.1299) Contrast ἆρ’ οὖν which he next uses.
173
This is corroborated in the sequel, which focusses on the role of the κοινωνός. The point of the substitution is that contractual relationships require fairness but partnerships presume it. D.J.Allen’s notion of a “partnership between buyer and seller” makes nonsense of all three of these terms.
174
δῆτα (A14) acknowledges that he is giving the response Socrates is expecting, and thus indicates he believes that Socrates’s presumption to be clarifying his meaning is correct.
175
Compare 333B1-2 (ἆρ’ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν) with 332D10-11 (τίς δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγιείαν). We have χρήσιμος instead of δυνατός, and εἰς instead of πρός; and instead of the “helping friends and harming enemies” formula we have simply “partnership” (κοινωνός).
176
That the κοινωνός is a friend is implicit. Note that in addition to being χρήσιμος the κοινωνός is stipulated to be ἀγαθός (B1, the adjective being attributive). Addition of this term is meant to memorialize Polemarchus’s moral aversion to the inference that the δίκαιος might be ἄχρηστος. Socrates echoes the stipulation in the subsequent example-questions (ἀμείνων [B5,B7]), but then drops it.
177
What makes it obvious is the etymological connection between πεττεία and πεττευτικός. As there is a rhetorical, there is also a dialectical figura etymologica. This is the first one we have encountered in the dialogue so far. Often a superficial use of etymology leads to error: Rep.348C5 (treating κακοηθεία as the opposite of εὐηθεία); 439E5 (θυμοειδές / ἐπιθυμία). Cf. n. ad 375A2-3.
178
Playing draughts is not a throwaway item, however. It is one of Socrates’s favorite examples for mental activity, respectable therefore in some respects although not in others. It was invented by Theuth alongside mathematics and writing (Phdrs.274CD); it enjoys pride of place therefore alongside geometry and the rest (Gorg.450D6-7 [cf. Dodds ad loc.]; Leg.820C7, 820D1-2; Polit.299E1). It can stand for a kind of knowledge that does not improve the soul (Charm.174B), and a kind of knowledge that jokingly vies with virtue for being hard to teach (Alc.I, 110E). At 374C5-7 below it is compared with the art of war in an a fortiori argument.
179
ἀλλά (B4) introduces the question because like the last one it is designed to incite resistance and get a “No” answer.
180
τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ (B5): In place of a choice between two we have a comparison between two, with comparative adjectives replacing adjectives in the positive grade, and a genitive of comparison replacing an (B2) that had meant “or else.”
181
In English we do refer to a mason as a bricklayer but never to a chessplayer as a pawnplacer.
182
τε (B8) is noteworthy, as an unobtrusive (because enclitic) wedge making a place for an otherwise unexpected καί which in turn (because proclitic) creates a berth for the new item, cithera-playing. For this τε cf. Leg.633C1.
183
For other instances of clinching the point with an accelerated last minute addition of exemplary material after the conclusion is reached, cf. Charm.168E9f; Crito 47B9-10 (eating and drinking added [with γε]); Lach.193AC (a single non-military example); Leg.658A7 (ἱππικόν added to imitate the indiscriminateness of the contest maker), 716D2-3 (but note mss.); Lysis 220A1-6; Phdo 64D (clothes), 96D8-E1; Polit.284E4-5, 293B5-6 (εἴτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες); Prot.332B6-C8 (where adding τῇ φωνῇ clinches the point by disambiguating the last example), 356C5-8 (adding acoustics); Rep.340D2-7 (γραμματιστής), 475E1(τεχνυδρίων added after harder parallels are excluded).
Sometimes the last minute addition actually begins a transition to something new, as when at Gorg.475A1-2 the addition of the new item μαθήματα to the list from 474D3-4 moves the interlocutor to volunteer a generalization; or as when the addition of γυμναστής at Leg.720E2-3 begins to free us from the paradigm of the doctor so that we can move on to that of the lawgiver; or as when the elaboration of the conclusion elicits a transitional objection from Glaucon, at Rep.475B11-C8. Compare also the addition of sleeping and waking to the other pairs of opposites at Phdo 71C1-2 and, at Charm.161D-162A, the re-instantiation of the principle reached with new examples that usher in the next step of the argument.
Related is the better known and much more commonly employed technique, dubbed “cumulative illustration” by Campbell (Rep.2.259), the technique of moving through exemplary material at an accelerated rate before drawing the conclusion (e.g., Rep.438B4-C4, 507C1-5), including generalization or lavishing particularization of the last item (e.g., Phdo 70E6-71A10; Phileb.21D9-10). For a fuller treatment of this range of phenomena cf. n.202).
184
We are right back at the dilemma of placing one’s possessions in the hands of another (παρακαταθέσθαι, 331E9 and 332A12), except that there it was gold (332A12) and here it is silver. Does Polemarchus not yet realize this?
185
πλήν γ’ ἴσως (B11).
186
I.e., when it is to be spent rather than placed. Clearly Polemarchus did not mean by θέσις ἀργυμίου a decision whose hands to place it in!
187
κοινῇ (B12), an adverb, reproduces κοινωνός.
188
That the κοινωνός is a consultant, rather than a client or a venture partner with whom one might consummate a συμβόλαιον, becomes crystal clear at this point, and with it the need to clarify συμβόλαια with κοινωνήματα at A13.
189
πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι (B11): Socrates’s objection-question-form places χρῆσθαι, as a new general heading, into the position of the εἰς τί (for which he has reverted to πρὸς τί) and then instantiates it (buying or selling a horse), and suggests which κοινωνός would be better than the just man in that instance (ὁ ἱππικός). Notably, the instantiation is done with a present general conditional protasis, itself introduced in a mild anacoluthon which I have reproduced in my paraphrase (ὥσπερ [vel.sim.] is wanting).
190
καὶ μὴν... γε (C3), following πλήν γε in the previous question, shows that this question threatens further (καί) damage to Polemarchus’s position.
191
ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης (C3): the acceleration gotten by suggesting two terms when only one is needed is ominous.
192
Announced by οὖν (C5).
193
In its first articulation the criterion was τὸ χρήσιμον (332E13), arising as an objection to ἄχρηστος (332E11), which Polemarchus found morally derogatory. Socrates humored this objection by adding ἀγαθός to χρήσιμος at B1 (cf. n. ad loc.). In his next question he retained both adjectives in a comparative formulation (B4-5), and in the next he reduced them to the single comparative ἀμείνων (B7). In the last phase of the argument (B11-here) his question-form did not need to make the adjective explicit and he used none (C1: ὁ ἱππικός [sc.ἀμείνων κοινωνός ἐστι]); ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης [sc. ἀμείνονες κοινωνοί εἰσιν]). Here, as is appropriate in the definitive and concluding question (which we should call the συμπέρασμα), he reverts to the original formulation, speaks amply, and leaves out the “scire licets.”
194
ἢ χρυσίῳ (C5): an instance of the technique noted above (n.183), where the last minute addition facilitates a transition, this time a reversion to the original formulation of 332A11-B3.
195
παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι (C7): cf. 331E9 and 332A12. The double infinitive describes the activities of the two κοινωνοί, one man putting it into the custody of the other and the other keeping it safe for him.
196
ἄρα with ὅταν (C11).
197
πάνυ γε (C10) vs. κινδυνεύει (D2).
198
καὶ ὅταν (D3).
199
καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ (D4). The action is useful to the depositor, but the usefulness is inherent within the act of guarding, whoever does it.
200
φαίνεται (D5).
201
φήσεις (D6), assert or declare to be true a proposition voiced by another, as at 377E8, whence οὔ φημι means “deny.”
202
Note the pacing of the examples, first one (C11f), and then another with expanded articulation of the question (expanded both by καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ and by the ὅταν δέ clause, D3-4), then the expanded articulation applied to two examples simultaneously (D6-8), then the generalization (D10-11).Moreover, the new examples, shield and lyre, range back and re-use previous exemplary material (cithera, B8; war, 332E5), widening thereby the application of the current result.
For this and other pacing strategies cf.(with notes) 334C12, 353C5-6, 397E6-7, 437B1-4, 438B4-C4, 442E4-3A10, 455E6-6A12 (where note the freedom in the development of cases), 507C1-5; Charm.168BD, 173DE; Crat.390B1-C5; Euthyd.298D; Gorg.495E6-6B5; Ion 540B6-D2; Leg.643B8-C1, 709B2-3; Phdo 70E6-71A10, 75C9-D2ff, 90A4-9, 105D13ff; Soph.258B10-C3 (where the mss. readings exhibit pacing and emendation is unnecessary); Tht.188D7-9A14; Tim.82A8-B2.
203
φυλάττειν (D6, repeated from D3), is here elaborated by καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι adduced from C8 as the original warrant for φυλάττειν at D3, with χρῆσθαι placed at the end of the protasis so as to maximize the connection with the usefulness of justice, here the first word of the apodosis (D7). The noose tightens.
204
ἀνάγκη (D9): The necessity he refers to pertains only to the “analytic” truths that a musician uses the lyre and a soldier the shield. ἀναγκή and ἀναγκαῖον are often used of logical truths and truths by definition (353E4, 443C3, 458D2; Charm.168C3; Phdo 87E1; Prot.332B1). By a conversational convention he agrees to the whole by agreeing to the last (as 374D7, 433C3, 462D4, 463B13, 477E2, 495C7, 529D4-6, and 611A10 [τοῦτο denying the whole by denying the last]; Gorg.453D10-11; Prot.333E5-4A2, 354B), to which compare the convention of answering a series of questions in reverse order (as Charm.169D5-8, D9; Euthyph.2B3, 10B3; Leg.890E6ff [and England ad loc.]; Phlb.54A6; Rep.462D6-7). Cf. Riddell, Digest §§305-6.
205
οὐκ … πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον (E1): From above (332E11-12), that justice should be useless is an absurdity. That same conclusion is here mitigated by understatement.
206
τόδε τι (E3): It is noteworthy that he does not pause to secure the answerer’s agreement to the conclusion but moves on, owning up to the fact that it is with an idea of his own (first person demonstrative). Soon enough we will see where he is going, and what is going on.
207
ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ (E3-4) chooses either the wrong genus (μάχῃ should have been ἀγῶνι) or the wrong species (πυκτικῇ should have been ὁπλητικῇ) but then quickly makes the error moot by generalizing with εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ. Campbell’s comment that πυκτική is “added to vary the notion of μάχη from ὁπλητική,” notices the awkwardness, but his solution doesn’t help since by playing the role of the genus, μάχη retains more of ὁπλητική than it leaves behind.
208
I place a comma after λαθεῖν and read ἐμποιῆσαι (E7), with all mss. To take νόσον as the object of λαθεῖν (Jowett ad loc. calls it a personification) is easier than breaking the parallelism of οὗτος with οὗτος above and ὅσπερ below, and avoids the awkward suggestion that λαθεῖν rather than ἐμποιῆσαι is being contrasted with φυλάξασθαι. Cf. κλέψαι below taking πράξεις. The parallelism is improved by reading καί before ἐμποιῆσαι, read by Stallbaum with the note “in multis codicis abest.” It is conversely reported by Adam as the reading of the corrector of Venetus 185 (Burnet’s D) and of the Monacensis 237. Slings attributes it only to the former. All notice of the reading has since been dropped in Burnet and in Chambry.
209
τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ([sc.ἀγαθὸς] κλέψαι) καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις (334A2-3), another awkward list due to καί proleptic with βουλεύματα in interrupted attributive position after τά, but followed by correlative καί and a new article that renews the attributive position. κλέψαι is as awkward taking τὰς πράξεις (esp. after taking τὰ βουλεύματα) as λαθεῖν was taking νόσον above. To point out with Campbell (ad loc.) that κλέψαι can mean steal as well as overtake recognizes the problem but burdens us with a far-fetched zeugma.
210
ἀναπέφανται (A10). Both the prefix and the tense express surprise at the conclusion.
While φαίνεσθαι with infinitive in oratio obliqua designates uncertainty, or the sense that more thinking is needed, with the participle (the construction with verbs of perception) it can designate an assertion as “perceived” (to be true) at some moment during or at some place in the dialectical process and rethinking is no longer necessary. This dialectical use of the verb is one of many evidences that the conversation is viewed as an event or an experience. To think of the contents of an ongoing conversation in this way and to “follow the logos whithersoever it may lead” resembles and anticipates Hegel’s concept of phenomenology. Cf. n.1446.
For instances of the term, cf. Alc.I 112D8-9; Charm.154D4-5, 172A8; Crat.387D1-2; Crito 48D3; Gorg.460E1-2, 481B5, 495B4-5, 508E7, 517A4; Euthyd.282A2, 289A3, 297A6; Euthyph.9C8; H.Maj.291C8, 294E7-9 (with elaboration of the metaphor), 300D6 and 7, 302D6; H.Min.369B3, 371E7 (with ἄρτι); Ion 541E8; Lach.193D2 (with ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν); Leg.646D8, 896C6; Lys.220A4, 220E3, 220E4; Phdo 94C9 (with νῦν); Phdrs.245C2, 261D7-8; Prot.333B5-6, 355B6, 357A6, 360C3; Rep.335E5, 336A9-10, 350C10, 441A5-6, 445B3-4, 587A13, 612D8; Soph.232B3-4, 233C11, 258A7-8, 260B7-8, 264C1; Tht.179B8-9, 181B2, 181E6. 190E3, 5. It can be so used absolutely (without oratio obliqua): Charm.166D9 (prob. = “as it appears to you at the moment” cf.Rep.337C5), 175B1; Crito 46D6; Euthyd.289D10; Gorg.527E2; Rep.434E3-5A3 (elaborating the metaphor), 484A2, 487B7, 491C8, 602D6; Soph.231B6-7 (παραφανέντι; cf.φάντασμα, infra 232A2-3), 256D4, 264C11; Tht.157D4, 183A4, 199C8 (παραφαίνεσθαι). It can be used in a personal construction (e.g., “We will become obvious being wrong”): Euthyd.282A2; 294E7-9; Leg.898D6-7; Lys.220B1; Prot.313C2; Tht.165C8, 181B2. Construction with the participle of εἶναι is often not made explicit: Crito 48C1; Gorg.457D4 (with νῦν), 478E1, 479D2, 508E7 (where the metaphor is spatial rather than temporal); Euthyd.292B7; H.Maj.293B5, 297C6 (mildly contrasted with δοκεῖν), 297D3 (with ἄρτι), 303E12 (with νυνδή); H.Min.375D5; Leg.896B1, 899B6; Lys.218B5; Phdo 76A1; Phlb.11D11, E1, 21A1, 31A5, 66A9, 66E8, 67A3; Polit.268B8, 305C10; Prot.351E5, 355B6; Rep.383A1, 351A4, 440E2, 464B5, 478D11-12, 584A2 and 3 (cf.φαντάσματα, infra A7-10), 602D6, 611B7; Soph.224D2, 233C8; Tht.151E2, 157D3 (cf.φάντασμα, 155A2). At Rep.454D it takes participle in the μέν and infinitive in the δέ clause, the latter perhaps by an attraction from the ensuing articular infinitives.
For dialectical φάινεσθαι with prefix ἀνα- acknowledging the change of perspective caused by the discovery, cf. Charm.175D5 (after B1); Gorg.514A4, H.Min.369B3, Ion 541E8; Leg.896B1; Lys.220E4; Polit.305C10; Rep.350C10, 484A2, 487B7; Soph.224D2, 233C11, 260B7-8; Tht.157D3,164C3. For use of the perfect πεφάσθαι cf. Rep.410A6, 464B5, 478D11-12; Soph.231B9-C2, 264C1; for ἀναπεφάσθαι cf. Charm.160D3, 172A8; H.Min.369B3, Phdrs.245E2, 261D7-8; Rep.350C10; Soph.233C11. With prefix προ- cf. 545B1, Charm.173A3.
There is a “dialectical” γίγνεσθαι as well, depicting a position as arising (as a truth) in the dialectical process (Gorg.459A7, 478D7, 494D7, 512D5; Lys.219B7; etc.). The two idioms are combined at Tht.186E12: καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ὄν.
211
καὶ κινδυνεύεις … μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό (A10-11): As the sloppy language indicates the argument is merely a jocular appendix to the main reductio by which Socrates stealthily races to the conclusion that the just man is a thief. The three cases simply exemplify the general principle of the μία δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, and it is on the force of this general principle—though, as often, it is not enunciated as such -- that the just man, qua guard, becomes thief.
212
He simply steps forward with καί (A10), just as he had moved abruptly into the argument he has just finished with τόδε δέ (333E3).
213
Αὐτόλυκος (B1), “Very-wolf,” quoting H.Od.19.395-6.
214
τοῦτο (B8), second person demonstrative, quoting Socrates’s μέντοι clause (B5) which for the first time used this language of ὠφελία and βλάβη.
215
With λέγεις (C1) Socrates continues ἔλεγες (B5) and ἔλεγον (B6), emphasizing that the position Polemarchus is taking is his own.
216
δοκεῖν in Socrates’s question (C1,C2), easily pairs up with the contrasting εἶναι (ὄντας, C2) because weak; ἡγεῖσθαι (in Polemarchus’s answer, C4) is a stronger term. “Feel” in English gets the relevant weakness of δοκεῖν. On the different modality of these terms cf. L.Bodin, Lire le Protagoras (Paris 1975).
217
That is, it is not that I like him (φιλῶ) because he is a friend (φίλος) but that he is a friend (φίλος) because I like him (φιλῶ), for his worth.
218
Substitution of πονηρούς (C12) for κακοί (C10) is also a reversion to the πονηρούς of C5 for which κακοί had been a substitute. Varying the terms used for the same idea is part of dialectical pacing.
219
Polemarchus’s φαίνεται (D2) denotes the restricted sense of mere appearance, to be distinguished from “dialectical” φαίνεται.
220
οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι (D3), γε causal. Goodness in the relation of man to man has been identified with justice, for purposes of the present conversation, ever since Cephalus’s casual assertion at 331A4. Socrates relied on it at 331C1ff.
221
δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἵοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν (D3): τε καί is illative, linking ground and inference (cf. n.ad 330D7). The inference is almost tautological but lays the suggestion that the question is about to be begged. μή rather than οὐ for the essential nature rather than the fact.
222
ἀληθῆ (D4) the truth of the proposition is independent of the context, in the manner of the minor premise.
223
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (D5), reminding him again.
224
μηδέν (D5) brought forward from μή (D3). The concept of the enemy is exactly that he has done or will do me some harm; and it has only been on this basis that one felt justified to treat him ill. οἱ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντες are people from whom one can expect no harm, and are therefore non-enemies.
225
At the same time that he reduces Polemarchus’s position to paradox (note the emphasis he achieves by juxtaposition ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον, D5), Socrates skirts a petitio principii, since regardless what the good of justice and the evil of injustice are, it cannot be right to return evil to someone who does you no evil.
226
μηδαμῶς (D7), as if he felt the sting of the μή's Socrates had been using.
227
πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος (D7-8): he means of course that it would be πονηρόν rather than δίκαιον to mistreat persons who aren’t unjust, and by a loose inference πονηρόν rather than δίκαιον to assert the opposite. Just as at 332E12 he refused the implication that the δίκαιος should be ἄχρηστος as being distasteful (cf. n.193, 176), he here allows his moral sensibilities to settle his mind absent the logic, the way most people do. Another person might say, “That conclusion is false; one of the premises or inferences must have been wrong.”
228
ἄρα (D9) so invites him.
229
τοὺς ἀδίκους (D9) stand in as the opposite of τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας just above (D5).
230
οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται (D11): Again he chooses what suits him better.
231
With another ἄρα (D12).
232
Reading αὐτοί (E2) with D (and the corrector of F apud Slings), the friends here spoken of being the ones they are mistaken about, far preferable to the αὐτοῖς of AFM read by edd., though it is, indeed, construable (cf. Adams, Jowett/Campbell ad loc., though one would prefer paroxytone accentuation of εἰσὶν under their interpretation), but misleading (cf. Stallb. ad loc.). Chambry does not report this variant.
233
τοὐνάντιον (E3): in sum, the position implies either that one may treat the good badly (inherently absurd), or that one may harm one’s friends (the very opposite of Simonides’s assertion).
234
μεταθώμεθα (E5), perhaps a term from the placing of draughts on the board (cf.333B1-2), and so mildly suggesting that Socrates is his κοινωνός in the “setting down” of his position (θέσις) about justice. In this phase of the argument they are conducting a σκέψις ἐν κοινῷ, with one playing answerer and the other questioner: hence the first plural. In acknowledging the consequence (συμβαίνει) and in proposing to revise the premises (μεταθώμεθα, E5), Polemarchus accepts the need for logic after all. He may change either the Simonidean definition of justice, or his empirical “definition” of friends.
235
φίλον εἶναι (sc. θέμενοι, E8). Originally he thought their settled attitude (ἡγεῖσθαι, C4) was sufficient to make them friends; now he sees that asserting that this made them friends was a matter of taking a position (θέσις) in his own mind. It will not be their attitude but his own that he will now change, by substituting a different position (μετατιθέσθαι).
236
334E10-335A2. His first definition was empirical but insufficiently thought through; this one is only a congeries of words. To say “I only seem to like my seeming friend” borders on nonsense. Polemarchus is moving into the area between opining and thinking.
237
προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν (335A6-7): the construction is awkward (“to posit a supplement to what the just is, [more] than our original position”) but that does not quite warrant Faesi’s deletion of .
238
εὖ ποιεῖν (A7) replacing ὠφελεῖν; κακῶς (sc. ποιεῖν, A8) replacing βλάπτειν.
239
ἀγαθὸν ὄντα (A9): the burden of Socrates’s restatement of the position is borne by the circumstantial participles ὄντα (also with κακόν, A10), which are causal. As above he is scrupulous to note what the unamended position is (cf. 334E7 with the λέγοντες phrase at 335A7-8) before confirming the emendation (cf.334E9 with νῦν δὲ κτλ, 335A8-10).
240
Shifting back to βλάπτειν (B2), from κακῶς ποιεῖν.
241
βλαπτόμενοι δέ (B6). The question lacks an interrogative particle (cf.333A13): again he relies on his interlocutor to know he is being questioned and that he is to play answerer.
242
ὁντινοῦν (B3).
243
γε (B4) twice, sputtering.
244
τε καί (B4) linking ground and inference.
245
The false alternative makes the true more attractive (B8).
246
ἀνάγκη (B12): cf. 333D9 with n.
247
δή (C14) of the target case.
248
συλλήβδην ἀρετῇ (D1): the human virtues collected together. He had used ἀρετή above for the “virtue” of the horse and dog in his analogy, and so there needed a more specific term for the (inherently moral) ἀρετή that is human. The term most commonly used for this notion is “justice” (cf. n. ad 331A4, and Phdrs.276C3, 277D10-E, 278A3-4; Polit.295E4-5; Prot.327B2). Now that he is done with the analogy he re-appropriates the term ἀρετή to its normal moral meaning.
249
The concept of opposites is often instantiated with physical properties as they arise in the world of change, in the Ionian manner (cf. 380E3-4 and n., Leg.889B6-8, 892B2-3, 897A6-B1; Lys.215E5-8; Phlb.14D1-3; Phdrs.270A5 [where read ἀνοίας with BT], Symp.186D7-E1; Tim.82A8-B2). In such a context Tim.50A2-3 can call one pole an opposite.
250
δή (D7), of the target case.
251
δέ γε (D9), of the minor premise.
252
οὔτε φίλον (D11-12): to this much Polemarchus had agreed from the beginning.
253
τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιον (E1-2), the original language, with ὀφειλόμενον (cf. 331E3-4). Simonides for all his authority is now no better than a τις.
254
νοεῖ (E2) redoes διενοεῖτο, used during the attempt to discover Simonides’s wise undermeaning (332C1), the prefix dropped as is usual in all IE languages (cf. n.1551; Adam ad Prot.311A); but now it is just τις that is the subject: it is not the person but the argument that will be the authority for our belief.
255
This is what defending Simonides’s position drove Polemarchus to assert at 333B7-9.
256
Socrates moves from the present φησὶν (E1) back to the imperfect ἦν (E4) on the force of the intervening recapitulation of what happened.
257
σοφός (E4): it is the uncritical use of this term in unknowing praise that Socrates presses to criticize: we must expect the wise at the very least to know the truth, and we need to know something in order to have an inkling whether they do.
258
μαχοῦμεθα ἄρα (E7): the battle is of course argumentation, with its “rough and tumble” that might bruise opinion, as Polemarchus has lately seen. The language recalls and redeems the idea that the just man will help in battle (332E5) as μεταθώμεθα above (n.234) had recalled the language of his helping in draughts. Often the argument itself repays the strain on the intentionalist consciousness one spends to follow it carefully, by luminously coming round full circle; conversely the dramatic context can be made to provide a concrete instance before theory treats it abstractly (“drama precedes dogma”). In the pendant to his reductio (333E3-334A10,ff) Socrates had used κλεπτοσύνη to reach the conclusion that the just man is a thief (cf. n.211); and earlier, Cephalus’s clever repartee provided an embodiment of the belief and the attitude that the way to treat enemies is tit for tat.
Self-reference and self-instantiation of this sort is one of Plato’s favorite literary devices and deserves a monograph. It has an obvious use in transition, as here and as at the end of several dialogues (Ion closes [541D] with Socrates commenting that his criticism of Ion’s answers as ἄνω κάτω στρεφόμενα prove that he is a good general after all. Lysis closes [223B] with ‘We friends don’t know what friendship is!’ Phaedo closes with Socrates undergoing περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος [cf.73B6-7]. Protagoras closes [361A] with the logos laughing at Socrates and Protagoras for having exchanged positions).
He uses it with a philosophical purpose to remind us that method is to be kept in balance with message, that the philosophizing is taking place in a world that preceded it and will survive it unchanged, or in the largest terms that the search for truth and reality paradoxically takes place within, and is an event within, reality. We may say that the device serves Plato in his writing, as irony served Socrates in live conversation. Instances are to be found everywhere in the corpus (indeed, it is in its nature to pop up anywhere):
Charm. the interlocutors variously exhibit σωφροσύνη or fail to: 155E3 (Socrates’s μόγις: cf.156D1ff,155A5), 158C5-D6 (n.b.D7), 159B1-2, 162D2-3 (paradox of sobriety as ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, vis à vis Critias’s impatience with Charmides), 164C9-D3 (Critias’s definition as γνῶσις ἑαυτοῦ founders when he doesn’t know what he is talking about), and 166D1-2 (Socrates’s reply to Critias’s personal attack [166C7ff] on the grounds that he is investigating the matter to improve his self-knowledge).
Crat.384C3ff (Hermogenes’s name fails to work κατὰ τὴν φύσιν), 388A2-7 (etymological induction).
Crito 48A7-10 (Crito’s improper εἰσήγησις in the dialogue belies his criticism of the improper εἴσοδος at the trial: 44E3-4), 50B8 (The Laws have the same blind spot as Crito: cf. δικαὶ δικασθεῖσαι [50B8] with δίκαια ὄντα [49E and 50A3]).
Euthyd.286B7 (Ctesippus forced to disagree in silence), 286E9 (the brothers show ἀμαθία though they say it doesn’t exist), 287E2 (they err but deny error’s existence). In general, the sophistic trickery is words in action.
Gorg.456A-458B (Gorgias says the φιλονικία of students should not be blamed on their teachers and Socrates shrinks from pointing out that Gorgias has contradicted himself), 467A8-10 (How can you say rhetors are powerful if you can’t prevail upon me to believe it?), 475D4-6 (Socrates reassures Polus he will not be hurt by his answer about pain), 494D2-6 (Socrates shames Callicles into being unashamed about his position), 501C7-8 (Socrates elsewhere won’t accept an answer like ‘I’ll say yes to please you,’ but here, where the topic is flattery, he does), 505C3-4 (neither man nor λόγος will persist), 517C4-7 (the argument is moving in a spiral)
H.Maj. (on beauty) The ubiquity of the expression καλῶς λέγεις, vel sim.
H.Min. The entire dialogue instantiates its doctrine: Socrates is ἀμαθής and therefore gets the wrong answer ἄκων (broached at 373B4-9). The characters themselves are more aware of self-instantiation in this dialogue than in others whose authorship is more certainly Platonic, as at 368D6-8 (cf.369A4-8), 369E5, 370E10-11, 373B4-9(cf.372D4-7), etc.
Lach. 193D11ff (the λόγος / ἔργον contrast in Doric speech [188DE], but are we brave enough to engage in discussion? We must obey what we are saying!), 196A4ff (acknowledging aporia bravely [γενναίως]), 197A4 (being daring enough to make assertions cf.B4,C5 and 193B1)
Leg. 626B5 (γεγυμνάσθαι on gymnastics), 629A1-2 (Cretan’s love of war militates against Socrates), 662B2 (the disagreement about music is an instance of ἀπᾴδειν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων), 722Cff (sudden discovery that what they’ve been doing all along is a προοίμιον to the laws), 891E7 (ψυχήν which will be the earlier thing placed later), 897D5 (προσλαμβάνειν in relation between interlocutors, but cf. 897B1), and 965B4.
Phdo 72E3-3A3 (Cebes reminded of ἀνάμνησις), 73A5 (Simmias’s request to be reminded of ἀνάμνησις – παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, B6-7), 77A1-2 (ὁμοίως presaging the affinity argument), 77C7 (συντιθέναι presages fragility of compound), 96A6-100B9 (Socrates’s “autobiography” discovers a new method in the very questions motivating the search), 96B9 (ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον, studying μεταβολή: cf. φερόμενος, 98B7), 97D7 (κατὰ νοῦν), 103A5f (the opposite said about the opposites).
Phdrs. Socrates’s guess that the logos is under Phaedrus’s cloak. Lysias’s speech is designed is to convince by the very action of speaking. Socrates’s shame drives him to speak. 243E7-8 (Where’s that παῖς? Right here!).
Phlb. 58A (The knowledge we are looking for is the science we are looking with).
Polit. 260B7-8 (search for the πολιτικός will require only ὁμονοεῖν [cf. Campbell ad loc.]). In other passages one begins to see the aridity of self-referential intellectualism: 277D9ff (παράδειγμα παραδείγματος) 283B6ff (treating the proper length of treatment), 286DE (conversation about conversation).
Prot. 312A2 (Hippocrates blushes), 333A6-8 (οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς referring to Protagoras’s theory of education), 333C1 (αἰσχύνομαι instantiates Protagoras’s theory of knowledge: cf. νουθετεῖ 341A8-B1), 341A7-B2 (Socrates commenting on Protagoras’s use of δεινόν at 339A1), 361CD (Socrates resembling the savior Prometheus from Protagoras’s Myth).
Rep.336C1-2 (Thrasymachus unbeknownst to himself sounds like Cephalus at 329A4-B3), 340A4-B8 (Thrasymachus legislates [τιθέσθαι] a position against his own advantage), 344D3-4 (the “stronger” compel Thrasymachus to stay), 350D2-3 (Thrasymachus blushes), 402A7ff (presentation of the Theory of Ideas right after a reference to the arrival of rationality in the young), 433A, 439E-40A (proving the difference between thumoeidetic and epithumetic by invoking the feeling), 487BC (Adeimantus’s charge against Socrates becomes a charge against the bad φύλαξ), 504BC (Adeimantus must emulate the φύλακες by taking the longer road—which is the exercise of the Line Passage and Advanced Education), 506A6 (cf. n.3055), 533A (what the power of dialectic really is can appear only to those who have gone through the preliminaries we have just gone through).
Soph. Generally: the evasiveness of the subject matter (the sophist) is replicated by the sophist popping up here and there, e.g. 223C, where he eludes them before they reach him.
Symp. Generally: Alcibiades’s speech attributes to Socrates the attributes the symposiasts had attributed to eros, proving thereby Socrates’s thesis that eros is both ἐνδεής and the cause of good. (cf. Bury [ed.] lx-lxiv).
Tht. Much play on perception and appearance, the theme being knowledge (151E2 [φαίνεται νυνί], 152C7, 154C10-D2, 155A2 [φάσματα], 155D10, 155E3, 156C6, 157C2-3, 157D10, 157E4,158C8, 185E6-6A1, 186E11-12, 187A9-B1); Theodorus’s changing perception of Theaetetus (144D-5C5, 148B3-4, 148C9ff, 155D1, 185E3-4 (Theaetetus is καλός because he λέγει καλῶς); 160E5 (midwifery has brought to birth [ἐγεννήσαμεν] the theory that brings sensibles to birth [γεννᾶν αἰσθητά, 159C14]); 183A4-5 (πάντα ῥεῖ: even the answers are in flux: cf. A8-B5).
259
σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν (E9) recalling σοφὸς καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ (331E6), with μακάριος used climactically as often (Euthyd.273E6, Soph.233A4, Pind.Pyth.10.1-2 and Bundy ad loc.[SP 2.38], Rep.419A9 trumping the εὐδαίμων at A2; 561D7; and cf. the specifically Thrasymachean use, 344B7 [and n.]), and therefore effecting closure. Simonides has been topped by two of the Seven Sages.
260
ἑγὼ γοῦν (E10) evinces his inward, very personal sense of commitment to the cause.
261
ῥῆμα (336A1): cf. Prot.342E7, where it is used with φθέγγεσθαι, which makes it an utterance; and its use with ἐκβέβληκας, 473E6 infra.
262
Περιάνδρου … ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός (A5-6) linked by and generalized with ἤ τινος ἄλλου, Socrates copies the form, at least, of his list of wise people above (335E8-9, using and ἤ τιν’ ἄλλον). The first, the tyrant Periander, himself came to be a member of the canonical Seven Sages (Demetr. apud Stob.3.1.172 [= Diels-Kranz 1.65.15-66.3]), but the personnel of the list was not stable: cf. D.L.1.40ff (= DK 1.61). Muson rather than Periander appears in the (early) list given by Protagoras at Prot.343A. The choice of Periander here may have the role of a transitional case between those of 335E8-9 and these.
Though the list is parallel in form with the list above, including its use of ἤ τινὸς ἄλλου for closure, the concluding item of the list, μέγα οἰουμένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός does not generalize the specific cases of powerful men but complicates things by introducing the type of the rich man who believes and vaunts the power he has by dint of his wealth. Indeed, ἄλλος is adverbial (on which cf. n.1479); and Socrates deftly closes the argument with a passing back reference to the man who willed the argument to Polemarchus thinking another sacrifice to the gods would be more efficacious for his own piece of mind than exploring issues with Socrates. Every decade has its men who think they are important because of their wealth, and other men who secretly think so for them so they can envy them and petulantly complain about them: there is no need therefore for Socrates to name names; but the surprise the drama holds for us at this moment is that we are about to meet the Master of Envy himself.
263
ἀληθέστατα (A8).
264
ἐφάνη (A9) with participle is dialectical (cf.334A10 and n.). When Cephalus left, the λόγος survived a change in answerer; now it has survived failure; all that has survived is the question.
265
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (B2) of interrupting the speaker with a question: 495D3, 505A1, Gorg.506A2, Soph.239D1. The force of ἀντι- is that of taking up the opposite end of the rope and pulling back. It is not always belligerent, as it (and most everything else about Thrasymachus) is, here. At H.Maj.287A Socrates confides to Hippias that he is only good at ἀντιλήψεις, so would he please hold forth for him. πολλάκις indicates there were several moments in the conversation at which he wished to intervene. Despite the questionable logic of the argument, those who eavesdropped on it (παρακαθημένων, B3) found it interesting because of the sense it made at every step, as we have taken pains to notice by watching it close up.
266
Continual use of the prefix δια-, with διακοῦσαι (B3) as well as with διαλεγομένων (B1) and διεκωλύετο (B3) before it and with διεπαυσάμεθα (B4) and διαρπασόμενος (B6) after it, evinces the audience's sense that the conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus has a life of its own worth allowing to play through to the end: tension is mounting because of Thrasymachus's utter disregard for this value.
267
οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν (B4-5).
268
διεπτοήθημεν (B7), another δια-. The first plural gently reminds us, at this transitional moment, that the event is being reported to us by Socrates.
269
εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος (B8). The first inconcinnity in his behavior is duly noted: though his remark portrays itself as an address to Socrates and Polemarchus (ὑμᾶς) he noisily delivers himself of it into the midst of the entire group.
270
τίς ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει (B8-C1): The prolepsis of πάλαι expresses, or feigns, that he is sick and tired of their conversation, that he has been wanting to interrupt for some time, and that that time is now over. πάλαι refers not to a remote past but to a time that present events now threaten to supersede. Cf. 392B9 and n.1407.
271
ἀπόκριναι (C5): For all the sputtering, what Thrasymachus actually says is that if you want to ask about something you should give your answer about it.
272
μοι (C6): with the loose ethical dative he somehow appropriates Socrates’s attempt to learn as an event to be tailored to his own enjoyment.
273
ὅτι τὸ δέον … μηδ’ ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ’ ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ’ ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ’ ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον (C6-D2): The relentless anaphora of μηδ’ ὅτι τό expresses (or feigns) enervation in advance, but it is unclear what argument foul he means these examples to instantiate. The combination of unclarity and vehemence is a rhetorical device for challenging assent, affecting the audience (and even the exegete!) upon whom in the meanwhile it devolves to construe the general complaint. Shall I make his case for him by guessing that he is objecting to the manner in which Socrates characteristically isolates and deals piecemeal with ideas (cf. ἀπολαμβάνειν, H.Maj.301B4, cf. H.Min.369B9), which in common speech and thinking tend to slide through (cf. εὐχερές, Tht.184C), as for instance the way he isolated δικαιοσύνη as a subject (331C1-2, n.b. αὐτό) and ἀποδιδόναι ἄν τίς τι παρὰ του λάβῃ as a predicate (C3), out of the flow of ideas that constituted Cephalus’s speech (δίκαιος, 331A4; ὀφείλοντα … χρήματα, B2-3), what Shorey calls “collecting a definition,” citing Gorg.453A as a parallel (WPS 558, ad 331C)?
The speaker may hardly remember what words he used, and so may perceive Socrates’s “selection” of the item as taking Cephalus too literally (cf. Gorg.489B8; HMaj.284E1-2; Ion 540B6ff [where Socrates treats the elements of Ion’s generalizing polar doublet as though he meant them singly]), or as nitpicking (HMaj.301B2-4, Rep.340E3), or as making large things out of small (Gorg.486C8, 497B6-7; HMaj.304AB; Prot.328E3-4 [where he anticipates this objection]; Rep.487B), or as illiberal and uncultured (Gorg.461C4, 485C7, 508E-9A).
In the course of barring Socrates from giving an abstract answer, Thrasymachus in fact cannot resist revealing by degrees what will be the essence of his own answer. His list moves from a likely but generic answer (τὸ δέον), through an answer like the one Polemarchus and Socrates have been considering (τὸ ὠφέλιμον), to a debasement of this answer (τὸ λυσιτελοῦν), to an absolutely impossible debasement even of this (τὸ κερδαλέον, never approbatory, absent even from the list in ps.Plat.Cleit. that imitates this one [409C]), and finally to what will be his own answer (τὸ συμφέρον, cf.338C2)!
In the course of the conversation an actual reason behind Thrasymachus’s objection (as opposed to the guess his method has forced us to contrive for him in the interim) will become clear: cf. n.557 ad 348E5-49A2, infra.
274
ἐγώ (D3) emphatic because expressed. The context requires ὕθλους to mean the opposite of the σαφές and the ἀκριβές—hence “smoke.” Its sense, like that of φλυαρία (B8), is largely onomatopoetic (cf.337B3-4). ἀποδέχομαι is not here absolute: its object, ὕθλους τοιούτους, is “incorporated” into the ἐάν clause (cf. Smyth §2536-8). Indeed Thrasymachus’s rhetoric is a little like Cephalus’s (cf. ὀλοφύρονται, ὀδύρονται, ὕμνειν [cognate with ὕθλος]: 329A4-B2); or more exactly Cephalus’s is a little like his.
275
ἑωράκη (D6), the pluperfect, used in contrafactual conditions “when stress is laid on ... the continuance of the act” (Smyth §2306a).
276
προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος (D8): from Thrasymachus’s words the essential point that Socrates gathers is that he is being attacked. He alludes to the superstition about encountering—or more exactly being encountered by—a wolf. Pliny NH 8.34 explains (cf. Verg.Ecl.9.53, Theocr.14.22): The moment one discovers he is in danger (the wolf has spotted him) he discovers also, by inference, that he has been in danger (the wolf has been watching); and then realizes his opponent has not yet attacked. The reflex to defend oneself is therefore short-circuited by an inner reflection that the proper strategy is to ascertain why the attack has been delayed. A particularly trenchant account of the feeling is René Girard’s “mimetic rivalry.” It is to avoid the escalation of violent feelings (like those of Thrasymachus) that, according to Girard, Jesus looks down and doodles in the sand when confronted by the crowd that wants him to sanction stoning the prostitute, rather than raising his eyes to their spokesman (R. Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning [New York 2004] 54-61). The dialogical encounter is subject to the same derailments as any other human encounter, including the invidious dynamics of the evil eye (cf. Phdo 95A4-6B8), and to the extent that Plato is presenting it “live” it devolves on the reader to recognize when such things are happening.
277
ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι (D8), the opposite of κηλεῖν, used in the context of hunting prey at Lysis 206B2, the other Platonic occurrence. Socrates is referring to the behavior he described above (B2) as ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.
278
ὅδε (E3): By his first-person demonstrative Socrates commemorates and preserves the sense that he and Polemarchus have been working together and indeed have become “allies in battle.” It is this that so bothers Thrasymachus. He blames Socrates rather than both of them for their success because he envies Socrates, as Socrates has indicated to us with his reference to the invidious evil eye.
279
τιμιώτερον (E8) suggests that Socrates is vying for honor in his conversation after all, the honor of learning, and neutralizes thereby Thrasymachus’s accusatory φιλοτιμοῦ (C3).
280
ἔπειτα (E8) cf. 331B3 and n.
281
οὕτως ἀνόητος ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις (E8), a tamer version of Thrasymachus’s εὐηθίζεσθε ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς (C1-2). εὐηθής is a favorite term in the cynic’s vocabulary (e.g., 343C6); Socrates replaces it with the vocabulary of philosophy (νοῦς and ζήτησις). οὕτως is a “second person” demonstrative.
282
φανῆναι (E9) dialectical.
283
The construction of E4-9—μὴ οἴου (negative command) ~ irreal present condition (μέν) ~ simple present condition (δέ) ~ οἴου σύ (positive command)—swiftly commands our attention despite the inflammatory remarks of Thrasymachus.
284
ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον (337A3): The noise he makes from his throat draws our attention to his face on which we see fixed a sardonic grin: the subplot of first looks continues.
285
αὕτη ’κείνη (A4): the second person demonstrative as predicate of third person demonstrative subject (“there you have it”), since Thrasymachus is again addressing his remarks about Socrates to the others present, but he uses the third person demonstrative as subject (“the good old irony”) as if he had already warned his audience about it before, as he goes on to assert (A5-7). Will we ever catch up with him?
286
ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δέ … ποιήσοις … ᾿ἀποκρινοῖο (A6-7): with rare future optatives (governed by the imperfect, προύλεγον, A5) Thrasymachus stresses his foreknowledge.
287
σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ (A8). The term is often less than approbatory in Socrates’s mouth. In the Apology it serves as a grounds for prosecuting him (23A3) and also a grounds for criticizing those who condemned him (38C3-4)! The generally approbatory εὖ λέγειν might also mean less to Socrates than it does to others (cf. n.316).
288
ᾔδησθα, προείποις (A8,9): Socrates mildly taunts Thrasymachus by borrowing the verbs from his unsolicited self description (ᾔδη, προύλεγον [A5]): that προείποις is used in a different sense (prohibit rather than predict) improves the taunt.
289
μὴ ὅτι … δὶς ἓξ μηδ’ ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ’ ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ’ ὅτι τετράκις τρία (B1-3): Socrates closely imitates Thrasymachus’s prohibition (336C6-D4), including the tedious anaphora of μὴ ὅτι and the gratuitous plethora of examples; but with ἀποδέχομαι (B3) he forgoes the arrogant ἐγώ and in redoing ὕθλους with τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς forgoes Thrasymachus’s swift “incorporation” of the object into the ἐάν clause (D4, cf. n.274).
290
Reading ἀποκρίνοιτο (B4) of AFDM, against the perispomenon scribitur of the Monacensis, read by edd. The future is not needed. The leading construction is oratio obliqua in secondary sequence with ὅτι. Owing partly to the morphology of the verb, the logical significance of the optative ἔροιο in the ensuing protasis is therefore maximally plastic. It can represent an imperfect indicative (an original aorist would have been kept), a present or aorist subjunctive with ἄν, or an original optative in either tense, and so it can constitute the beginning of a contrafactual, present general, future more vivid, or future less vivid condition. In the event, however, the protasis is so long that Socrates restarts the sentence (δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι) rather than moving on to an apodosis, and then generalizes, with οὐδείς and with the re-characterization of the questioner—no longer Thrasymachus (this would require dropping τῷ, which three of four mss. have [Chambry saw it in the fourth in superscript])—as a person seeking information (for πυνθάνεσθαι [B5] cf. 328E2 and n.). The present indicative may therefore stand as part of the generalization.
291
ὡς δή (C2) ironic. Most of the time one will understand Thrasymachus by assuming he means the opposite of what he says. But this raises the question, Why does he speak?
292
Reading ἀποκρίνεσθαι (C5) with AFM, rather than the future with D and edd. Cf. B4 and n.
293
τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ (C5): dialectical φαίνεσθαι.
294
Scrupulously Thrasymachus avoids the give and take of conversation (C7-8).
295
δείξω (D1) promises something more than a mere statement, and suggests a display (ἐπίδειξις).
296
ἑτέραν … παρὰ πάσας ταῦτας (D1-2). ἑτέραν instead of ἄλλην indicates this new answer is of an alternative type. Cf. n.2111 and also n.1216.
297
παθεῖν (D2). That Socrates should be required to pay a penalty for failing to answer reveals, even if only in play, that Thrasymachus feels that the evasiveness he has been accusing Socrates of is essentially unjust behavior. According to Attic legal procedure (and as occurred in Socrates’s actual trial), once the jury finds the defendant guilty the defendant proposes a penalty alternate to that preferred by the prosecution, to be suffered or paid (παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι is the formula). Thrasymachus’s remark therefore presumes that in breaking down and giving an answer himself, Socrates will have succeeded in his evasion and be guilty enough in succeeding that he must propose a penalty. At the same time of course, eager to give his answer, he fails to see his own role as accomplice in the unjust act. That he should forgive injustice when it helps himself and enforce it when it harms others might come as no surprise.
298
μαθεῖν (D4): In the penalty phase of his trial (Apol.36Bff) Socrates likewise proposed to suffer (παθεῖν) a reward as his penalty, making there the same play on the etymology of the verb ἀξιοῦν (cf. esp. 36D1-3). In his own mouth, many years before his execution, the play is γέλοιον; for Plato to put it there many years after is σπουδαῖον. To a great extent Socrates’s condemnation can be attributed to people undergoing the irksome “irony” of which Thrasymachus accuses him here. Plato achieves dramatic irony also, having Socrates unwittingly allude to the apothegm πάθει μάθος.
299
ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ (D6), echoing 337A8, another insincerity of Thrasymachus distasteful to translate. He failed to secure a physical penalty (παθεῖν) and so now proposes to settle for the alternative, a financial one (ἀπότεισον, D6). In this there is dramatic irony, for in being on the verge to perform his song-and-dance as a teacher it will convene with his habit of being paid for doing so. He is a sophist.
300
Glaucon’s intervention (D9-10) continues the allusion to Socrates’s trial, during which our author among others (38B6-8) intervened to stake him thirty minas. But Glaucon’s reason is that he wants the conversation to continue, whether to hear Thrasymachus’s answer or Socrates’s response to it or both. That it is Glaucon who here intervenes, rather than Polemarchus, the host and Socrates’s new ally, is noteworthy. The interest of the onlookers is something Plato’s new genre of dialogue has some difficulty depicting unless the interlocutors provide him an opportunity, as this byplay between Thrasymachus and Socrates does.
301
διαπράξηται (E1): The prefix and the voice imply success by hook and crook. Thrasymachus tells us something about the relation between Socrates and Glaucon by interpreting Glaucon’s interruption as indicating less interest in Thrasymachus’s answer than in Socrates’s response to it.
302
εἰ (E5) in all strictness goes with τι καὶ οἴεται so that ἀπειρημένον εἴη, the true optative protasis that goes with the foregoing apodosis, lacks an εἰ. In the event, however, the hypothetical thing he fancies he knows (the τι that is the subject of οἴεται) is “also functioning” as the subject of ἀπειρημένον εἴη (more exactly, it is “incorporated” into the εἰ οἴεται clause: cf. ὕθλους at 336D4).
The sentence got off on the wrong foot when Socrates found himself unable to pass up an opportunity to interpose an avowal of ignorance, according to his habit. He adopted the strategy of employing the idiom of the participle with ἔπειτα (on which cf. 331B3 and n.111) to interpose this avowal which was going to end up being inconsequential to the entire sentence anyway since what is actually inconceivable is that a person would answer at all when he has been barred from doing so.
303
ἡγεῖται (E7), of the sort of belief that a person acts upon without a second thought. Compare the crucial role this kind of attitude played in Polemarchus’s argument at 334C4, in Thrasymachus’s eagerness to answer just below (338A6), and in Cleitophon’s attempt to inoculate the ruler against error at 340B7.
304
ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου (E7): ἀνδρός for ἀνθρώπου or τινος makes the litotes all the stronger. Thrasymachus certainly wants to come off as an ἀνήρ.
305
εἰπεῖν (338A1), drawn out of λέγειν before and avoiding the term ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Socrates is referring to Thrasymachus’s claim to have an alternative type of answer and his mincing offer to “exhibit” it (δείξω ἑτέραν, 337D1), and yet he persists in asserting the presumption that this λόγος is the result of knowledge (εἰδέναι), exactly because this is what will give him the warrant to interrogate the “exhibitor” (and make him “answer” after all).
306
μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει (A1-2): now it is Socrates’s turn to use this formula in suasive peroration (cf.328B1 and n.), and fill it out with amplitudinous reference to Glaucon and the others (τε … καί and hyperbaton of τοὺς ἄλλους), so as to impose an ineluctable incumbency on Thrasymachus to comply.
307
With τόνδε (A3), “first person,” Socrates acknowledges his special closeness to Glaucon that Thrasymachus had assumed above; but with διδάξαι he attributes to Glaucon a different motive from the one Thrasymachus deduced from it.
308
ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην (A6-7). The adjective reveals that it is the other meaning of ἀπόκρισις that Thrasymachus has in mind, the answer-performance or ἐπίδειξις of the sort that was part of Gorgias’s advertised repertoire (cf. ἐπαγγέλλει, Gorg.447D7, 448A2, 449B2; and compare δείξω, 337D1, with ἐπεδείξατο, Gorg.447A6).
We get a full picture of this skill at the beginning of both the Gorgias and the Protagoras. Callicles recommends people ask Gorgias a question (Gorg.447C5-8, saying οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν), and Gorgias takes up the position to answer by saying οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν (448A2-3: cf. Meno 70B6-7). From these remarks we may infer that answering is nothing but impromptu oratory. We here learn also that the measure of a professional answer is its degree of beauty (Gorg.448A9-B1, cf. ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, 448D9-10 [and Meno 70B6-7], as embodied in the answer Polus finally gets to give at 448C4-9 [compare Meno’s answer, also inspired by Gorgias, at Meno 71E1-72A6, and Protagoras’s self-advertising early answer at Prot.316C5-317C5]), rather than its adequacy (e.g., ἱκανῶς, Gorg.448B1) to the question. Measured for its adequacy to the question, the rhetorical pretensions of the performance-answer render it liable to the charge of μακρολογία by Socrates (Gorg.449B4-8, C5; Prot.334A2-C6), while for the fully accomplished rhetorician brevity in answer is another ability he is ready to display (Prot.334E4-5A1). There is therefore a distinction and a tension between the plain (cf. φαῦλον at Tht.147C3-6) shortness of pertinence and the brevity of wit, which is sometimes misunderstood by scholars, as for instance in the treatment of Gorg.449B7. The audience response to a professional answer is applause (e.g. Euthyd.276B7, Prot.334C7); when the applause subsides the sophist calls on the next questioner; after a while he retires.
This performance situation, with himself doing the talking (εἰπεῖν, 338A6), is what Thrasymachus desires so much to move on to that he is willing to let Socrates off the hook. Like Polus in the Gorgias, who has to tolerate a certain amount of question and answer in the usual sense of the term (448B7-C3) before he gets the opportunity to unfurl his rhetoric (448C4-9), Thrasymachus tolerates a certain amount of Socratic elenchus (338C4-343A10) before he presents his own “answer” in full dress (343B1-344C8).
309
προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν (A7) the imperfect and its present infinitive point to an effort being made that Socrates does not deign to include in his narrative for us: he emphasizes his decision not to include it by placing the important fact, that Thrasymachus would in fact be holding forth, in the (essentially concessive) μέν clause (A5-7: cf. 342D2-3, 350C12,ff). φιλονικεῖν indicates it was more of what we have already seen: rivalry for its own sake; having the cake and eating it, too; and getting the last word.
310
κἄπειτα (B1).
311
αὑτὴ δή … ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία (B1), Thrasymachus finally gives in to winning the opportunity to speak by reverting to the formula he used at 337A4, now to accuse Socrates not of irony but, with irony, of the wisdom that Socrates had with irony accused him of (337A8). With αὑτή (second person) he again seeks to capture the sympathy of his audience (cf. n. ad 337A8), since now he is about to address them.
312
διδάσκειν (B2), pres.inf. Thrasymachus calls it teaching rather than answering, which he had accused him above of avoiding (337A5-7), since he, following Socrates’s flattering suggestion from above (διδάξαι, A3), is now, in his way, announcing that he is about to hold forth.
313
περιιόντα (B2), another allusion to Plato’s Apology in the form of the complaint that he is a busybody. Cf. ἐπ’ ἄλλον ᾖα, 21D8; πλάνην, 22A6; ᾖα A8, C9; περιιών, 23B5; and περιεργάζεται, 19B4; and the implication these uses have for περιέρχομαι at 30A7: “my meddlesomeness consists of nothing but trying to elevate your thought.” Cf. also 31C5, συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν (reading T rather than BW). The charge is a mob-tactic, by which one member of the mob can acknowledge to the others that “he did to me what he did to you” without admitting it himself or forcing them to, either.
314
χάριν ἀποδιδόναι (B3), a euphemism for paying a wage. Thrasymachus is used to being paid, though of course he does not expect to be in this casual gathering.
315
The strained expression χάριν ἐκτίνειν (B5) calls Thrasymachus on his euphemism. He had first identified his fee for teaching with a juridical penalty due (a τίσις, 337D1-10); now he identifies being paid with being thanked. Socrates will not allow his own inability to pay to be mischaracterized as ingratitude.
316
εὖ λέγειν (B8) and εὖ ἐρεῖν (B9) draw attention to the ambiguity of the expression. Of course for Socrates it means to give a good argument; but the test of a good argument will be how it survives under dialectical scrutiny, i.e., how it survives as an answer (whence ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνῃ, B8-9).
317
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἤ (C2): the definiens should always tell us nothing else than the definiendum, neither more nor less than what it is, so that the protestation “is nothing else than” or “is nothing more than” is strictly gratuitous. Then as now, however, such phrases are used, as when one asserts that emotions are “nothing but” neurological discharges. The stipulation adds a tone of tendentiousness that betrays that the statement is not meant to be the “definition” that it purports to be after all. Thrasymachus likewise expects his audience to be moved by what is tendentious in his formulation.
318
τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον (C2). He had forbidden Socrates to give an answer like τὸ δέον or τὸ ὠφέλιμον for being too vague (the opposite of σαφῶς καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγειν: 336C6-D4). His own answer makes the scandalous point – there is no justice, only power -- by mocking the Socratic form: “The advantageous as you might say – to the strongman, that is!”
319
οὐκ ἐθελήσεις (C2) picks up the charge of μὴ ἐθέλειν at B2 above, carelessly.
320
τοιόνδε (C7), first person demonstrative adjective of quality.
321
ἡμῶν (C7): it is striking that Socrates should suggest he and Thrasymachus are the weaker rather than hope to be the just man!
322
βδελυρός (D3), another sonic slur from Thrasymachus’s harp. Of course whatever sort of incompetence he means to accuse Socrates of is removed by his ensuing charge of clever ill-will.
323
κακουργεῖν (D4) of the questioner seeking to vitiate an argument by intentionally misconstruing it as at Gorg.483A2.
324
σαφέστερον (D5): Socrates immediately imposes on Thrasymachus the first standard for proper answering that Thrasymachus had threatened to impose on him (σαφῶς, 336D2). The second, ἀκριβῶς (336D3) will make its appearance at 340E2.
325
εἶτα (D7) feigns impatience. He will indeed tell us something σαφές, but not without deriding Socrates.
326
τὸ ἄρχον (D10) is as abstract as can be, while κρατεῖ is as concrete as can be (cf. 339A2).
327
δέ γε (E1) introducing the minor premise.
328
His meaning has to be that the various laws are designed to preserve the respective form of government, including both the power elite and the order it protects. His formulation with ἀρχή leaves this distinction undrawn, and his figura etymologica stresses a self-referential relativism in the several sets of laws instead, to the point of suggesting arbitrariness.
329
ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα (E5). The τε καί is illative. Thrasymachus’s point is that the ruling elite makes the argument (ὡς expressing their grounds) that breaking the law is eo ipso an unjust act. He avoids asserting that the required behavior is required because the rulers deem it just, in order to assert instead that it is just because it is required. His argument is different from that of the Laws in the Crito, who simply identify τὸ δίκαιον with a δίκη δικασθεῖσα, just as our law counts a man innocent until proven guilty but guilty upon conviction regardless of the truth. For Thrasymachus there is no legitimacy in the ruling element, but only power (κράτος), a power that makes resistance futile. This much is contained in his original formula, κρείττονος συμφέρον, to which his use of κρατεῖ here is meant to advert etymologically.
330
τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ (339A3). In place of λόγος the realist uses λογισμός, and gets the answer that is right (ὀρθῶς) because it is right everywhere (πανταχοῦ). Thrasymachus suggests by the generalization over space that he has isolated the essence of things, but his position is true everywhere only because it is tautological, and cannot be false anywhere.
331
σμικρά γε ἴσως (B1), “ironic.” This “small” supplement about the largeness of their power ends up being the only basis for the conclusion that their συμφέρον is justice, and so the addition contains the entirety of the meaning. Again Thrasymachus is saying the opposite of what he means.
332
συμφέρον γέ τι (B3), somehow advantageous: Thrasymachus’s προσθήκη specifies the τι.
333
ἐγώ / σύ / ἐγώ (B4-5): Socrates’s repeated use of personal pronouns, always emphatic in the nominative, is striking. The ensuing elenchus will be serious and trenchant.
334
καί … μέντοι (B7-8): “also,” i.e. in addition to asserting that the just is the κρείττονος συμφέρον: μέντοι responds to ὅτι μέν (B2) after the interruptive back and forth (B3-7).
335
τιθέσθαι (C7) middle, as used by Thrasymachus above (338E1, E3), to emphasize their conscious intention.
336
ἃ δ’ἂν θῶνται (C10): Socrates uses what we have come to call a “general” condition (ἄν plus subjunctive in the protasis), but despite our nomenclature the force of the subjunctive is anticipatory. Thrasymachus agrees to the proposition without noticing the trap he is stepping into, not because he unguardedly allows Socrates to generalize, but because he anticipates the direct and unthinking compliance of the ruled as something that appeals to him.
337
τί λέγεις σύ (D4), the unnecessary nominative pronoun again emphatic, and derogatory, expressing impatience. The expression according to Aristophanes is a commonplace in eristic argument (Nub.1174, the scholium to which says one uses it to knock his opponent dumb [καταπλῆξαι]).
338
ἃ σὺ λέγεις (D5): Socrates returns the nominative pari passu.
339
ὡμολόγηται (D6) perfect, of an agreement already reached (to be preferred 339E2, infra).
340
προστάττοντας (D7), the simple act of commanding, replaces τιθέσθαι νόμους, lawmaking, with which Thrasymachus identified it, above (338E3-6).
341
The superlative (βελτίστου, D7) makes error more likely, and therefore makes the proposition that they sometimes err harder to rescind.
342
προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες (B8): the subject of προστάττειν is restated to firm up the grounds for the assertion that they must obey.
343
οἴου τοίνυν (E1): again Socrates re-uses Thrasymachus’s words (cf. σύ, D5) but τοίνυν adds an edge: Thrasymachus must agree.
344
ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι (E2), τε καί linking illustration with idea: Socrates reverts to the original definition (τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, 338C2), for which the ruling group (τὸ ἄρχον, 338D10) was merely an illustration as Thrasymachus himself said at 339A2 (cf. n.ad loc.).
345
φῇς (E4), subjunctive, with Burnet (Chambry prints it baritone and therefore as an indicative, with a correspondingly strained translation). The construction in μέν / δέ pre-empts any interpretation by which the two clauses should not be parallel, and therefore requires the subjunctive regardless of the slight inconcinnity in the character of the two conditionalities. Adam is concerned about ὅταν being appropriate with only the first, but the indifference of the matter is revealed by the facts that ἐάν would have been appropriate with both and that we commonly say “When x is 2, 2x is 4,” without thereby committing ourselves to having asserted that x has ever been 2.
346
At 331D4-5, where just as here (340A2) he uses γε to justify his intervention.
347
μάρτυρος (A4). Cf. σμικρά / μεγάλη (339B1-2); λέγεις (339D4-5). Polemarchus’s use of καί here, instead of an adversative, shows he believes he has the upper hand.
348
Similar sub-squabbles take place in the Protagoras (335C8-336D5: Callias for Protagoras, Alcibiades for Socrates) and in the Gorgias (448A6-C9: Chaerephon for Socrates, Polus for Gorgias).
349
Cleitophon’s γάρ (A7) derisively mimics the γάρ of Polemarchus, at the expense of being so elliptical that, like many of Thrasymachus’s retorts, it approaches meaninglessness.
350
ἔθετο (A8): is lightly ironic (the verb has hitherto been used, saliently, of the ruling lawmakers: cf. 338E1, E3, 339C7; and nn.335 and 340): it broaches the idea that Thrasymachus’s own attempt to rule the conversation with his thesis of the advantage of the stronger might have been formulated in a way disadvantageous to himself.
351
κελευόμενα (A7): He speaks as if substituting κελεύειν for προστάττειν makes the contents of the commands moot. For him, as for Thrasymachus at 339C10-12, the focus is on the relation command-obedience (cf. n. 336, supra; and note the use of the term at 327B5, where Polemarchus’s slave speaks as though the mere act of κελεύειν requires obedience, which for him of course it does).
352
καὶ γάρ (A9). The γάρ, besides its mocking echo of Cleitophon’s γάρ, accepts the truth of the answer in order to deny its relevance, as at 333A2. The brunt of Polemarchus’s rhetoric is in the mocking repetition of Cleitophon’s words δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο (B1: cf. A8).
353
θέμενος (B1): cf. n. ad A8.
354
κελεύειν (B2): He accepts and uses Cleitophon’s new term since it has been neutralized.
355
ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους (340B3) Polemarchus shows how acutely he has picked up the identification Socrates had made (339E2) between the “rulers” of the illustration and the “stronger” of the original definition, by now adverting to the fact that, conversely, the ruled are functioning as an illustration of the weaker.
356
Polemarchus’s exactness in rehearsing the expression of the argument is Socratic (cf.331C8 and n.). Thrasymachus posited that justice is the advantage of the stronger at 338E1-9A4, and that justice is obeying their commands at 339B7-8. It was after these posits that he agreed, in turn (note Polemarchus’s αὖ), that the rulers sometimes make disadvantageous commands (339C1-9).
357
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (B4) the expression alludes formally to a type of refutation (e.g. Democritus DK68B156) that was to become one of the skeptical tropes. Cf.487C3 with n.2736, 538D9, 609B3-4.
358
ὃ ἡγοῖτο (B7). For the verb denoting settled opinion, cf. 334C1,2 and n. By using optative for indicative in secondary sequence Cleitophon prefers to allude to the time of Thrasymachus’s talk, as opposed to the present moment when things in fact appear to have changed.
359
ποιητέον εἶναι (B7-8), shifting away from the ἔλεγεν construction to an infinitival construction without a leading verb, the indicative portraying the meaning Thrasymachus intended by his words (ἔλεγεν) and the infinitive the “propositional content” of the formulation (ποιητέον).
360
ἐλέγετο (B9), appropriating Cleitophon’s term (ἔλεγεν, B7) to his own purposes, with ἐλέγετο, now denoting “what was said”: for the shift to the passive to distinguish the proposition itself from what the speaker might have “meant” cf. Gorg.475B3-4 and 479E6-8 (where Socrates drops ὑπ’ἐμοῦ, to emphasize the impersonality of the truth reached by dialectical agreement). The shift is only more emphatic when the indirect discourse is represented, since with the passive it wil shift into the infinitive from the active where it would be done with ὅτι or ὡς (or else λέγω would mean “command”: Smyth §1997).Hence when Thrasymachus below comments on the meaning of an expression (λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι … ) he introduces the expression with ὅτι (D5).
361
ἀποδέχεσθαι (C2) means, for the questioner, to accept an answer as meeting enough of the rudimentary criteria of competence to make it worthy of dialectical scrutiny (as here); and for the answerer, to accept a proposition as worthy of defense. Cf. the extensive discussion of the matter in Phaedo 91E,ff. When Thrasymachus barred Socrates’s one-word answers (οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, 336D3), he was claiming such answers were categorically inadequate for consideration; but for Socrates the only criterion for such adequacy is that the answerer really believes it, and this only because it will motivate the answerer to defend it, and therefore help Socrates test its veracity through question and answer (337C3-6: cf. Gorg.495A5-C2; Meno 83D; Prot.331CD, 333C5-9; Soph.246D [and Campbell ad loc.]; Tht.154C-155A).
362
ἀλλά (C6): Thrasymachus feigns to try to conceive how he could think this. His reason for finding his rulers infallible is not to retreat to an idealist defense against Socrates’s refutation but to continue the conversation unscathed by shifting the ground of the conversation toward his main idea, his “killer answer,” that the strong are the only people that matter anyway, since the others are foolish enough to give them power in their belief that there is something called justice according to which they feel they must do so, or would be benefitted by doing so. His admiration for the strong is not rational, and so it does not need us to rationalize it.
The moment a strong man makes a law, obeying that law becomes justice. Now it comes into view that the strong man who makes that law becomes a strong man only after he makes a law, since it is the law that will make him stronger—if, that is, the others obey—and that in doing so these others become the weaker. Not only does the strong man not err: he is strong only because and only when he does not err.
363
ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν (C9): Socrates, as often. restates the language of the previous passage in its idiomatic particularity, as if to recall the very moment it was said to his interlocutor’s mind (e.g., the phrase τι καί at 340C9 repeated from 339C2: cf. 392B1-4, 394B9-C1, 427D4-7, 490D3, 503A6-7, 504B5, 607B2, 612B1 and n.5107, 613C8; Phdrs.272D2 [cf.260A1-3]; Prot.311D4 [cf.310E1-2], 313B7 and C1 [cf.310E4], 313C1 [cf.311E4], etc.). On the other hand his repetition is not slavish: he omits the adjectival supplement οἷοι (C2), and he shifts from ἁμαρτάνειν to ἐξαμαρτάνειν, as a nod to what Thrasymachus has just now said, ἐξαμαρτάνοντα ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ (C6-7).
364
συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ (D1). Thrasymachus’s responses have ranged from mild impatience to snide misdirection to bald derision (336B8-Cff, 337A4, 337C2[ὡς δή], 337C7-8[ἄλλο τι οὖν], 337D6, 337E1[γε], 338B1-2, 338D2-3, 338D7[εἶτα], 339B1[γε], 339D4, 340C6[γε]). He has by now called Socrates three names (with peremptory γάρ : ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ [337D6]; βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ [338D3]; συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ [340D1]). When he is not derisive he is boastful (337D1-2 vaunts that he has a killer answer and 338C1 commands Socrates to hear that answer). Yet he is able to introduce the steps in his argument without the edge, and does respond to Socrates’s elenchus politely—at least, until Socrates concludes he has contradicted himself (τί λέγεις σύ, 339D4).
The sycophant acts honest and simple for devious and dishonest reasons. In argument this might consist of making an innocent-looking allegation that Thrasymachus’s argument should be held to a standard which Socrates knows all the while it does not need to meet (cf. the use of the term in Arist.Top.157A32; 139B26, 33). Thus for Thrasymachus Socrates’s sycophancy is just an aspect of his irony, his strategy of playing dumb and asking questions, and thereby defeating persons by holding them to a higher standard than he himself could sustain as answerer.
365
ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα (D2), as when a speaker starts with “first of all” to indicate he could have started elsewhere at the same time that he promises he’ll get there in good time. Cf. Gorg.472D1 (and Dodds ad loc.); Lach.195B3; Phdrs.235E; Prot.359E3 (and Stallb.,“ne longe hinc abeam”); Tht.166B; Adam on Crito 44D; Riddell, Digest §143.
366
καλεῖς (D2), as opposed to λέγεις (340C8 and before) broaches a distinction between the word and the meaning.
367
κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν (D4-5): The argument depends on the meaning of κατά, “in respect to,” and therefore “by looking at.” When we call him a doctor even though he errs, we are looking at something other than the error; conversely when we focus on the error (cf. κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, D3) we would not call him a doctor.
368
λέγομεν (D5): to prove his charge of sycophancy – i.e., that Socrates is holding him to too high a standard – Thrasymachus needs to have Socrates make the same minor error he does; but to save his position he needs to have everybody speak this way, and so he shifts from the second singular (καλεῖς, D2) to the first plural. He softens or hides the transition by avoiding to use any verb at all in the intervening and transitional case of the accountant (D3-5).
369
ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής (D5-6). The γραμματιστής is new. Last minute additions are a typical way of confirming a point (cf. 333B8-9 and n.). What is casual in their being added without warning is here underscored by his dropping of the verb in this third case.
370
οἶμαι twice (D5, D7), feigning humility. He is beginning a vaunt.
371
τὸ δέ (D7), “but in truth” (as often), here meaning not just in fact but in essence or in reality.
372
ἕκαστος (D7), as the superlative of ἑκάτερος, insists on superlative specificity; as such it is one of the expressions Plato uses for the ideas (cf. n.4650).
373
κατά (D7) now used with quantitative ὅσον (ἔστι paroxytone).
374
προσαγορεύομεν (E1), more technical than καλεῖν (D2) or λέγειν τῷ ῥήματι (D5).
375
δημιουργός (E4): Thrasymachus suddenly introduces the term to serve as a generalization from his three examples of the doctor, the accountant and the grammarian: the question is whether he means it also to cover the ἄρχων for the sake of whom these three examples have been adduced.
The semantic field of the word is complex. The δημιουργός is sometimes a mere craftsman (Leg.850B1, C3; Prot.312B1-4; Rep.396A8) but sometimes on a par with the finer competencies (parallel with ἐπιστῆμαι at Charm.173C2, Leg.902E5,Tht.146C8-D1) Sometimes the range of use appears to be exhausted by manufacturing trades (e.g. Apol.22D [and Riddell ad loc.]; Charm.173C2; Euthyd.280C8; Rep.415C2, 466A8-B2, 468A6-7 [where the γεωργός is not a δημιουργός]; ἄλλων is ambiguous at 371C2], 552A9-10, 598B9; Soph.219AC [esp.C4]), including the production of graphic art works (Rep.401A1-4 [but contrast 597D11]); but sometimes it extends beyond them, perhaps by metaphor although without apology, to approach any competency whatever (Crat.429A4-B9; Gorg.452A2-3, 503E; Rep.421C1-2, 466E5-6, 552D4-6). Rep.433D2-4 needs to be treated separately. In all cases competency is present.
The etymology of the word, its use in distinction from ἰδιώτης (Ion 531C5-6, Prot.312B1-4, and cf.Thg.124B5-7), the parallel use of the term δημοσεύειν in a context like Gorg.455B3 (cf. Thompson and Dodds ad loc.), and its ready availability for the approbatory uses of Timaeus and of Eryximachus in Symposium (186D4-5 [and Dover ad loc.], 187D3-5, 188D1), all suggest that the value of the competency lies in the public’s reliance upon it. This perhaps explains Glaucon's denial that a painter of a bed is as much a δημιουργός as a bedmaker (597D11-E2).
376
δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων (E4-5): The list is rhetorically bold at the same time it is strikingly ambiguous. It may consist of three nouns, “a specialist, or a wise person, or a ruler,” but the logic of such a triad is obscure, the fact that he expatiates only on the third item needs to be explained, and the subsequent elaboration with ἰατρός and ἄρχων appears to leave out the middle item, the σοφός.
σοφός in particular is new in the present context. Logically it stems from ἐπιστήμη (E3); as such it should modify δημιουργός. In this case ἄρχων, presumably parallel to it because also introduced by , should also modify δημιουργός. Thus the list means, “no specialist, whether working for the people as expert or as ruler ...” and the point of the list is to cast back through the σοφοί of the present paragraph (the γραμματιστής, the λογιστής and the ἰατρός), so as to return us to the explicandum they were introduced to explain, namely, the ruler. Such a list-configuration, in which a general term is followed by a pair of specifiers, is well established (Euthyd.271B4-5; Leg.766E1-2, 776D8-E1, 933A2-3; Phlb.17E4-5; Rep.411D3-4, 431B9-C1, 528A4-5; Soph.260C8-9); and linking nouns with modifiers as though syntactically coordinate is commonplace (Charm.161E12-13; Leg.665C2-3; Prot.319D2-4; Tht.175B3-4 [and Campbell ad loc.]).
377
(E5) again existential (cf. D7), though diacritics cannot indicate so in the subjunctive.
378
ἄρχων (E6): or, “really is ruling.” The word may be a noun or a periphrastic participle, but it comes to the same. It is an index of his subliminal desires that Thrasymachus exploits the opportunity to expatiate on the last item in his list only (he says “when he rules” when he could or should have said “when he heals or rules”), just as, conversely, he had taken given shorter shrift to the last item in his last one, in which he is uninterested (γραμμιστής, 340D6). To generalize for all the items in terms that generalize the last only, cf. Alc.I 107B9 [A7-8]; Leg.631C4-5 [applying also to B7-C1], 906E10-12, 948E5-9A5; Phdrs.247D5-E2; Polit.288D7-E4 [esp.E2-4], 290B1-4, 307A8-B1 [where the solution to the coming paradox is broached with a generalization of the last item only]; Rep.526D2-5, 529E1-3.
379
ἀκριβέστατον (E8): The superlative is gratuitous and enthusiastic.
380
ἐστὶν (341A1) enclitic; or ἔστι, “really is ruler,” as at 340D7.
381
μή (A1), because the denial is based on the definition or nature of the ruler.
382
βέλτιστον (A2), the superlative, taking head-on the challenge Socrates had made with his superlative at 339D7. There is a note of triumph in the presentation of his conclusion.
383
He claims he has not shifted positions, but by adding ποιητέον (A2) he shifts the accent from the justness of the command to the justness of obeying it, from the paradoxical statement that whatever the strong want is eo ipso just, to the almost tautological view that obeying the law they impose by virtue of their position as rulers, is just. The former is controversial; the latter almost goes without saying, since in common parlance laws prescribe what behavior is “just.”
384
ἐρέσθαι (A8), present infinitive representing the imperfect.
385
He has not only seen through Socrates’s sycophantic ruse (λάθοις, B1) of holding him to a higher standard than Socrates himself could maintain, but has succeeded to meet that higher standard himself (so that Socrates’s ruse had no force [βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο, B2-3]).
386
With τοιοῦτον (B4) Socrates avoids dignifying the squabbling with a name, which besides would in all likelihood only extend the controversy.
387
ἀκριβεστάτῳ (B8), Thrasymachus’s enthusiasm reappearing (cf. 340E8).
388
ὄντα (B8) again “existential” (cf. A1, 340E5, 340D7).
389
κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει (B9) invites Socrates to concatenate the two kinds of attack Thrasymachus has accused him of trying so far (κακουργήσαις, 338D4; συκοφαντής, 340D1).
390
γοῦν (C3) of “part proof:” whether he would is mooted by the fact that he already did.
391
καί (C6).
392
τῷ ὄντι (C6). The distinction between the loose and strict senses having been secured, Socrates can now refer to the strict sense with a variety of terms. Here he repeats Thrasymachus’s formulation with existential ὄντα (from B8) by varying τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ (C4) with τῷ ὄντι.
393
κυβερνητής (C9): Socrates expands on Thrasymachus’s example, ἰατρός (E6), with κυβερνητής so as to instantiate not only expertise (like Thrasymachus’s supplementary cases: λογιστής, γραμματιστής [340D3-7]) but the sorts of expertise that we rely upon in life and death situations. Cf. 389C2-6, 551C3; Leg.709B2-3, 961E-962A; Polit.299BC; Prot.344D2-5.
394
ὀρθῶς (C9) replaces τῷ ὄντι in attributive position (cf. C6).
395
ναυτῶν ἄρχων (C11): Though he was triumphant in the by-play Thrasymachus’s answers now become defensively spare (cf. C8).
396
οὐδέ (D1) illative, as καί would be if the two clauses were positive (cf. 342A5 and n.).
397
κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν / κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (D2-3): Socrates closely imitates Thrasymachus’s expressions at 340D3 and D4-5.
398
τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν (D3): With his exegesis (καί) Socrates adopts and emphasizes the association between expertise and rule that Thrasymachus had relied on above and expressed with δημιουργός at 340E4-5.
399
ἑκάστῳ τούτων (D5): ἑκάστῳ may be neuter or masculine, but given Thrasymachus’s insistence on the distinct nature of the various τέχναι it, with τούτων, likely refers to the two sample practitioners, doctor and pilot, rather than to the pilot and the sailor (who moreover should have been in the plural). D.J. Allan’s flat assertion that ἑκάστῳ is masculine, on the grounds that there has as yet been no mention of objects or persons whose benefit the arts secure, merely begs the question. There is no warrant in the text by which we can intervene and remove the ambiguity: it is intended by Socrates.
400
If this ἑκάστῳ (D8) has the same reference as the previous one (D5), an inference we have at this point no warrant either to assert or deny, Socrates has now suggested that skills have come into existence to benefit their practitioners. This is Thrasymachus’s position exactly. The art of rule is for him identical with the ruler obtaining and maintaining power by the promulgation of laws the obedience to which redounds to his benefit, even though secured merely on the argument that, being laws, it is just to obey them.
401
ἐπὶ τούτῳ (D9): Thrasymachus’s reply is still spare and without affect, despite the fact that Socrates has finally and for the first time articulated exactly the controversial thesis Thrasymachus wants to thrill everyone with.
402
With ὥσπερ (E2), adverb, Socrates answers in kind Thrasymachus’s peculiar question, πῶς.
403
πονηρόν (E5): the diction is strained. But if we ask why a villain is called πονηρός it is because he is troublesome and burdensome to us or, as we sometimes say, a “pain.”
404
τί δὲ δή (342A1) with δή indicating a move to the target.
405
εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα (A4), ‘to move them in the direction of the ability (ἀρετήν) they each need.’ εἰς is used with ἀρετή exactly this way at 335B8, B10, and C2.
406
καί (alterum, c. δεῖ, A5) illative, as at Gorg.478D6-7; H.Min.366A2-4; Lach.197A8; Meno 76D4; Phdo 85E5-6A1, 86A2-3; Phdrs.229B8; Polit.274A2; Rep.382B2-3, 434C1-2, 465C7, 476A10, 488E4-9A1. Close and sometimes hardly worth distinguishing is καί designating the temporal consequence of items as Charm.156D1-3; Gorg.467D3-4; Leg.738D6-E1; Phdo 81B8; Phdrs.251A7-B1; Symp.206D3-5, D5-7.
407
(primum, B1) meaning “or else” (cf. 401B [bis], 504D, 598E4; and Phdrs.237C1; Tim.52C5), the first alternative having been refuted, and therefore eliminated, by the fact that it leads to infinite regress. Distinguish this use from for the “or else” of the unattractive alternative (e.g., 490A2, 574A3, 598E4; and Crat.426B2; Gorg.494A1; Lach.196E4; Phdrs.245D8).
408
ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῆς πονηρίαν (B2): The language begins to raise τέχνη to a higher level and even to personify her.
409
οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ (B3): the language turns away from logical demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) toward praise (ἐπίδειξις), a praise of τέχνη that takes its cue from the enthusiasm that Thrasymachus had momentarily shown (ἀκριβέστατον, 340E8).
410
ἄλλῳ (B4): as with the dative ἑκάστῳ above (341D8) the reference and the gender are unascertainable.
411
οὗ (B5) continues the semantic obscurity of ἄλλῳ and adds syntactic obscurity: is the genitive objective or subjective? Does the τέχνη benefit the technician whose τέχνη it is (subjective) or the thing on which it operates (objective)? The former possibility was mildly suggested by Socrates at 341D5-8, perhaps a little perversely. That the latter might be the answer is however suggested by ἐκείνῳ, which as the demonstrative of the more remote reference would point back to the items τέχνη was said to seek the advantage of (341E6-7) before the talk about τέχνη needing another τέχνη (342A1-B2).
412
ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἕωσπερ ἂν ῇ ἑκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστίν (B5-6): the heaping sequence of approbatory abstractions sounds Parmenidean! Among these terms Socrates has incorporated ἀκριβής (B6), which he borrowed from Thrasymachus, as he goes on to remind him (B7).
413
ἄρα (C1) without apology and without supplementary connective.
414
ἐκείνῳ οὗ (C5): The ambiguity of syntax and semantics is continued (cf. B5) and becomes all the more pregnant (unfortunately difficult to render in English: my “that” for ἐκείνῳ can be a person): the ambiguous phrase is starting to echo.
415
ἄρχουσι (C8), emphasized by γε.
416
ἐκείνου οὗπέρ εἰσιν τέχναι (C9): This phrase since it was first used at 342B5 was amenable to a misinterpretation advantageous to Thrasymachus, but now its true reference is ineluctably clear: the genitive is objective and not subjective and the antecedent of ἐκείνου is the object the art operates on. The skills belong to nobody; the world belongs to the skills.
417
ἄρα (C11), again (cf. C1), direct and bare, this time supplemented with γε after ἐπιστήμη: “knowledge, given what she is.” He reverts from narration back to quoting himself abruptly, without ἦν δ’ ἐγώ or ἔφην, as if we knew he would.
418
ἐπιστήμη (C11) is really what they have been talking about all along (cf.340E3), though Thrasymachus’s introduction of δημιουργός (340E3), which helped him bridge the analogy between the σοφός and the ἄρχων (nn.375 and 376, supra), deflected attention toward the bridging term, τέχνη.
419
ἐπιτάττει (C12) replaces ἐκπορίζειν (341E6, 342A4), its ἐπι- picking up the goal of τέχνη as done with ἐπί plus acc. at 342B2; but the root of the new verb recalls the language of the previous context, in particular the picture of the ruler giving commands to the ruled (προστάττειν: 339D6, E3, 4, E7, and 340A5, replaced with κελεύειν by Cleitophon at 340A7).
420
ἐπεχείρει … μάχεσθαι (D2-3): Compare his enervated behavior at 338A8-B3 (and n.). Again Socrates places the important fact, that he did agree, into the (concessive) μέν clause (cf. n.309). From this we get the impression he has taken an effort to spare us burdensome detail. Cf. 350C12,ff.
421
ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἰατρός (D6): another variation in the expression of Thrasymachus’s pronouncement (cf.341C6, C8 and nn.), this time incorporating the emblem of Thrasymachus’s proud enthusiasm (ἀκριβέστατον, 340E8, cf. 341B8).
422
ὡμολόγηται (D6), the perfect pointing back to an agreement previously secured (341C4-8). With this step he closes the door on the second meaning of ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν at 342B5, which was there still ambiguous enough that he could still secure Thrasymachus’s agreement there.
423
οὐκ ἄρα (E2) abrupt and bare for the third time (cf. 342C11 and C1).
424
γε (E2).
425
σκέψεταί τε καὶ προστάξει (E3): Now that he has the instance of the pilot back in the picture he has a more natural example of an art that rules (since it rules the sailors), so that he can replace ἐπιτάττειν with exactly the original term, προστάττειν. The distinct uses he had in mind for the two examples he had given at the beginning, the medico who is not a businessman and a pilot who is not a sailor, have now been revealed and brought to fruition. We had been told that the essence of the example of pilot and sailor consisted in the fact that the pilot was also sailing in the ship (πλεῖν, 341D2); but the real purpose was to set up the image of an expert ruling others, which also was broached there (with the rather strained expression, ναυτῶν ἄρχων, 341C9). Now he cashes this image in, but only after a strain in expression that calls it back to mind, the expression σωμάτων ἄρχων (342D6). Socrates’s refutation is a consummate display of virtuosity.
426
οὐδέ (E6) was proleptic, announcing a large period, and is picked up here (οὐδ’ ἐπιτάττει, E8). The pair of negatives is then shuttled by ἀλλά (E8) into a series of positive statements linked by καί in “triumphant exuberance” (cf. England ad Leg.734D), building to a climax and then brought to a rest by the generalizing anaphoric doublet, λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ (E10), capped with ἅπαντα (E11).
427
καί (E8) epexegetical, but ushering in a series of καί's in triumphant exuberance (342E9-11), of which the characteristic is that they come one after the other with different forces and different effects: 360B7-C3, 402C2-5, 475C6-7; Alc.I 105B4-7, 122C4-8; Crito 47B1-2, 51A7-C1 (the Laws speaking); Gorg.507E-508A; 511E1-3, 525A, C, D4; 527BE; Leg.734D, 892B3-4 (unswaying march to the goal), 942B4-5; Phdrs.239E5-6; Prot.325A6, 360B4-5; Symp.180B6-8, 185B5-6, 188D4-9 (all perorations: conversely, note conspicuous absence of καί in Agathon’s peroration: 194C1-E5). Compare καί in unremitting satire at 396B5-7, 425B1-4, 573D2-4; and Charm.161E11-13.
428
καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ (E8-9): Socrates remembers to clean up a detail: Thrasymachus had brought in the δημιουργός so as to confuse his strong man with the strength conferred on a practitioner of an art (340E4 and n.). To make his point in English I have taken some liberty with the wording: τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ (342E8-9).
429
βλέπων (E9): Now it is Socrates’s language (rather than Thrasymachus’s: cf. 340D7 and n.) that approaches the terminology of the ideas!
430
καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ (E10): Closure is often achieved by a complementary or polar doublet: 361B4-5. 412B3-4, 476B4-5 [χρόας καὶ σχήματα a doublet for the visible world] 580A3-5, 608E6-9A4 ; Crit.115A4-5; H.Maj.304B2-3; Leg.694E6-7 [πολλῶν πολλάς], 744B7-C2 [reading πενίαν with A and O2 vs. πενίας with O], 764C8-D3, 779D2-5, 836A6-B1; Phlb.11B7-8; Polit.267E7-8, 299D3-E2; Prot.315C2-5, 325A6; Tht.186D10-E1; and cf. Thg.124B5-7.
431
ἅπαντα (E11) achieves a climax that was postponed by Socrates’s choice to use simple relative clauses (ἃ λέγει and ἃ ποιεῖ, E10) rather than the generalizing formulation that he had just used (ᾧ ἂν … δημιουργῇ, E8-9).
432
ὅτι (343A7): Thrasymachus’s riddle about the nurse was meant to elicit the question, “What do you mean?” just as a “knock-knock” joke relies on eliciting “Who’s there?” Socrates did say τί δέ, but he went on to scold Thrasymachus for asking an inappropriate question. In order to tell his joke Thrasymachus has to ignore the remark and act as if Socrates did not say it. Thus Thrasymachus has to bring himself to answering a question Socrates did not ask.
433
περιορᾷ (A7) and δεόμενον (A8) reveal that Thrasymachus is parodying Socrates’s praise of knowledge as the savior of the weak. He chooses to confuse Socrates’s ardent admiration for knowledge with a sentimental or softhearted concern for people who need its benefits. As though supposing that Socrates “identifies” with them, he now treats Socrates as a helpless baby. We shall soon see that his impatience is not due to the fact that his position has just been refuted, but that what is dazzling and compelling about his outlook has not yet burst forth upon the scene so as to make all this pussy-footing conversation unnecessary.
434
αὐτῇ (A8): The dative is ethical and loose, parallel to his use of μοι at 336C6.
435
This third ὅτι (A10) ends the back and forth and becomes the opening word of his performance.
436
καὶ δὴ καί (B4) is the shoehorn Thrasymachus uses to make a transition to his main thesis from the example of the shepherd. Cephalus used it in a similar way (329B7, and n.).
437
οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν (B5). The expression echoes and imitates his own stipulation of a “strict sense” but the meaning as we shall see is now almost the opposite (“realistic” rather than “idealistic”: cf. τῷ ὄντι, C4).
438
ἡγῇ (B5), of settled belief (cf. 334C2 and n.216, 494A1).
439
διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας (B7): The doublet vies with the doublet λέγειν / ποιεῖν in Socrates’s peroration (342E10).
440
τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης (C1-2): neuter adjective and abstract noun denoting practice and precept.
441
τῷ ὄντι (C4) continuing the realist tenor of ὡς ἀληθῶς. A
442
Polemarchus’s terminology of ὠφελία (C1) and βλάβη (C5) has now returned.
443
ἀδικία (C5), surprisingly, is the subject of ἄρχει (C6), in a virtual personification. It is a passion of Thrasymachus to see the concept personified in the person of the strong man—unless we prefer to say he sees injustice “embodied” in the strong man—so that ἀδικία for him is a metonymy for ὁ κρείττων.
444
τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων (C6-7) an instance of “reverse καί” (or τε καί as often as not), as at 359A3, 376C2, 378A3, 392D8 , 409A2-3, 411A7-8, 411D3-4, 411D7, 431B7, 474D5, 503C4, 524B4, 564C10, 574B2, 579D10, 590B3-4; cf. Apol.19D2 [τε καί]; Gorg.461C6, 474A1; Phdo 80C7-8, 100B8; Phdrs.254C8; Symp.191A1, 209C3; Tht.162B4-5; Tim.73E2.
445
ἐκεῖνος (C8) repeated (cf. C7), shows his enthusiastic approval.
446
εὐηθέστατε (D2) echoing his εὐηθικῶν above. Thrasymachus carelessly identifies the ”weak” with those who disagree with his strong-man attitude.
447
πανταχοῦ (D3): Again we see Thrasymachus’s penchant for identifying the truth with the omnipresent (ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν [338E6-9A1], whence πανταχοῦ (A3): cf. n. ad loc.), in order to avoid revealing that his argument is tautological: the unjust man has more simply because he takes more. In this case he goes further. What he presents as a proof by exhaustion (note the structure πανταχοῦ, 343D3, followed by πρῶτον μὲν ἐν X [A3],ἔπειτα ἐν Y [A6]) becomes for him a vehicle to praise injustice in all its venues one by one and thereby gradually to overcome his auditor’s resistance to his λόγος πονηρός. Again, απόδειξις becomes ἐπίδειξις (cf. 343B2 and n.).
448
συμβολαίοις / κοινωνήσῃ (D4): The terminology of business and partnership now reappears.
449
λήψεις (D8), “gettings” is obviously meant to stand in parallel with paying assessments (the parallelism prepared by corresponsive τε at D7). He plays down the technical term εἰσφοραί by burying it in the verb εἰσφέρειν, and then coins the term λήψεις, and in so doing gives legitimate-sounding voice to the sentiment “I give them all this money, but what do I get back for it?” Translators miss the rhetoric and supply a decent sounding term. “Distributions” [Shorey] and “retributions” [Leroux] are officialese; “anything to be received” [Jowett] and “quand il s’agit de reçevoir” [Chambry] are milquetoast passives; “when the city is giving out refunds” [Grube] combines both these vices; Allan (Plato.Republic I [London 1940] ad loc.) invents certain “exceptional distributions of land or money” for it to refer to. The idea that there is something to get is its own warrant!
450
πολλὰ κερδαίνει (E1): the term, with its connotation of excessive profit, reappears from Thrasymachus’s list of interdictions (κερδαλέον, 336D2).
451
καὶ γάρ (E1) introducing proof by focussing on specifics.
452
ὅνπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον (344A1), though there has been no depiction of the unjust man as such. Thrasymachus can now reveal that all along he has been talking about one and the same man, first as the κρείττων then as an ἄρχων and a δημιουργός and finally, just above, as the ἄρχων ὡς ἀληθῶς (B5), namely the fully unjust man. To reveal this is his rhetorical climax. The old dispute over whether to read ὅνπερ or to substitute the ὅπερ of the recentiores (Ast apud Adam ad loc.) is another attempt (cf. λήψεις, D8 and n.) to save Thrasymachus from himself—from saying what he really means—by blunting his expression.
453
His expression is ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς (A4), again (with its propositional phrase) entertaining the personification or embodiment of injustice in the unjust man; but ἔλθῃς almost suggests that his student or auditor is meant to entertain the notion and imagine himself going to these ends himself.
454
With (A4) Thrasymachus verges on epideictic personification, as Socrates had at 342B3ff.
455
τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων (B4) a genitive of condemnation with pregnant τοιούτων (“condemned for committing the crimes by themselves being called by their several names”).
456
μακάριοι (B7) goes beyond εὐδαίμονες, toward a divine happiness (cf. n.259). Socrates will remember this hyperbolic and impious claim throughout the entire dialogue, starting at 346A3 (n.259) and ending at 591D8 (n.4616).
457
καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον (C5): Thrasymachus like Socrates perorates with καί in confident fullness (342E9-11 and n.), but adds homoioteleuton into the bargain. The triad rhymes and reaches a climax in the surprising candor and intensity of its last term, but constellates no meaning or gestalt along the way.
458
ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη (C6). ἱκανός is always ready to be used in this superlative sense. The term is a favorite among men who are satisfied about being tough, like Callicles (cf. his ἐλευθερον καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανόν, Gorg.485E1 [cf. 484A2], 491B3, 492A1, noticed and corrected by Socrates at 489A6, 493C7, 495A8). Contrast its use in meiosis, as at Gorg.480A4 where it means basta.
459
ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον (C6-7), referring to 341A3. Thrasymachus’s speeches progress not in argumentation or logic, but in candor and intensity.
460
λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον (C8): With the addition of λυσιτελοῦν Thrasymachus adduces for his own purposes the fourth (even in its participial form) of five definientia that he forbade Socrates to adduce in his definition of justice, predicating it, now, of injustice (compare ὠφέλιμον, brought back at 343C1; κερδαλέον, brought back at 343E1; and of course συμφέρον, passim). The τε καί is gratuitous decoration.
461
φοβούμενοι (C3): in order to achieve epigrammatic swiftness Thrasymachus has to stretch the meaning of φοβεῖσθαι to include shrinking from doing evil (this is why φοβούμενοι is in hyperbaton). Compare the distinction between δέος and αἰδώς in Euthyph.12AB. Again the translator must make his own decision how willing he is to try to talk like Thrasymachus (cf. on ἡδύς, 337D6 and n.).
462
Now we can understand why he could easily identify Socrates’s irony (337A) with a desire to learn without paying (338B) and with playing the sycophant (340D1 and n.). Thrasymachus envies Socrates for his ability to persuade his interlocutors to abandon their willful sense of superiority and follow him (and the logos) instead, which for instance took place in his conversation with Polemarchus.
463
Thus the only way for him to ὑπολαμβάνειν the λόγον is ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (336B2 and n.).
464
τελέαν (341D11), ἐξαρκεῖ (E2, E5), and 342B3-6, esp. ὅλη (B6).
465
τελεωτάτην (A4), ὅλη (C2).
466
Now we learn how it is that Thrasymachus can think asking a question is the same as deciding an answer to it, as he had at 3366C2-7. Cf. n.ad loc.
467
343D8: cf. n.ad loc.
468
Laterally: i.e., from one species to another of the same rank, although with καὶ γάρ he portrays the transition as a focussing, as if public office were a species of λῆψις, which of course for the just man it is not (cf. the false promise of a focus in καὶ δὴ καί, at 343B4). Allan (ad loc.) takes the bait and invents the notion that ἀρχαί are to be included under λήψεις, which, like his attempt to domesticate that term itself, is an unconscious attempt to save Thrasymachus’s argument from its own concupiscence.
469
Illogic and inconsequence are symptomatic of excited discourse, and are therefore also found in the imitation of it and in the satire of it. When illogic is present in a text for these reasons, to emend it away is a misuse of learning. For instances of illogical order in the listing of items due to the speaker’s excitement or confusion, or the imitation of these in another person, cf. Alc.I 122B8-C2; Leg.661A5-B4 (desire), 687A6-B2 (desire), 734D7 (triumph), 896E8-7B4 (triumph); Rep.373A1-8, B5-C1, C2-4 (concupiscence), 561C7-D2ff (democratic man), 573A5-6 and D2-4 (concupiscence, bis), 586A8-B3 (concupiscence: cf. n.4483 ad loc.); Symp.183A4-7 (desire). For a sophist’s use of flooded kaleidoscope to bowl over his auditors, cf. Gorg.473B12-D2 and Symp.197D3-E5, to which the gratuitous use of ποικιλία gravitates: Prot.316D6-E4, 334A3-C6. In the depiction of things by their nature disorderly, the illogic or inconsequence might be classed as objective rather than subjective: Gorg.490C8-D1, 491A1-2 (both derogatory); Leg.669C4-D2 (imitation), 669E6-7, 842A5-B2, 842D3-5 (and Engl. ad loc.), 842D7-8, 890C4-5; Phdo.111A5-6; Rep.425C10-D6 (miscellaneous legislation), 516C10-D1 (cave images), 596E1-3 (imitation).
470
For εἰ βούλει (344A2) in priamel cf.P.O.1.3-4 and E.L.Bundy, Studia Pindarica 59n.55.
471
κρίνειν (E2) is common in the epideictic context of the priamel (the usual function of which is to select an item), but will reappear in the apodictic context of Glaucon's challenge to Socrates, in Book Two (360E1ff) and will return to play a very important role when Glaucon reassumes the role of interlocutor, Book Nine (576Bff: cf.n.4275).
472
He excuses what will be a detailed and lurid account on epistemological grounds with the teacher’s formula πάντων δὲ ῥᾷστα μαθήσῃ (344A3-4), which also has the function, by means of its superlative, of moving from foil to cap.
473
(relative, 344A4). His passionate tendency to personify Injustice leads him to the language and formulas of the kletic hymn.
474
Thrasymachus would have us believe that ἀδικία, like Pindar’s Zeus, τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει (Isth. 5[4]52); cf. H.Od.6.188-9).
475
Within the ambience of the kletic hymn we move from one to the other avatar of the goddess.
476
The selection of fragments and testimonia in Diels-Kranz (2.319-326) is quite enough to reveal that outside Plato Thrasymachus was thought of as a rhetorician only; the long fragment we have from a speech of his in Dionysius Helicarnassus (Dem.3=DK, B1) evinces no theory (and the “assertion” reported by Hermias in Phdrs. [239 Couvrier, = DK85B8] contradicts, if anything, a theory that justice is bad) but only a hard and emotionally powerful use of balanced antithesis. As to the Platonic “evidence,” besides the vivid depiction in Rep. I we have a description of his oratorical “powers” in Phdrs.267C7-D2 where his claim of a redoubtable ability to arouse an audience with slander and then to charm their anger away is all that is said. In that context he is singled out from other teachers, and even satirized, for the violent forcefulness of his art (κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ, C8: cf. σθένος [C9] and κράτιστος [D2]). Here, his violent effect on Glaucon and Adeimantus is the problem.
477
ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον (344C5).
478
πλεονεξία: “Having or getting more”—more, that is, than another. Likewise, his hero is not strong, only stronger (κρείττων); and the pinnacle of tyranny is only that everybody thinks he is. For Thrasymachus being first is all but he needs a second in order to achieve this. This is the “difference between the shepherd and the sheep” of which Socrates is so blissfully ignorant. Cf. πρότερος 336D5, προύλεγον, 337A5; βελτίω, 337D2; πλέον, 341A9; and within his big speech, his use of comparative (ἔλαττον, 343D3; μᾶλλον, 344A2; capping comparatives at 344C5) and μέν / δέ constructions (343C3-D1, D7-E7, and 344C7-8).
479
This impotence of power had already been broached in the case of the list of anti-sages to whom Socrates attributes the “doctrine” that justice is helping your friends and harming your enemies, above (μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός, 336A6-7).
480
Shorey: “...in the case of many doctrines combated by Plato there is no evidence that they were ever formulated with the proper logical qualifications except by himself.” (WPS 8, quoted by Shorey in connection with Thrasymachus’s putative “doctrine” in his Loeb edition [I.xi.]).
481
Like a tub of water his logos was ἁθροός καὶ πολύς (344D2-3), a doublet of quality and quantity. The feeling of density is an index of how many places the listener might have wanted to ask a question and couldn’t.
482
His technique of bathing people is less gentle than that of the τίτθη. To administer the cold shower of realism is as much ministering as he will do for these trucklers: they’ll have to wipe themselves dry. From his own perspective his Great Answer is the end of the discussion since among other things he has now revealed that discussion is for losers. All along he has intended only to hold forth, never to converse.
483
ὑπομεῖναι (D4): The prefix denotes that he is to put himself at their disposal.
484
διδόναι λόγον τῶν εἰρημένων (D5) suggests that somehow his εἰρημένα were not already λεγόμενα. To make sense of the phrase we must recognize the difference between holding forth and conversing.
485
When Socrates reverts to narrative he reverts to the first person, we move into the position of the second person, and the others present revert to that of the third. The force of καὶ δὴ καί (D5) is to assert that Socrates’s response was consonant with and even representative of the reaction of the whole company. By infixing αὐτός within καὶ δὴ καί he balances his role as narrator against his role as participant. Parallels of such infixing are naturally few.
486
Of course his primary duty is to explain himself (cf. λόγον παρασχεῖν above), a job that Socrates now slightly overstates with διδάξαι (D7) so as to introduce the alternative, μαθεῖν. Hereby Socrates articulates the difference between τὰ εἰρημένα and their λόγος. The speech is a performance referred to in the perfect (εἰρημένα) because the performance is over. Its meaning (λόγος) is the enduring and separate precipitate or “aftermath” of the performance. Evaluation cannot begin until the performance is over. Just as Thrasymachus’s authority (διδάξαι) is called into question by μαθεῖν, οὗτος is called into question by ἄλλος. The binary cancellations leave standing only the notion of sufficiency (ἱκανῶς), the criterion of all dialectical conversation (cf. nn.495, 534, 695, 1526, 2038, 2104, 2633, 3317, 4848; and 435D7, 523B1, 603D5). Thrasymachus thinks he is finished but Socrates in effect asserts he has not begun.
487
ὅλου βίου διαγωγὴ ᾗ ἂν διαγόμενος ... (E1-3), a “lilies of the field” construction meant to amplify the topic, in contrast to thinking it σμικρόν. διαγόμενος represents an optative protasis. The condition (completed with ἂν … ζώῃ) is ideal in order to stress that how one lives one’s life is a matter for deliberation (whence βουλευόμεθα, 345B3 below). The shift from βίος to ζώη suggests a distinction between what we sow and what we reap.
488
τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν (E4) refers to Socrates’s words εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει (D7-E1). τουτί (“this thing you just heard [sc. in my speech]”), with its deictic iota suggests a gesture with the hand. What he said cannot “be otherwise” since for Thrasymachus it is not a theory but a fact.
489
ἔοικας ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ ἤτοι (E5): Socrates is suggesting (with ἔοικας) that Thrasymachus’s speech is not sincere but just a display meant to thrill and scandalize his audience. For otherwise (ἤτοι) he would be concerned that our taking him seriously would have a serious effect on the way we live our lives (E1-3, E5-7). Socrates brings to the surface that in lieu of a captatio benevolentiae for himself, what Thrasymachus’s rhetoric is meant to do is stir up envious resentment against others.
490
προθυμεῖσθαι again (E7: cf. n.37). Cf.Euthyphr.11B4, E3.
491
τοσούσδε (345A1) first person demonstrative, suggesting now that the whole company is on Socrates’s side (cf. 338A3, 336E3); but since it is quantitative (vs. τούσδε) it is reminiscent of Polemarchus’s remark to Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue (ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς ὅσοι ἐσμέν; 327C7) about overcoming him with superior numbers. The τοι and the litotes οὔτοι κακῶς add to the mock-minatory tone. Now it is the strong man’s advocate that is being overpowered!
492
κερδαλεώτερον (A3), rather than the less crass λυσιτελές used at 344E2 and C8 (cf.336D2 and n.), to indicate he has understood that Thrasymachus is arguing “as a realist:” still, he does not agree.
493
ἔστω / δυνάσθω (A5): The third person imperatives hypothesize the scenario that Thrasymachus has just constructed, and the personification of injustice acknowledges the power with which he asserted the position (cf.344A4ff and nn. ad loc.). Socrates takes pains to indicate that he has indeed undergone the performance, but that he was affected otherwise by it than Thrasymachus had hoped (πέπονθεν, B1).
494
ἕτερός τις in place of ἄλλοι τινες, as well as ἴσως and the vague πέπονθεν, create an extended litotes. For πεπονθέναι describing the “effect” of a speech on a person, cf. Apol.17A1, Phdrs.234D1-2, Symp.215D3-E1.
495
ἱκανῶς (B2) the criterion of dialectical argumentation repeated from 344D7 above, which implies also that πεῖσον here means what “teach or learn whether it is thus or otherwise” meant there, just as βουλευόμεθα here (B2) repeats what was done with an ideal (deliberative) condition there (344E2-3).
496
καί (B4) impatient as at 340A4.
497
ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα (B9-C1) apologizes (γάρ) for bringing up the previous argument (τὰ ἔμπροσθεν) in order, by investigating it further (ἔτι), to illustrate the present issue.
498
ἐφ’ ὧ τέτακται (D2), perfect.
499
μηδενί (D7): μή of what is true (or false) by nature or definition.
500
ἐκείνῳ (D7) echoing ἐκείνῳ at 342E9 (cf.n.416), as this entire passage echoes that passage, at the end of which Thrasymachus saw no alternative but to deliver his long speech. As often ἐκεῖνος is used to designate an object notionally remote, here remote from the interests of the practitioner.
501
ταῖς πόλεσιν (E2): the plural again indicates he is making an empirical observation: cf. 338D7.
502
οὐκ (sc. οἶμαι, from οἴει, E3) ἀλλ’ εὖ οἶδα (E4), averring straightforwardly the same fact he had averred indirectly, at 344E4, with his ironic remark, ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν (cf. n.).
503
ἐπεί (346A1), as often, provides the questioner a way to continue speaking so as to block the answerer from answering until the questioner can give the reason he asked the question, which reason comes in the form of a preliminary question he wants the answerer to answer first. With τοσόνδε he concedes that his former question may have asked for too much of a concession.
504
παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι (A3): the expression also suggests courting paradox (τὸ παράδοξον) for its own sake, which has been Thrasymachus’s constant practice in conversation. The give and take of conversation is, after all, a medium ill-suited to the display of his true message in all its glory.
505
ὦ μακάριε (A3), the highest characterization a man could have, now lavished on Thrasymachus, along with other honorifics, as if to keep him calm in the aftermath of his outburst (345B2, 345A5, 344E7, 344D6).
506
σύ (B2) as always is emphatic: Socrates provides him as wide a berth as he needs not to answer παρὰ δόξαν.
507
τήν (B8) makes μισθωτικὴν the subject (with ἰατρικὴν the predicate) of καλεῖς, both understood from the previous question. μισθωτική therefore plays a role parallel to that of κυβερνητική in the previous example, as οὐδέ confirms.
508
μισθαρνητικήν (B10), substituting unobtrusively for μισθωτική, in order to provide a berth for the phrase μισθὸν ἀρνυμένος below (C9).
509
οὐκ ἔφη (C1): the kappa makes οὐκ adhaerescent. Socrates is not quoting Thrasymachus’s answer as being “οὐ,” but asserting as our narrator that he denied the question without telling us what words he used to do so. Socrates’s ease in wavering between narration and quotation has subtle effects worth keeping track of.
510
τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένος ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργούς (C9-10) scrupulously replaces the nouns ὠφελία and μισθαρνητική with verbs (nominal infinitive and participle): the event that they are better off by earning money cannot be disputed, but once it is stipulated the analysis of how it happens can only be that the ὠφελία comes from a particular art (per 346A6-8), and the action of making money (μισθοὺς ἄρνυσθαι), which since beneficial must be by art, is by the τέχνη μισθαρνητική (B10: an etymological argument), or μισθωτική for which it was substituted, from B8 and B1.
511
ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις (D2) a new formulation of “being paid” that employs Thrasymachus’s crass term for the “haul” that the unjust man seeks from government service (343D8).
512
οὐδ’ (E1) continues the οὐ in οὐ φαίνεται: “Would you say it also (δέ) seems to be the case that he does not (οὐ) confer (in addition to not receiving) any benefit, in case he works for free?”
513
πάλαι (E5) means not long ago but in a previous phase or section of the argument (cf. n.1407 ad 392B9), in this case the argument before Thrasymachus’s big speech (341B4-2E11).
514
ἄρτι (E8): the converse of πάλαι (E5), during this section or phase of the argument (namely, 345E2-3). Cf. 395A5-6 and n.
515
μηδένα (E8) instead of οὐδένα, for emphasis.
516
τὰ ἀλλότρια κακά (E9) echoing and quietly mocking Thrasymachus’s ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν (343C3).
517
τὸν τῶν βελτίστων μισθόν (347A10), as if this were a proverb like “noblesse oblige.”
518
τοίνυν (B4): Glaucon’s agreement (ἔγωγε) gives Socrates the warrant to draw his inference, which he naturally expresses with an “apodotic” chiasm (οὔτε χρημάτων … οὔτε τιμῆς, B5-6).
519
λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς (B8): the verb is derogatory, again echoing Thrasymachus’s laudatory language use of λήψεις (343D8); for ἐκ cf. 343E4).
520
περιμένειν (C3) present.
521
In contrast to what Plato is here able to have Socrates say, I cannot resist mentioning the fashion, thriving even in local jurisdictions of my beloved country, according to which the electorate seeks to hobble the politicians they nevertheless continually re-elect by imposing “term limits” upon them. The actual effect is that these persons go on to run for offices they have not yet held in other departments of government, and are usually elected by dint of something the press calls “name recognition,” and defeat candidates who have sought to move up from staff positions within that department, inevitably more competent and inevitably less known to the nevertheless all-powerful and all-incompetent electorate. It is because the refreshing cold shower Plato can so easily toss off with a comment like this that we call him a classic. Moreover he will treat a version of this very problem in Book Six.
522
πονηρότερος (C4) a person deficient in comparison to themselves. The adjective is used as at 341E5.
523
ἐπεί (D2) expressing, as often, a new idea on the ordinate rather than the subordinate level (cf. 346A1 and n.). To hear an allusion by “Plato” to the “ideal” state that Socrates and Glaucon and Adeimantus will construct in the coming books is an overstatement deaf to the drama that is being played out here and now, in which Plato is not even a speaking character. It is true that those guardians would prefer not to rule (520Dff), but the basis for persuading them is still that otherwise they would be ruled by their inferiors (520B6-7). The “ideal” city they construct is not a city consisting of ideal men.
524
With τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινός (D4-5) Socrates appropriates and concatenates two of the expressions for the Thrasymachean strictness (cf. n. ad 341C6), and then caps them with πέφυκε (ibid.).
525
πᾶς ὁ γιγνώσκων (D6): For the absolute use cf.476D5.
526
ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν (D7-8), a telescoped construction where the expected parallel, ὠφελεῖν, is demoted to a participle so as leave open a syntactic berth for what the parallel entails, πράγματα ἔχειν.
527
εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα (E2). To search among the Dialogues for a passage to which a further treatment of this question is postponed, takes too seriously what is only a formula of dismissal placed in a concessive μέν clause, and ignores Socrates’s point, which is that this captious “definition” is hardly as serious a matter as the showy declaration (φάσκων [E4], like pouring water over the audience) that one ought to dedicate one’s life to injustice. For dismissal with reference to another time cf. 506E1 (and n.3074); for dismissal by reference to other persons cf. 400C7 (nn.1564, 1854, 492A6-7 (and n.2822), 583B5-6 (and n.4404); for dismissal by reference to other arguments cf. 611B9-10 (and n.5070).
528
κρείττω (E4): In his peroration he had said ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης (344C5-6). That Socrates should summarize these adjectives with κρείττων is substantively correct but uncharacteristically imprecise. Still, by repeating κρείττων he introduces a point of comparison between the two concepts that brings them close enough together that the great difference in their importance becomes salient. “Yes, Thrasymachus loves to extol the strong; but when he says injustice is stronger than justice, I have to draw the line.” Cf. οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην, 354B8.
529
τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι (E7): Glaucon ignores Socrates's squinting use of κρείττω and reverts to the original language of Thrasymachus’s thesis (λυσιτελέστερόν τε καὶ συμφέρον, 344C7-8) preferring indeed the finer expression (λυσιτελέστερον) to the crass language Socrates had used to restate it (κερδαλεώτερον, 345A3 and A7).
530
ἤκουσας (348A1): the asyndeton is abrupt, and Glaucon answers by repeating the word.
531
With τοίνυν (A7) Socrates expresses a little impatience with Glaucon’s echoing answers. “If you agree with me, what shall we do?” There is a choice to be made what method to use, as the initial ἄν, taking up the already indefinite protasis (n.b. πῃ, A4) of the previous question, and then being followed by μέν, shows.
532
δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακρινόντων (B2). Not uncommonly the indefinite adjective plus attributive participle together do the work of an indefinite relative clause.
533
ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν (B3): For the term and the idea cf. διομολογεῖσθαι at 350D4 and Phdrs.237C3. This method, which assumes nothing but checks itself at each step, is tantamount to the method Socrates expressed above with διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει (344D7-E1), where the answerer who upholds and teaches a thesis might end up learning from the questioner’s questions that what he is upholding is wrong.
534
δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες (B4): Aristotle borrows the metaphor at de Caelo 279B11-12, where ἱκανῶς echoes the notion of dialectical adequacy implicit here.
535
ἴθι δή (B8), formulaic in dialectical discussion, for the questioner taking the answerer in hand. ἐξ ἀρχῆς is likewise a formula designating that the slate is wiped clean of ὁμολογήματα.
536
τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν (B9): Thrasymachus’s argument that injustice is better than justice began as a straight comparison (343C1ff) but this gave way to a praise of injustice, not injustice per se but injustice on a large scale, and in particular “perfected” injustice (343E7-344A4: τελεωτάτην, A4). He has left the possibility therefore that small injustice is not better than small justice; but Socrates leaves this weakness behind and posits a perfect justice which for Thrasymachus would be unmeaning or ridiculous. His question requires Thrasymachus to assert that injustice is, in principle or in the abstract, better than justice. Having thus begun he can continue the argument on the abstract or formal level.
537
καὶ δι’ ἃ, εἴρηκα (C1): With this second answer he has unguardedly and unnecessarily placed back onto the table all that he said (note the perfect εἴρηκα) during his long speech.
538
φέρε δή (C2) a formula like ἴθι δή.
539
αὐτοῖν (C3): With the dual Socrates secures for the argument the formal parity of ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη as abstractions that he had gotten to with his previous question, although in all likelihood, for Thrasymachus, only ἀδικία has a real perfection or highest form.
540
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; (C4): The categorical response indicates he is viewing the opposites on a formal level.
541
οὐκοῦν (C5) as if this were a continuation of his previous statement; μέν / δέ continuing the pairing of concepts.
542
ἥδιστε (C7): With this and with γε Thrasymachus reverts to sarcasm (a step up from ἡδύς γὰρ εἶ, 337D6). He has no choice since his position can only be expressed derogatively. For him it is good to be bad and bad to be good.
543
ἀδικίαν μέν / δικαιοσύνην δέ (C7-8). The answer indicates he has accepted the method of inferring ex contrariis.
544
γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, C12. Both terms are sarcastic so the phrase is obtrusively inscrutable. γενναῖος is often ironic (414B9, 454A1, 535B2, 544C6, 558C2) though just as easily approbative (363A8, 372B4, 375A1-2, 496B2 [where its connection with γνήσιον is shown], 527B9); εὐήθεια he has used above of the δίκαιος (343C6), and of Socrates who prefers justice (343D2), with the same sarcasm by which he has here called him ἥδιστε.
545
ἄρα (D1) stressing even more strongly the underlying logic of an inference ex contrariis.
546
κακοήθεια (D1): Socrates continues the method ex contrariis by correlating a predicate “etymologically” opposite to εὐήθεια with the subject correlatively opposite subject, ἀδικία. For etymological fallacy in dialectical exchange, cf. 333B2 and n.
547
εὐβουλίαν (D2), “being good at planning,” as opposed to εὐήθεια, good at being too dumb to plan. Thrasymachus is continuing to answer within the confines of inference ex contrariis. The ingenuity of his answer reveals at the same time what is inexact in this method. Just as the knight in chess may move over and up or up and over, the argument ex contrariis may move from positing the positive (εὐήθεια) either to negating the positive (κακοήθεια) or to positing the negative (εὐβουλία).
548
φρόνιμοι … καὶ ἀγαθοί (D3-4): καί might imply that an inference is being drawn, without saying so, that it is their astuteness (φρόνιμοι, implied by εὐβουλία in contrast with εὐήθεια) that makes them able or “worthy” (ἀγαθοί). But at the same time ἀγαθός can be the adjective for ἀρετή (e.g. 381C2 [cf.B10 and C8], 588A9-10, 601D4, 618C7; Apol.30B4; Phdrs.253D2; Symp.196B5 [referring to ἄριστον at 195A7]) in which case it would better be translated “good;” and φρόνιμος can be the adjective of virtue's component σοφία (e.g., 381A3), in which case it means “wise” more than “astute.” Being essentially conservative, the conventional moral vocabulary will always waffle in order to maintain a connection between the good and the praiseworthy (witness the stock phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός in which they are combined), though Socrates had just above found it easy to assert that οἱ ἀγαθοί are not φιλότιμοι (347B9).
549
σὺ δέ (D6), the pronoun emphatic.
550
λανθάνῃ (D8): For his attitude about being caught cf. 344B1-5. What makes perfect injustice perfect is that it does not need to hide: indeed it draws praise rather than blame (344B5-C2).
551
τοῦτο (E1): Second person demonstrative for the interlocutor’s idea (τοῦτο) and first person for Socrates’s own (τόδε).
552
ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας (E2), substantives corresponding chiastically to the adjectives φρόνιμοι … καὶ ἀγαθοί (D3-4 above) as we saw at the time (n.ad loc.).
553
ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις (E3): the construction is telescoped from ἐν τῶν ἐναντίων μέρει. For ἐν μέρει cf. 347A9.
554
ὦ ἑταῖρε (E5) Whether sincere or merely rhetorical, the vocative conveys the sense Socrates sees the two of them as partners (cf. n.3304). One of the functions of the vocative is for the speaker to characterize how he feels the argument is going: 351D8, 450D2, 453C6, 477D7, 504C9, 506D6, 522B3, 526A1, 527B9, 574B7; Crat.389D4; Lach.190C8; and L.Campbell, Tht. App. F, 283-4.
555
ἤδη (E5) marking a new phase or new regime and a point of no return, whether in the state of the argument or in the state of affairs (cf.348B2, 407A8, 411B2, 510D1, 540A6, 565C1, 569A8, 569B7, 574D2, 605A8, 605B2, 609B6, 612B7).
556
στερεώτερον (E5) perhaps belongs to the field of metaphors as ἀπορία and εὐπορία.
557
ἐτίθεσο (E7): In the language of dialectical debate the θέσις is the leading answer that is to be tested, and ὁμολογήματα are subordinate statements granted or conceded by the answerer, that might imply his thesis becomes tenable. For instance in order to persist in holding the thesis that justice is helping friends and harming enemies Polemarchus had to accept it was useless in peacetime; but if so then justice would not be the serious thing (σπουδαῖον) we think it to be. The answerer agrees to the subordinate statements since they are generally assumed to be true (here, νομιζόμενα; in the technical vocabulary of Aristotle, ἔνδοξα).
Socrates’s meaning is that Thrasymachus has taken a position where the usual ἔνδοξα cannot be brought into play by the questioner. From the very beginning Thrasymachus has held the “thesis” that injustice is the advantage that justice gives to the unscrupulous, and that good is good only for the bad. The motive of his original attempt to keep Socrates from using the νομιζόμενα ἀγαθά in his discussion of justice (336C6ff), and the meaning of his assertion that such talk is claptrap, has finally become clear. Such revelations are characteristic of real conversations.
558
κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρόν (E7) representing the negation of the conventional expression for value, ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν.
559
ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές (E8) is not meant to send us away from the text to find names to name, but to locate the position somewhere in between the idiosyncratic (παράδοξον) and what is commonly held, in public at least (ἔνδοξον).
560
καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν (E10): καλόν, a general term of approbation (cf. E7 and n.), supplemented by ἰσχυρόν, which is more closely tailored to Thrasymachus’s own outlook.
561
προσετίθεμεν (349A1), imperfect of customary action, standing in contrast with the prospect of Thrasymachus acting otherwise in the future (προσθήσεις).
562
ἐν ἀρετῇ … καὶ σοφίᾳ (A1-2): cf. 348E2 and 348D3-4.
563
τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (A7). Several times he has portrayed his speech as a cold shower of truth, e.g., 343B5 (ὡς ἀληθῶς), 343C1 (πόρρω εἶ), 343C3 (ἀγνοεῖς), 343C4 (τῷ ὄντι). Here the gratuitous pleonasm τῆς ἀληθείας expresses a sort of incredulity or abhorrence (cf. ἀποκνητέον, A4), as when one is moved to speak of the real world in conversation with an idealist, as if there were an unreal one.
564
οὐδέν (B1) is not only dismissive rather than literal (Shorey ad loc.): the positive reason for its use is to defuse a fight, a method of presentation that Thrasymachus always prefers. Cf.472B7 and n. ad loc.
565
τόδε and τοῦτο (B1), again (cf. 348E1-2 and n.): With τόδε Socrates warns Thrasymachus that he will need to distinguish between what he wants to say (over and over) and the new line of questions Socrates now has in mind, which Thrasymachus does not yet know about.
566
ἀστεῖος ὥσπερ νῦν καὶ εὐήθης (B4-5): ὥσπερ νῦν refers to 348C12, γενναίαν εὐήθειαν: Thrasymachus enjoys recalling his clever improvisation, and then varying it with bathetic καὶ εὐήθης.
567
ὅς γε πάντων (C6): γε indicates he infers the part from the whole, that he sees the inference as a fortiori.
568
οὐκοῦν (C7), purporting to continue the thought of the interlocutor.
569
γε (C7), emphasizing the inference Socrates needs, for which Thrasymachus had just suggested an a fortiori warrant that he had not explicitly asserted.
570
ὡς ἁπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ (C8-9): With Thrasymachus’s concupiscent term (λάβῃ, cf. λήψεις, 343D8 and 346D2, 347B8), augmented by the superlative πλεῖστον (while the argument only needs πλέον, C4) and the intensive ἁπάντων (while the argument needs only πάντων, C6) Socrates caters to Thrasymachus’s preference to overstate, rather than merely state, his position.
571
μέν / δέ (C11-12) for the just man but τε / καί for the unjust (C12-D1). The former draws a distinction whereas the latter masses all others together.
572
εἴρηκας (D2) the perfect for the complete articulation of a result.
573
δέ γε (D3) recalling a previous agreement here translated with the Thrasymachean slant (348D3-4 and n.), and adducing it into the position of the minor premise.
574
φρόνιμός τε και ἀγαθός (D3), repeated from 348D3-4 (here translated with the Thrasymachean slant: cf. n.).
575
καλῶς (D10) ominously echoes Thrasymachus’s adverbs εὖ (D5) and ἄριστα (D2).
576
ἕτερον (D13) is essentially comparative.
577
μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ (350A3), μή designating a man essentially unqualified.
578
ὅρα (A6), present imperative, of scanning across the entire field.
579
ἀλλ’ ἴσως … ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε (A10). He attempts to depreciate the inference (ἀλλ’ ἴσως) by asserting it is only logically true (ἀνάγκη), but grants it all the same.
580
ἴσως (B2) echoes ἴσως at A10.
581
σοφός (B3) straddles the Thrasymachean and the Socratic meanings (cf.348D3-4 and n.), and Thrasymachus laconically agrees (φημί, B4).
582
ἀγαθός (B5) likewise straddling; Thrasymachus laconically echoes his φημί (B6).
583
μέν / δέ (B7-8) of the discriminating man and τε / καί of the indiscriminate, as above (349C11-13 and n.).
584
τε / καί (B14).
585
μέν / δέ (C1-2).
586
ὡμολογοῦμεν (C7), imperfect of citation (cf.n.139, 352C4, 374A5 and B6, 392B9, 429E8, 472D9, 485A4, 511A3, 543C9 [with n.3596], 572C1 [with n.4165], 572C1, 580D10, 590D3, 605C7 [restored by Ast], 607B2, 612C8, 613C8; and cf. 559E4, 562B7, and 588E3 and n.4540).
587
ἀναπέφανται (C10) dialectical, in the perfect, taking the participial (sensory) construction. The prefix and the perfect tense marks the complete reversal of the previous position.
588
ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός / ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός (C10-11): chiasm for closure: cf. 370E2-3, 428D6-7, 463C5-7, 491D1-2, 510A5-6, 619E4-5; Leg.626C11-12, 665C2-3, 779D2-5; Phlb.11B8, 25A6-B1; Polit.299B3-4; Prot.343A1-5; Tht.175A3-4; Tim.38E10-40A2. It blends with the chiasm of opposites used in a list of opposites, as at Gorg.474D1-2; Phlb.32C1-2; Rep.410D1-2.
589
342D2.
590
ὡμολόγησε μέν (C12): μέν is concessive and suggests a division within him between what he grants, as dialectical partner, and what he really believes, or wants to believe, or wants to say he believes, or wants to get others to believe. We will learn which, below (cf. n.596).
591
All along we have presumed that Socrates is presenting the events of the previous afternoon and evening as they “actually” occurred. Above, as here, he allows himself to describe Thrasymachus’s behavior without quoting him (338A5-8, 342D2-3), and indicates the version he is giving us is streamlined. His continual placement of the important result into the μέν clause (cf. nn.420, 309)and the behavior he describes without quotation into the δέ clause continually indicates he is editing things only to spare us tedium. The purpose of such narrative interruptions surely is not to undermine our confidence in the version he has given us; it is a narrator’s way of announcing a transition.
592
More important than the logical impurities of Socrates’s argument is the effect it has on Thrasymachus. The power of his argument lies in the fact that his comparison of the master of injustice with an ignorant clown is deeply correct, and that he has been able to invoke the comparison objectively and without belligerence. Critics who infer from the course of the argument that their own command of logic is better than Thrasymachus’s or Socrates’s can supply Thrasymachus ammunition for fighting back, but he will still be Thrasymachus. To win the argument is not what he needs as his blushing indicates.
593
The δια- in διωμολογησάμεθα (D4) stresses that the conclusion was reached through a series of steps, and its middle voice that the steps were taken as a joint effort and together (cf. n.533).
594
τοῦτο μέν (D6): referring to the conclusion reached together at C7-8.
595
ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι (D7) is sincere and not a taunt. Thrasymachus’s basis for inferring that the unjust man is strong—namely, that he is competent and astute at getting his own way—has now been removed. If his mind were totally occupied by the thoughts that the dialectical process is moving through and were confined to its horizon, an assumption Socrates would easily make, Thrasymachus might at this moment find himself quite unable to remember what he had meant, as Polemarchus had at a similar moment (cf. 334B7, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’ ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον).
596
μέμνημαι (D9): By throwing Socrates’s word back at him, and then asserting that Socrates’s questions are actually an argument of his (ἃ νῦν λέγεις, D9), he abruptly dissociates himself from Socrates’s project of a σκέψις ἐν κοινῷ. In truth he was never the partner Socrates was taking him to be (and still took him to be even now in the narrative interlude, 350C12-D8, esp. ἡμῖν and φαμεν [350D6] and διωμολογησάμεθα [D4], and just before this ἡμῖν [C10] and ὡμολογοῦμεν [C8], and his own answer at 350C9). With ἔμοιγε οὐδ’... ἀρέσκει (non placit mihi) he blandly reserves the right to maintain his own view regardless of what he has himself said and regardless of logic, and by repeating λέγειν in καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν he treats his own manner of defense, the long speech, as equal in standing with the Socratic method of question and answer but only raises the spectre of logos set alongside logos, which as Socrates said will only postpone a decision (348A7-B4), as Thrasymachus realizes δημηγορεῖν, E1).
597
With ὅσα (E1) he threatens quantity, admitting his desire to hold the floor and harangue his audience: cf. ὅσα at 348A1 and A8, and ἁθρόον καὶ πολύν (344D2-3).
598
Even if Socrates succeeds at requiring him to converse, Thrasymachus at least gets to call him an old lady.
599
παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν (E5): Socrates reiterates his one criterion (γε): cf. 346A3, 349A6-8.
600
λέγειν (E6): arguing, as opposed to answering (D10, etc.). But as things unravel there is dramatic irony in hearing Thrasymachus agree to say what he believes since Socrates will not let him talk.
601
δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον (351A2): Socrates picks up where he wanted to pick up a moment ago (καὶ ἰσχυρόν, 350D7), adding δυνατώτερον. Thrasymachus made the assertion in his long speech (cf. 344A1-C2 [n.b.μεγάλα δυνάμενον, A1] and summed up at C5-6: ἰσχυρότερον … ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης.
602
νῦν δέ γε (A3) contrasts the current finding with what our position was before (cf. φαμεν, 350D6), as if Thrasymachus had been playing the “answerer” even during his speech. Socrates uses the optative εἴη, observing the secondary sequence of ἐλέχθη, to stress that positions change in the course of the conversation. Something else has since “happened” (ἀναπέφανται, 350C10), a reversal of the grounds on which we based that opinion. That reversal portends that it will come into view (φανήσεται, A4, dialectical) that justice is stronger than injustice.
603
οὐδεὶς ἂν τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοήσειεν (A6), for we have learned from the argument that injustice is lack of learning (ἀμαθία, A5)—i.e., the opposite of ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία. Perhaps ἔτι refers back to Thrasymachus’s assertion at 343C3.
604
ἁπλῶς (A6): the “simple” movement he forgoes is to take one step further in the same direction. Without even referring back to the subject term, justice, he can say that as justice’s knowledge led qua knowledge to its competence, its competence would lead qua competence to its effectuality (i.e. δυνατώτερον). His less simple path of argument will take him back to the subjects of justice and injustice, so as to derive a new line of implication from their inner nature.
605
ἐπιχειρεῖν (B1) is dependent upon εἶναι. The καί before ἄλλας, like the καί that commonly follows ὅμοιος, is nearly otiose: “... unjust to move beyond its border to other cities and attempt to enslave them.” Thrasymachus had depicted the ἄδικος, a single man, mounting such an assault on the civilized world (344B5-C2). Socrates now asks him whether his vision would also fit a city.
606
τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος (B5): with the superlative he refers to the τελεώτατα ἀδικία described in his long speech (344A1,ff).
607
ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος (B4-5) with his interlaced word order he tries to invoke, compendiously, the dramatic climax of his speech—whose illogic and lack of verisimilitude will finally become the subject of Socrates’s scrutiny.
608
μανθάνω (B6): cf. 372E2 and n.
609
οὗτος and τόδε (B6), again (cf. 349B1-2, 348E1-2): “There you go again, wanting to repeat your speech.” Thrasymachus’s speech did not assert that injustice was inherently powerful but praised injustice by depicting an unscrupulous man suddenly coming to power. Socrates now focusses on the process by which this seductively attractive result might, or might not, come about.
610
πάνυ καλῶς (C5): What is fine about Thrasymachus’s answer is that it reveals that his concern about justice and injustice at this point rests entirely on the question of astuteness (n.b., σοφία, C2), whether this is the disinterested knowledge of Socrates’s just expert or the unscrupulous cunning of his unjust tyrant-to-be.
611
σύ (C7) answering emphatic σοί, C6.
612
ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ λῃστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος (C8-9): The list consists of two pairs (πόλις, στρατόπεδον; λῃσταί, κλέπται) followed by the generalizing term ἔθνος. The πόλις is the case Socrates has raised; the army is presumably the agency by which this πόλις would impress its will. These two singulars are then followed by a pair of plurals that shift from the city and its mechanism to pluralities of persons that serve as parallels to the city, groups that are likewise out to do some large act of injustice. In contrast to the city and its army that might adopt an unjust policy, these persons, pirates and thieves, are by definition unjust (according to the legal and conventional view), though for Thrasymachus their names designate only the narrow specialism of their injustice (344B1-5; cf.348D5-9). Socrates’s shift from singular to plural is made less noticeable by his use of the otherwise gratuitous specificity of the pair λῃσταί and κλέπται as if to balance πόλις and στρατόπεδον. The shift to the plural enables him next to depict internal dissension among them.
613
ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι (D7) Thrasymachus mocks Socrates’s question in the wording of his answer, as Socrates’s χαρίσαι had mocked his χαρίζονται (C7). Placement of σοι again adds emphasis.
614
ὦ ἄριστε (D8), a case of the vocative indicating the speaker’s feelings about the argument (cf.348E5 and n.554).
615
With ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις (D10) Socrates has left behind the singular (πόλις), as well as the pluralities of the types of men that are unjust by definition. The phrase functions not only as a polar doublet so as to generalize the ἔργον of ἀδικία but also happens to present the very two sets of men into which Thrasymachus characteristically analyzes any human endeavor (cf. esp. ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον [344C5] and the present example of the best city enslaving [351B7] all the others). This forebodes that his unjust men will not somehow be exempt from the facts of reality after all. Plato does employ this doublet elsewhere, as a way of to speak of men in general, but always in conjunction with other doublets. Cf. Gorg.514D, 515A7; Leg.665C2-3, 838D7-8; Meno 71E-2A; Rep.431C1-3 (οἰκέται for δοῦλοι), 433D2-4.
616
διοίσονται (E3), the same verb for disagreement or fighting that Thrasymachus used in his mocking answer above (διαφέρωμαι, D7).
617
ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις (E4). The persons against whom the unjust are conceived to be plotting are here referred to as δίκαιοι, not because Socrates believes that the victim of injustice is eo ipso just, but according to Thrasymachus’s conception that the scruples of the just man are what enable the unjust to succeed (i.e., that justice is nothing but the συμφέρον κρείττονος).
618
δή (E6), moving to the target. A similar argument (from all to many to two to one) is made by the Athenian at the opening of the Laws (626B-D). Cleinias there remarks that as the focus narrows to the individual man the essential point becomes progressively clearer (τὸν λόγον ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἀνάγειν, 623D3).
619
οὐκοῦν (E9), spelling out the reason for the interlocutor’s agreement (cf.349C7).
620
φαίνεται (E9), dialectical, bringing forward what was agreed to at C7-D3.
621
εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν (E10-352A1): In redoing the list from C8-9 Socrates switches out the items that were both plural and essentially criminal (cf. n. ad loc.) in order to emphasize how an inherently neutral (i.e. non-criminal) group (denotable therefore by a singular noun) is affected by the invasion of injustice.
622
ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ (352A3). The list corresponds to ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις above (351E4) and καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις below (A8). What the middle term τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντί adds is the principle (παντί) according to which enmity to an unjust man is shared both by himself as unjust and by another man who is just: both become his opponent (ἐναντίῳ). Adam’s note on παντί: “i.e., whether just or unjust,” treats παντί as the noun and ἐναντίῳ as the adjective (i.e., πᾶσι ἐναντίοις οὖσι); Jowett’s translation: “becomes its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just,” is unclear without the exegesis of his note, “with all that opposes, and therefore (inclusively) with the just,” but the meaning thus clarified—that the unjust individual becomes inimical to all that opposes him—is mere tautology. Lee in the Penguin, “with itself and with its opponents and with whatever is just” seems to take παντί with both τῷ ἐναντίῳ and τῷ δικαίῳ by pluralizing the one and adding “whatever is” to the other; Grube “to itself and to what is in every way it opposite, the just,” and Shorey in the Loeb: “an enemy to itself and to its opposite in every case, to the just,” require καί to be appositive; Leroux in the Flammarion, “ennemie d’elle même et de tout un chacun qui est son opposé et qui est just,” and Chambry in the Budé, “ennemi de lui-même et de tous ceux qui lui sont contraires et qui sont justes,” import the inference that the victim of injustice is eo ipso just; Robert Baccou in the Garnier, “ennemi de lui-meme, de son contraire et du just,” leaves out παντί; and Allan Bloom’s “enemy to itself and to everything opposite and to the just” illustrates because of its ambiguity a limitation inherent in his decision to produce a “literal translation” of the sort that Aquinas had of the text of Aristotle from William of Moerbeke (cf. his “Preface,” init.). Tucker comes close with his note ad loc.: “to itself (i.e., inwardly), and to everything that opposes it and (consequently or necessarily) to the just.”. Cornford’s translation, “at enmity with itself as well as with any opponent and with the just” (cf. Davies-Vaughn and Lindsay), and Schleiermacher's “mit sich selbst verfeindet und mit allem entgegengesetzen und dem gerechten,” are clear, and I think correct, about τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντί, but fail to articulate how the just man fits in. Waterfield (1993) replaces the Greek with a sentence of his own that means something the Greek does not say. By my lights only Rufener's “es sich selbst und jedem Gegner un damit auch dem Gerechten zum Feinde wird” (Zurich 1973) is correct.
623
τοῖς δικαίοις (A8): reverting to the plural (as at 351E2) after the singular he employed with παντί to state the principle (A3), so as to prepare for the next step by bringing back the whole class of persons to whom the unjust is inimical.
624
δέ γε (A10) fits this unexpected assertion into the argument by immediately identifying it as a minor premise.
625
καὶ οἱ θεοί (A10).
626
εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου … θαρρῶν (B3): his remark is directed at Socrates’s apparently gratuitous addition of the gods to the argument, as if he were heaping food onto his plate.
627
οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι ἴνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπεχθάνωμαι (B3-4). τοῖσδε means “our auditors:” it is a first person plural demonstrative, as it were (cf.τοιούσδε, “our kind,” 597A8). Once again the reason he gives for agreeing undermines and mocks the logical procedure of argumentation by imitating the subject matter (ἐναντιώσομαι / ἀπεχθάνομαι: cf. διαφέρωμαι, 351D7), which comports not at all with the feasting metaphor he throws at Socrates. Thrasymachus now toys with blaming the company for his giving in to him.
628
τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἑστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον (B5-6): Socrates plays along with Thrasymachus’s metaphor of the feast (εὐωχοῦ) but not his corrosive mockery of the content and method of the argument (ἀπεχθάνωμαι).
629
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ (B6): γάρ announces he will explain how this next step will complete the feast (τὰ λοιπά … ἀποπλήρωσον), with μέν suggesting that the explanation will consist of a summary of what they have already done (as if they have “finished” these plates), to be followed by a δέ clause expressing what still needs to be done (eaten). The μέν clause is then interrupted with a self-correction (C1-8) lengthy enough to require a resumption (with μὲν οὖν, C8-D2), giving way finally to the δέ clause at D2.
630
οὐδέ (B8), the δέ with μετ’ ἀλλήλων.
631
οὕς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως (C1), referring to 351C8-10. οὕς brings back the plural he there introduced (cf. n. ad loc.) but subsequently suppressed (cf. 351E10 and n.). He now retracts the hypothetical notion of unjust people banding together to do injustice on the grounds their injustice would pre-empt them even from banding together.
632
The more neutral κομιδῇ ἄδικος (C3-4) relies on, but also replaces, Thrasymachus’s extreme expression τελεώτατα ἄδικος (351B5), an essentially epideictic expression he drew from his speech (344A4).
633
ἀπείχοντο (C3): a noteworthy use of the present contrafactual construction to deny the truth of a presumption. In English we would say, “They would never have kept their hands off each other in the first place.”
634
ἐνῆν (C4), imperfect, directs our attention back to the moment before we envisioned the unjust group mounting an assault on the just (351B1-3). One may compare the so-called philosophical imperfect.
635
μήτοι and γε (C5) add a tone of self-ridicule for their failure to see this point earlier.
636
ἐφ’ οὓς ᾖσαν (C5), shorthand for the imperial aspirations of the unjust, repeated from 351C9.
637
ἡμιμόχθηροι (C7), a term vastly disappointing for Thrasymachus since for him being all-bad is best, but being half bad is not half good (cf.344A7-8, B2-5). The term itself, like almost all compounds in ἡμι-, is derogatory.
638
παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι (C7-8): Socrates reverts to Thrasymachus’s formulation (the adverb τελέως, though still not the superlative adverb: cf.351B5), now that the notion has been vitiated, so as to use that formulation against itself (τελέως … ἀδύνατοι).
639
ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι (D3-4): Finally we revert to the original challenge Socrates brought against Thrasymachus’s long speech (345A2-B3). The question was postponed first by the digression into the rule either to use terms in the same meaning or to announce a change of use (345B3-347A6), which re-established along the way that true rulers never seek their own good, and it was then further postponed by Glaucon’s request for clarification of the principle noblesse oblige (347A7-D8), at the end of which Socrates and Glaucon agreed that the best method of testing Thrasymachus’s thesis was to revert to the method of question and answer they had been using before his long speech (348A4-B7). At that point Socrates began an entirely new line of questions (ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 348B8-9) designed to dismantle the image of the unjust man Thrasymachus had built up in his long speech, rather than attack the main point which it could reach only in its peroration, that the unjust life is better than the just life, which had been his original goal to impugn. The intervening argument has erased the picture Thrasymachus drew of an unjust man who with astuteness and competence developed his power to perfection; finally the original question, which had played the culminating role in his speech, and which regardless of his rhetorical strategy was always the most important question since it is the main question we face in life, can now be reached: whether the unjust life is in fact preferable to the just.
640
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος (D5-6): this phrase appropriately recalls 344E1-3, where the great question was first broached. The end of this conversation is approaching.
641
τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; (E7): ears being the complement of eyes, the question borrows its content from the previous question, ἔσθ’ ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθάλμοις; (E5), as also it borrows its grammatical formulation in the potential optative. Hence ἄν does not need to be repeated (exactly parallel to 382D11, which echoes D6-7: cf. n.1299). We can compare the omission of the interrogative particle when the questioner can rely on the interlocutor to know a question is coming (cf. 333A13 and n.).
642
καλῶς (353A4): Finally τὸ καλόν enters the argument! Having the right tool enables the craftsman to perform his job admirably.
643
κάλλιστα (A11), replacing ἄριστα in the original formulation (352E3).
644
οὐ γάρ που τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ (C5-6): The pacing of Socrates’s questions in this passage is noteworthy in several respects. Above, the list of tools inappropriate for cutting vines (353A1-2) might have brought to mind the δρέπανον by its very absence (cf.333D3-4); here Socrates by avoiding to name the ἀρετή of the eyes has brought that specific ἀρετή to Thrasymachus’s lips, but Socrates refuses to approve or disapprove this impletion of the question’s form or matrix, in order to insist that the matrix be recognized per se. We must wait to see why, in his presentation of the target case of this whole argument—soul.
645
τὰ ἐργαζόμενα (C7) internal or adverbial accusative, while ἔργον is an external or objective accusative.
646
μετὰ τοῦτα τόδε (D3): by the “persons” of his demonstratives the speaker distinguishes for his interlocutor between what the interlocutor already has taken in (ταῦτα) and a new point the speaker is about to make (τόδε). Above, the distinction has provided a way to impede Thrasymachus from repeating himself (351B6, 349B1, 348E1), but it can also serve to prepare the interlocutor for something quite new, as it does here.
647
τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα (D4-5). I do not know what background list, if any, this triad is relying upon, nor the logical configuration of the three terms.
648
With αὖ (D9) Socrates intimates that the function of living (τὸ ζῆν) falls under a second heading rather than being another member in the previous category, which contained actions of a moral nature. Even so, given the biological context created by the examples of the eyes and ears, when he now brings up ζῆν as a function of soul we might assume a biological meaning and therefore not notice that he has arrived at the target question of this section, ὅστις τρόπος ζῆν, brought forward from before (352D6 and n.).
649
ἀνάγκη ἄρα (E4) of logical necessity, as usual.
650
εὖ πράττειν (E5): Context and parallelism (of κακῶς and εὖ) require us to construe πάντα ταῦτα (353E5) as an external or objective accusative, making εὖ πράττειν mean what εὖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι (et sim.) has been meaning (E1-2, C9-10, C6-7, B14-C1, A10-11); but εὖ πράττειν cannot fail also to carry the connotation of “faring well,” in accordance with which πάντα ταῦτα would be construed as an accusative of respect.
651
ἀρετήν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην (E7), alluding exactly and only to διωμολοησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, 350D4, itself a restatement of the argument (349B2-50C11) that the just man in resembling the knowledgeable man (σοφός) shares also in his competence (ἀρετή) while the unjust resembles the ignorant and thus inherits his incompetence. The intervening second argument (351B1-352A8) had added effectuality or power to the side of justice and futility to the side of injustice, a conclusion Socrates already thought was implicit in the argument about σοφία and ἀρετή (351A3-6) but thought it worthwhile to prove by a more complex route (ibid., A6-7). The present, third argument uses the conclusion of the first to prove that the virtue the just man has, since it belongs specifically to his soul, enables his soul to do its job well, and thus enables it to give him a good life.
652
εὖ βιώσεται (E10) continues the same ambiguity we saw in εὖ πράττειν, namely, doing a good job of living and having a good life.
653
ἀλλὰ μήν γε (354A1) of the minor premise.
654
Socrates redeems these terms from their abuse by Thrasymachus (cf.344B7).
655
ἄθλιος (A4) is as much a descriptive term (“miserable”) as it is a term of derogation (“loser”). It was in its latter sense that it was given a role to play in Thrasymachus’s great speech (in the superlative, of course: 344A6), and Socrates intends to correct this here. Thrasymachus’s notion of happiness is likewise more a matter of others thinking the tyrant happy than of his actually being so.
656
ἀλλὰ μήν γε again (A6).
657
οὐδέποτε ἄρα (A8): The conclusion is a conclusion in principle regardless of circumstances. Thrasymachus’s speech on the other hand presented only a fabulous story of “successful” circumstances that was meant to be overwhelming in its appeal. Socrates had already declared himself immune of this attempt at persuasion (345A4-7).
658
ὦ μακάριε (A8), held out until the end. Socrates borrowed it from Thrasymachus’s speech (344B7) and has already used it twice of Thrasymachus himself (346A3, 345B2).
659
λυσιτελέστερον (A8) another reappropriation from Thrasymachus’s speech (344C8). κερδαλέον on the other hand, did not deserve to be redeemed.
660
ταῦτα δή σοι ὧ Σώκρατες εἱστιάσθω (A10): Thrasymachus has the last word by reminding Socrates he has now had his dessert (cf. τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἑστιάσεως, 352B5).
661
εἴτε κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή (B6), a “chiasm of before and after” (cf. n.18) that summarizes the last few moments of the argumentative feast: The notion that justice was a kind of viciousness (κακία) led to its being seen as ignorance (ἀμαθία) and incompetence rather than astuteness (σοφία) which turned out to be the province of virtue (ἀρετή).
662
σχολῇ (C1) idiomatically designates an argumentum a fortiori: cf. n.1451.
663
ἀπηλλάχθαι (357A1) denotes a release or respite that has been earned, and therefore alludes to the circumstances of Socrates’s presence, that he was compelled to join the group. Now, he thinks, they would let him go. His allusion connects the beginning of this Book to the beginning of the last, and the programmatic character of his remark approaches transparency.
664
λόγου (A1): The λόγος from which he hoped for release (note lack of article) may be argumentation per se or conversing: with Socrates the distinction does not amount to a difference for very long.
665
προοίμιον (A2): The first impression we get from the term is quantitative (“Long and toilsome as that conversation might have been, much more was yet to come”), but προοίμιον has this meaning only because of its true meaning, which is qualitative. Socrates swiftly intimates, under the guise of his characteristic irony, that the conversation invoked problems that only a fuller discourse could handle properly, and that the ensuing conversation did in fact achieve this. His comment therefore promises us that the conversation will become more substantial than it has been. By looking only backward Socrates indicates what we need to know about what is coming. What will make it more substantial? What will constitute the real beginning and turn the conversation so far into an only apparent beginning?
666
The ἀεί τε δὴ ἀνδρειότατος … καὶ δὴ καί construction (A2-4), akin to ἄλλως τε (…) καί, boils down to the praising Glaucon’s vigor for rising even in this very formidable occasion. For the sense of ἀνδρειότατος cf. 459C6.
667
ἀπόρρησιν (A4): The sense is given in a methodological passage from the Phaedo (85C1-D4).
668
βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι (A5-B1) cannot help but remind us of Socrates’s constant refrain in the Apology, “He seemed to be wise but in reality he was not” (Apol.21C-23B). Socrates here reports an imitation of himself by Glaucon, without letting on to it. Apollodorus likewise imitates Socratic talk at Symp.C6-D3, and Aristodemus his barefootedness, as there reported by Apollodorus (173B2). Chaerephon in Gorg.448A6-C9 sounds just like Socrates, as Alcibiades does at in a similar “sub-squabble” (n.348) at Prot.336B7-D5. Cf. also n.2285.
669
τοίνυν (B4), as always, presses the interlocutor to own up to the implications of what he has just agreed to.
670
οὐ … ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει (B4). The paradox again imitates Socrates –e.g., Gorg.467B2 οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται, q.v. and cf. 577E.
671
λέγε γάρ μοι (B4).
672
Goods viewed per se and objectively are typically distinguished as external, bodily and psychic (cf. n.80 supra). The criterion of the present division is our (subjective) reasons for valuing things, an idea later to be thematized with τιμᾶν and its cognates (359B1, 359C6). Glaucon employs the distinction in order to draw Socrates into holding forth; whether it is a cherished belief of the dialogue’s author is extra argumentum and does not matter to the drama.
673
αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα (B6): as we might welcome having an orange (αὐτό) for its flavor (αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα).
674
ὅσαι (B7) introduces a proviso (ἀβλαβεῖς [sc. εἰσιν]). καί is epexegetical introducing the negative μηδέν which will explain what is being denied by ἀβλαβεῖς. μηδέν is used instead of οὐδέν by a common kind of logical attraction according to which the explanation of a proviso might best itself be expressed as a proviso. But the construction squints: after a few words we have ταύτας, which indicates that the proviso is being explained by being commented upon rather than restated. The variants in F (καὶ μηδὲν] εἰ καὶ μηδὲν F : ταύτας] αὐτάς F) give the logically imperfect sense “as many as are harmless if in fact nothing else issues from them other then enjoyment,” and they do so with Greek syntactically faultless but less idiomatic. It is natural after all that an epexegetical remark should take on a constructio ad sensum.
675
ἔχοντα (B8) probably echoing ἔχειν (B5) but perhaps meaning “unvaryingly” in contrast with ἄλλο γίγνεται immediately before.
676
ἀγαπῶμεν (C1) varies ἀσπαζόμενοι (B6).
677
αὑτοῦ χάριν (C1) varies αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα (B6).
678
τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γιγνόμενων (sc. χάριν), C1-2, varies τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι (B5-6).
679
διὰ (C3) inexactly varies the constructions in χάριν and ἕνεκα above; and ἀγαπῶμεν reverts to ἀσπαζόμεθα (C3).
680
εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ (C5), a categorical term fully motivated and justified by the accumulation of instances.
681
In this last case the examples (C5-7) are given before rather than after the general criterion is articulated (C7-D2). Such chiastic order is of course natural for closure (cf. 350C10-11 and n.588; and 547D4-8C2), but we may note in addition that hereby the listener is mildly “induced” (i.e., led) to formulate the criterion, himself. The list of examples is notable for its content and its form: τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός (357C5-7). The first two terms are formally parallel (articular infinitives) and in content are motivated by ὑγιαίνειν above. The third term is a surprise, drawn in content from the second as if it were the active instead of the passive but saliently different from it in form, being an abstract verbal noun instead of an articular infinitive. Immediately it is succeeded by a categorical statement of what it is meant to represent that is effected by the fourth term, χρηματισμός. ὁ ἄλλος by a common idiom means “the rest of” (in lieu of a plural) and indicates that χρηματισμός is a generalized element of higher logical rank than the other items. ἰάτρευσις therefore has what we may call an “ancipital” role in the list. What is noteworthy is how much care is given to ensure through the careful choice of examples that the movement from one idea to the next be made as smooth and continuous as possible. The thought of the Socratic epagoge, as well as Glaucon’s imitation of it, is εἰρομένη rather than κατεστραμμένη and “often proceeds by minute steps through linked synonyms” (Shorey ad Rep.338E [Loeb 1.48.note a]).
Given the καί before ἰάτρευσις, the τε after it is strictly redundant. Its special force is to announce there will be a connection between its own item (ἰάτρευσις) and the ensuing item that is more intimate than its item’s connection with the previous items. Compare 407B8-C1, 410D1-2, 412B3-4, 431B9-C1, 519B1-2, 568E2-3 (οἵ going with all three), 611B2-3; Crat.407E5-A2; Leg.733E1-2, 738D6-E1, 834A4-5 (cf. England ad loc.), 899B3-4, 950E5-6; Meno 75C8-9; Phdo 85E3-4; Symp.206D3-5, 213D3-4; Tht.146C8-D1, 156B2-6, 157B9-C2, 167C1-2, 176C3-4. Distinguish the force of γε, δέ, and δή in similar position, all of which distance their item from the previous rather than bringing it closer to the subsequent (Tht.149D1-3 has both τε and δή). Distinguish also non-redundant τε placed in lieu of καί, helping to effect closure, where it may or may not also indicate an intimate link (A καὶ B καὶ ... καὶ X, Y τε καὶ Z—and—A καὶ B καὶ ... καὶ X, Y1 τε καὶ Y2) as Alc.I 122B8-C2; Leg. 665C2-3, 735B1-2, 828B4, 842E1-3, 886A2-4, 896B10-C1, C9-D1, D5-7, 899B3-4; Phdo 59C1-2; Polit.288B2-4; Rep.547B3-4; Tim.24A7-8, 42E8-9, 43B2-4, 46D2-3, 87D1-2, 92C7-8. In the present case the especially intimate relation between the item (ἰάτρευσις) and its subsequent (χρηματισμός) is that of particular and universal (for which cf. the similar list at Tht.157B9-C2).
682
δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν (C8), repeated from the first division (B5).
683
Note the chiasm (D1-2): μισθῶν … χάριν (varying ἕνεκα immediately above) picks up ἰάτρευσις and τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν (a repetition of the formula at C1-2) picks up the salubriousness of exercise and medical treatment.
684
γὰρ οὖν (D3) grants the obvious and ἀλλὰ τί δή voices, or feigns, a little impatience.
685
The μέν solitarium (358A1) indicates some diffidence but more resolve.
686
ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ (A1). Notably not τὸ ἄριστον, which would constitute a claim about the essence of goodness. To call something καλόν is often to express admiration, and τί τὸ καλόν; can mean “What shall we praise?” That we love (ἀγαπητέον, A2) justice for both reasons therefore makes it κάλλιστον in Socrates’s eyes exactly because in this case it affords us more grounds for praise. There is no deeper idea at stake; the tripartition has served its immediate purpose in that Glaucon has succeeded to warm Socrates to the task of praising justice in itself. To wonder about the doxography of this tripartition is to ignore its application in the drama, by which it is immediately exhausted.
687
μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι (A3): Socrates is remembering the climax of his argument against Thrasymachus, that justice is the virtue of the soul that enables it to do its job well, and therefore enables its possessor to have a happy life (352D8-354A9).
688
τοίνυν (A4): Glaucon marks the victory of his epagogic strategy. Glaucon’s signal “bravery” (ἀνδρειότατος, A3) is shown by his elevating the conversation to the Socrates’s own standard.
689
ἐπιτηδευτέον (A6): a new term denoting a “practicing observance” that (appropriate to the attitude being described) lacks the zeal of the terms used so far: γαπᾶν, ἀσπάζεσθαι, and ἐφίεσθαι.
690
μισθῶν θ’ ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν (A5). Despite the relative ubiquity of the verb from which it is formed (εὐδοκιμεῖν), the abstract noun εὐδοκιμήσεις occurs in Greek literature in these pages only (imitated twice by Adeimantus, below: 363A2, 6), apart from one late instance in Lucian (Pisc.25: τὰ δικαστήρια (sc. ἀπολείπειν) καὶ τὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις εὐδοκιμήσεις) and once, also late, in the singular, in Themistius (Or.29.347C: εὐδοκίμησις καὶ ἀρετή). The choice of the plural makes the abstract noun designate concrete instances of rewards coming from good reputation, and therefore might best be translated with the English plural, “favors,” in its concrete sense (cf. Gildersleeve §44). With μισθῶν it forms an hendiadys, and διὰ δόξαν by an artful figura etymologica sets into relief that such rewards can be the result of mere opinion, which is the burden of Glaucon’s present remark. The term represents a specific extension of “wages,” above (D1), and – for all purposes a coinage – finds a way to collapse into a single word both the reason others pay it (*δοκ-, which needed to be spelled out with διὰ δόξαν, and specifies ὅσα γίγνεται from above) and the reason the recipient wants it (εὐ). Adeimantus will imitate the pseudo-pleonasm, below (cf.363A1-5, esp. ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης [cf. n.786, and compare Socrates at 554C12]). Indeed in the next line justice is considered harsh not only αὐτό but also δι’ αὑτό.
691
ὡς ὂν χαλεπόν (A6) playing the opposite of ἡδύ. The term has a special career in the maxim χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, where it is essentially approbatory (this theme will come up below, 364A1-4); elsewhere, and here, it is just negative. With ὡς Glaucon emphasizes this is the opinion of οἱ πολλοί.
692
Cf. 337A5-7.
693
ἐάν … δοκῇ (B1): The construction is, “Listen on the chance that you will agree” (Smyth §§2672 and 2354; cf. 427D3-4, 432C2, 455B1-2, 474C5-6; cf.Gorg.458C4-5, Lach.179E6), just as we say “Listen if you please,” or as an advocate says “If it please the court.” In effect Glaucon is asking leave to lay the entire thing out in a long speech, by suggesting such a speech will carry Socrates along (cf. a similar use of the construction at Phdo.64C where Socrates suggests a line of argument). The pronouns are emphatic as usual. Glaucon is making a “personal” request that Socrates hear an argument that he himself despises but cannot get out of his mind. He hopes of course that Socrates will remain “unteachable” but cannot in himself see how.
694
Socrates’s “stunning” effect on his interlocutor (ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, B3) does not consist of reducing his argument to self-contradiction, but his self. Thrasymachus stays stunned; his blush indicates that he realizes in full company that he has been shown not to be what he has been showing himself off to be; but he has no further stake in the conversation other than to win it. His involuntary behavior reveals that he was making his argument not because he thought it was true but because making it made him a somebody. Glaucon on the other hand desires the truth because he thinks the answer crucial to his own happiness.
695
οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν (B3) is his expression for the inadequacy of the account, an inadequacy that he feels in his mind and that leads him to ask questions. Conversely if his mind were satisfied and had no further questions he would find the account “adequate” (ἱκανῶς).
696
ἐπιθυμῶ (B4) reveals he has been feeling an intellectual hunger.
697
ἀκοῦσαι (B4): Notably he says he wants to hear an account rather than that he wants to learn. Cf. πυθέσθαι below (D3).
698
δύναμιν (B5) is meant to exclude such γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ as might accrue not because of the inherent power of the thing itself (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό) but because of people’s opinion about the thing (διὰ δόξαν).
699
καθ’ αὑτό (B5) means to focus on the immediate operation of the thing, used properly, in its essential relations, as for instance the sharpness of a knife’s blade that enables the knife to cut, disregarding what kind of handle the knife has, what the knife might used to cut, whose knife it is, and where the knife came from.
700
ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν (B6-7) expresses impatience with the importance characteristically according to such things.
701
τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον (C1): This Thrasymachean position is actually held by οἱ πολλοί (A4); Thrasymachus’s relation to it is like the actor’s relation to his role: like the actor his personal beliefs are of no importance.
702
οἷον εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι (C2): “What sort of thing it is and whence it came to be” hides vagueness with parallelism. Was it that way before it came from there? or was its coming from there what made it what it is? If the former, what καί adds – where it came from – is superfluous; and if the latter all it is is what it became so that what καί is adds not a parallel second item but an epexegesis of the first. Cf. E2, infra, and n. ad loc.
703
ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν (C3-4): Glaucon has already abandoned his own tripartition. What was an ἐπίπονον ἀγαθόν of the third type there is here a necessity, and what was the first type of good there is here good simpliciter. In his division the second category had merely been a means to introducing the third, as the transitional example ὑγιαίνειν (357C3), leading to γυμνάζεσθαι, ἰατρεύεσθαι, and thence to ἰάτρευσις, revealed.
704
εἰκότως (C4) already suggests that their reasons are both shortsighted and justified, revealing Glaucon's ambivalence.
705
ἄρα (C5) is redundant after γάρ, itself is a compound of γε and ἄρα (just as μή was redundant after μῶν, itself originally a compound of μή and οὖν, at 351E6-7: cf. Smyth §2651c); but it is not entirely otiose. It marks the unexpectedness of their grounds. The question remains whether it expresses Glaucon’s surprise or that of οἱ πολλοί, and the answer is, both.
706
διατεθρυλημένος (C7), from onomatopoetic θρῦλος: Glaucon hears it everywhere from Thrasymachus and countless others, and unable to get away from it. Thrasymachus's position is not unique after all: it must only be persuasiveness that we might attribute to him.
707
With ἐπεί γε (C6) Glaucon indicates not the reason for the foregoing but his reason for saying it (cf. Smyth §2380), and with ἀπορῶ (C7) moves completely into confession. The movement of the thought is emotional and unpremeditated: these are indices of Glaucon’s sincerity and desire. ἀπορῶ gets no grammatical complement, but a cause instead (διατεθρυλημένος), which itself is given a cause (ἀκούων). With ὑπέρ instead of περί Glaucon shows which side he is on at the same time that he abandons the effort to do the praising himself (he has passed over saying ἀπορῶ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου λέγειν), although he does know what needs to be done, and says what that is, and then expresses his sense that Socrates is just the person to deliver this message: πυθέσθαι replaces ἀκούειν as if he feels he can no longer trust his ears.
708
διό (D3) like οὑτωσί (B7) and ἐπεί … γε (C6) continues his confession under the guise of explanation. It is paradoxical and ironic that what Glaucon wants is a defense of justice but what he insists on doing is to castigate it. Somehow he feels he must do the only thing he can do – to re-enact the bad argument in all its parts.
709
κατατείνας (D3) echoes ἀντικατατείναντες (at 348A7): In his eagerness to confess his feelings to Socrates Glaucon has forgotten the point Socrates there made, that listing all the pros and cons is worthless unless and until a judge arrives to weigh them (348B2). It is as though he conceives that rehearsing the argument will prompt and stimulate Socrates to make the opposite argument.
710
ὅρα εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ (D6) the third time the student addresses a plea to his teacher, this time slightly more direct (εἰ instead of ἐάν), but still he does not directly ask Socrates to make a speech. The force of the idiomatic periphrastic construction with the dative is deferential (cf. Lach.187C1 and my n. ad loc.).
711
νοῦν ἔχων (D8), echoing Glaucon's κατὰ νοῦν (B3). For μᾶλλον πολλάκις cf.
712
χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων (D8). Compare the conversation between Echecrates and Phaedo at the beginning of the Phaedo, and in particular how Echecrates after testing Phaedo’s memory for details gingerly requests him to give him an eyewitness account of Socrates’s last conversation (58D2-3), the formula by which Phaedo agrees to do so (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον [D5-6]), and how Echecrates is then relieved by the answer (D7-9). The reversibility of roles is topical in the Greek concept of χάρις, but also is integral to the reciprocal process of dialectical conversation (cf. Prot.310A1-7). Thus pairing the verbs commonly denotes dialectical scrutiny by question and answer (432E5-6, 489E3, 605C10 [ἀκούων σκόπει], 608D6-12 and n.4999, Prot.347D6-7): Socrates agrees not to perform an answer for Glaucon (on πυνθάνεσθαι cf. n.50) but to engage in dialogue with him.
713
κάλλιστα λέγεις (E1), answering Socrates’s superlative (πάντων μάλιστα), followed directly by καί.
714
Whether we read τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν (E2) with AM and Burnet (in which case ὄν is to be understood with τί and ὅθεν, both interrogative) or οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν with F (in which case again the two interrogatives are parallel) the important points are that, in contrast to the first putting of the matter at C2, γέγονε has become the only verb while te kai collapses the questions of the what and the whence into one question. Justice is something wasn't before it evolved. The final step will be taken with the bare expression πεφυκέναι, with which the argument will now begin.
715
πεφυκέναι (E3) now obliterates any distinction between the two questions by collapsing them into the verb: the φύσις of justice is nothing but the outcome of its γένεσις.
716
δοκεῖ (359A1): Glaucon shifts out of the infinitival indirect discourse as if this were his position.
717
ἄρξασθαι (A3): Now Glaucon shifts back to the infinitive of indirect discourse.
718
νόμους τιθέσθαι (A3): Adopting laws is presented as a logical extension of the concept of reaching agreements (συνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, A1-2). To list the extension of the idea before the basic idea places it into a kind of reverse exegesis of its own extension, often in the manner of a correction (“laws, which are, after all, compacts”). It is a species of “reverse καί” (343C6 and n.): cf. καὶ δόξα, Crito 47B1-2; ἐργασίᾳ (new) τε καὶ χρήσει (old), Euthyd.281A2; καὶ φύσεις, Leg.798A7-8; κηρυκικῇ (without καί, placed last although the “basic” item), Polit.260D11-E2; καὶ ἀληθεῖς, Tht.167C1-2. We may class here the καί that explains effect by adding cause, e.g., Rep.392D8 (γελοῖος διδάσκαλος καὶ ἀσαφής); Gorg.474A1 (γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν). Cf. also 381A4 and 381A7-9 with nn.
719
νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον (A4): The argument is etymological. The ἐπίταγμα is called νόμιμον because νόμος ἐπιτάττει. From here, we are to believe, it is a short step to δίκαιον, as if this were a synonym of νόμιμον. That the step is short is the burden of τε καί to gloss over.
720
γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης (A5): We had been told we would hear what justice is and how it came to be (358C2, E2), but in the event we hear only how it came to be. What it is, is now being portrayed as just the outcome of the becoming (compare Thrasymachus’s expression οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον [338C2] which likewise denies that justice has any inner meaning). Moreover, the definition (or evolution) of justice requires the essence (or existence) of injustice, and so the account is baseless or circular.
721
ἀγαπᾶσθαι ὡς ἀγαθόν (A8-B1) reverts to the language of the tripartition (357C1, 358A2) but does here carry the connotation of acquiescence.
722
ἀρρωστία (B1) means not weakness but a deficiency in the kind of overmastering power that would enable us, as described above, to ἐκφεύγειν the one and αἱρεῖν the other (358E6-9A1). The phrase ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμούμενον is therefore an oxymoron.
723
οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι (B6-7) restates 358C3 (οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν) in such a way as to sandwich in what the first point yielded (ἀδυναμίᾳ [359B6, cf. ἀρρωστίᾳ, B1]).
724
λάβοιμεν ἄν (C4): contrary to good empirical procedure the result of the experiment is revealed before the experiment is allowed to take place. It is after all within the διάνοια of Glaucon’s rhetor’s audience that the experiment is in fact taking place.
725
εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα (C4) arriving at the same destination even though coming from different places.
726
νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ (C5-6): the word order again stresses the complacent and superficial contrast of φύσις and νόμος (cf. πεφυκέναι, 358E3, and n.). The jarring juxtaposition of νόμος and βία is mitigated only slightly by the intervening δέ; the lack of καί makes βία a virtual synonym for νόμος in contrast with φύσις. Compare Aristotle’s division of motion into κίνησις βίᾳ and κίνησις κατὰ φύσιν (e.g. Phys.4.8.215A1-2). For the awkward juxtaposition cf. ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ, at 552E2 (and n.). It is thus that though (natural) ἐπιθυμία can be said to ἄγειν (ἄξει, C3), νόμος is said to παράγειν (παράγεται, C6).
727
ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν (C6). τὸ ἴσον is here treated, with some cynicism, as mere political sloganry (cf.561B2, 558C5-6). To use τιμή relies in part upon the previous use of τιμούμενον at 359B1. In the natural case one honors what he thinks good, but we need to explain a psychology that grants honor to something that a person does not think good. From such behavior come such expressions as “empty pomp” and the “show of honor.”
728
Taking τοῦτον δὲ as redirecting attention from the corpse to Gyges and reading ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν (D8) with ms.A (legit Burnet), as the lectio difficilior, rather than ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν with the majority (mss. FDM). ἄλλο is proleptic with μέν in the manner of a second ἄλλως τε καί construction (after D5-6) as further narrative focussing, and waits for a construction it will share with the contrasting item in the δέ clause. As it turns out, that item, χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, comes after δέ instead of before it since the storyteller wishes to depict Gyges’s attention moving toward the hand. Thus περί is made to initiate the construction of the δέ clause and the anticipated parallelism dissolves.
729
ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι (E1), accepting the unanimously attested ὅν. The three words embody the swift λέξις εἰρομένη of an Ionian logographer like Herodotus, including abrupt and unwarned shifts of subject (mitigated by tense changes in the participles), which I imitate in my paraphrase (note also prepositioned connective in καὶ τόν rather than postpositive τὸν δέ [360A2], in change of subject). In this the rhetor adopts a style familiar in storytelling—indeed a similar story is told by Herodotus (1.64ff). Reversion to this archaic “objective” style happens to leaves out (or conveniently and naively hides) the inner psychic dimensions and processes of consciousness and conscience.
730
ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου (360A2). They said to each other “Say, where’s Gyges? He was just here a moment ago.” Notably Gyges discovers his “private interest” in the midst of his one public and corporate engagement, the monthly meeting. The rest of his life he spends alone with his sheep out in the fields. During the last few weeks he had perhaps already happened to fiddle with his ring, but the sheep did not notice he became invisible and so neither did he.
731
ἐπιψηλαφῶντα (A2): Note the jocular touch: We are to imagine the man who has become invisible to others becoming invisible also to himself.
732
πειρᾶσθαι, συμβαίνειν, γίγνεσθαι (A5-7): The present infinitives represent imperfect indicatives in the oratio recta (whence dependent optative ἔχοι, A5).
733
αἰσθόμενον (A7) is absolute: “he recognized the significance of what was going on,” an understatement conveniently neutral like Thucydides’s use of ἀναίσθητος.
734
γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα (A8): cf.ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα (359E2-3). διαπράξασθαι (A7) suggests he kept his motives hidden (cf. 576A2 and n. ad loc).
735
Our storyteller has taken us to Persia where, also, Solon once met Croesus. Croesus could not understand how somebody who was unknown could be the happiest man in Solon’s judgment and finally had to learn that Solon would call no man happy until he was dead. Our rhetor has similarly left out the final fate of the Lydian shepherd. Or on second thought, despite himself he has not. The shepherd who became king will perhaps be buried out in some field, something more than a mere man but naked in a hollow bronze horse with little doors, with nothing on but that ring.
736
ὡς δόξειεν (B4), “as it would seem,” the rather weak peg on which the entire argument is made to hang. But in all strictness the thought experiment is not an argument. It is a devil’s diversion whereby each member of the audience is for a moment given his chance to turn the collet inward himself, and to decide to do evil in hiding by condoning his own weakness through a condemnation of all mankind. Truly it is this moment that Glaucon meant to describe when he said of himself, ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλήμενος τὰ ὦτα ἀκούων (358C7). During the moment that he finds himself falling silent (ἀπορῶ) his chance to jump up and object passes by, and a moment later, eo qui tacit, placuit.
737
τἆλλα (C3): Absence of a noun pushes this toward meaning τὰ λοιπά (cetera), since the foregoing items (B6-C2), though they do constitute a pair of two pairs, do not imply a genus fo us to supply. Syntactically τἆλλα is an adverbial or internal accusative with πράττειv; and for its broadly generalizing semantic sense compare ἄλλου at 368B1(cf. Leg.699C7-8 and Ast ad Leg.666B5): “and in general to do doings among men as if he were equal to the gods”.
738
Harming others in hiding he is unconcerned about doing harm to himself that only he could see, and conversely he sees no benefit to his hidden self (ἀγαθὸν ἰδίᾳ, C6-7) from doing good. The same is true of the storyteller, who tells the story of the Lydian instead of the story of Solon.
739
Reading ἀδικεῖν ἀδικεῖν (C8) with ADM and edd. (over the ἀδικεῖν ἀδικεῖ of F and d), maintaining the construction in indirect discourse initiated by φαίη τις at C5, by which Glaucon maintains distance from the position of the τὶς, at the same moment that with ἐπεί … γε he depicts the τὶς as presenting the ἐπεί clause less as a justification for the claim he has just made than his reason for presenting it (Smyth §2380), and as such stresses his subjectivity.
740
ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων (D2): After himself asserting that all men think injustice pays Glaucon adds this phrase both as a disclaimer (to distance himself from the argument) and as a confession (blaming the speaker for the effect the speech is having on him—in his διάνοια—as though to say to Socrates: “See what I mean?”). τοιούτου and the redundancy λόγου λέγων bring forward Glaucon's sense of having his ears flooded by the talk (358C7).
741
ἀθλιώτατος (D4), in the Thrasymachean sense of the “loser” (cf. 354A4 and n.).
742
αὐτήν (E1) vauntingly indicates that the universal prejudice against justice evinced by the experiment in thought will now be placed on an objective foundation. But in all strictness it was not all men who gave in to the opportunity but only the men imagined in the διάνοια of the person who engaged in the experiment. It was only he who knew no man made of such stern stuff as to resist the opportunity, or could not conceive of one, or would not, or chose not to. Nothing at all was proven except that he would find himself ready to hide in the shared conspiracy of lowered expectations. The rhetoric of the thought-experiment includes providing for the anonymity of the person engaged in the experiment; but it is obvious that that person is the man in the rhetorician’s audience. Thus the vaunt to put the thought experiment onto an objective basis is an invitation to that same member of the audience to conspire to close the door on justice forever. The powers and principalities are allowed to take over, and this is the heart of Glaucon’s concern. One may compare how the κρίσις between Barabbas and Jesus, by which his fate was finally sealed, was dignified by Roman procedure.
743
τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτήν (E1): This formulation replaces the original description of the third point in his program, ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι (358C4), i.e., that men choose injustice when they can since the unjust life is better than the just life. Glaucon now interposes an event: a judging (or trial) of the lives (κρίσις), to see whether (or show that) the preference for an unjust life is εἰκότως, “reasonable” (or justified).
744
ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα … οἷοί τ’ ἐσόμεθα (E1-3): The more “impartial” optatives that are customary in methodological announcements (e.g., 359B7-8) are now replaced with the more sanguinary subjunctive and future indicative, then hortatory subjunctives (E4, E6), and then imperatives (E7, 361A3, etc.). But let us stop to notice, amidst all of this being pushed around, that we are not being given to judge the lives by a criterion (κρῖναι, E3), but to compare them side by side (this is the purport of the need for a διάστασις); and that what is being placed side by side as if symmetrically is a life that has something (δικαιοσύνη) and a life that is deprived of that same something (ἀδικία); and that the something (τὸ δίκαιον) has been defined as being only as a ficta res contrived as a mechanism for avoiding that privation. So we are being asked to compare a non-entity with an anti-entity.
745
ἐπιτήδευμα (E6), a term mendacious in its neutrality, had entered the speech only to replace the language of ἀγαπᾶν and ἀσπάζεσθαι in order to account for “unwilling observance” (358A6 and then C3: cf. nn.). Now it becomes the measure of both men, both the just (who despite the attempt to define him out of existence still loves justice because he thinks it good: ἀγαπᾶν ὡς ἀγαθόν) and the unjust. The notion that both the positive and the privative, both ὁ δίκαιος and ὁ ἄδικος, can have a perfected or complete form likewise rests only on the dubious presumption of a symmetry between the two types. Socrates had already shown (in fact it was presented as a mere obiter dictum at 352C) that ἀδικία can become τελέα only through an admixture of δικαιοσύνη, in which case the best injustice would only be half bad.
A prudent reader knew that once this common terminology had been convened the horse was already out of the barn.
746
δεινοὶ δημιουργοί (E7): The ambivalent adjective already suggests expertise is to be pressed into the service of something nefarious; ἄκρος then drops all scruple.
747
ἄρα (361A1) with the second limb, of a backup alternative in case the first fails, imitated below (B1; cf. also 587A3), a usage not isolated by Denniston (but note his mention of an hypothesis or idea “not before recognized,” 37-8).
748
σφόδρα ἄδικος (A3): σφόδρα deftly avoids value-language—the presence of which would of course vitiate the fairness of the procedure.
749
ἡγητέον (A4): Glaucon now slips from setting up the διάστασις (hypothesizing a description of the unjust man) into telling the judge what to think about his counterpart: in other words, to admire the unjust man’s ability to evade being caught; and he vitiates thereby the fairness of the procedure he just sought to protect. His term φαῦλον replaces Thrasymachus’s ἄθλιος.
750
ἐσχάτη … ἀδικία (A4-5): like σφόδρα, ἐσχάτη avoids positive or negative connotation.
751
τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν (A6-7): τελέως (brought forward from 360E5) moves to the outer edge of language still neutral, a limit already tempted by σφόδρα and ἐσχάτη; but in adopting Thrasymachus’s redundantly hyperbolic superlative, τελεωτάτην (cf.351C5), which we saw Socrates eschew (352C7-8), Glaucon allows himself to wander across the line once again (cf. ἡγητέον above).
752
καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληται (B1): With the repetition of ἄρα (from A1) we realize Glaucon is making a transition to the unjust man’s ability like a δεινὸς δημιουργός to recuperate, and therefore that the intervening lines (A4-B1) have constituted an improvement upon the λανθανέτω of A3. In the perfect case the unjust man must not only be hidden doing the greatest injustice but must be seen as perfectly just in the very act of, and in despite of, so doing.
753
λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ (B2-3): τε proleptically links λέγειν (ἱκανῷ) with βιάσασθαι (ἱκανῷ), not with ἐπανορθοῦσθαι (δυνατῷ), introducing an exegesis of the latter in apposition. To the extent that it looks backward at all, it may be called “explanatory τε” with England (ad Leg.809B4, comparing 654B3). Cf. Leg.809C7-8, 848A4-6; Prot.315E4; Rep.381A6 (and n.), 495A7-8, 552B9, 555A2; Soph.219D5-6; Symp.186A3-7; and Denniston 502.
754
λέγειν τε … καὶ βιάσασθαι (B2-3): implicit is the universal doublet, λόγος / ἔργον.
755
διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας (B4-5): the elaborate exegesis of ἐπανορθοῦσθαι (B2), starting with the balanced antithesis with paired protases and culminating in this list, constitutes a climax. The list includes goods of all three traditional categories, in the form διὰ A καὶ B καὶ διὰ C1 καὶ C2 (psychic: ἀνδρεία; bodily:ῥώμη; external: φίλοι καὶ οὐσία). The form, in which the final category is instantiated by two terms (the governing term [here διά] either repeated before the final category, as here, or not), is common (342E10-11, 400B2-3, 426E1-2, and nn.). Alluding to the categories undermines the thesis, however, since the ἀνδρεία in question is not virtuous, the semantics of ῥώμη suggests a power without internal strength (ἰσχύς: cf.410B7 and n.1722), and the selection of friends and money lacks the item or items, family and background (συγγένεια, commonly included among external goods, e.g., 491C1-4, 494C5-7; Alc.I 107B6-7; Charm.157B7-8; Lys.207C3; Meno 71B6-7; Prot.319C3-4; and cf. ὁπόθεν, 362B3).
756
ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ (B6): the metaphor is from statuary (cf.D5).
757
ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον (B6-7): the adjectives are similar to those with which Thrasymachus paid lip service to virtue in Book One (γενναία εὐήθεια, 348C12) but they lack his snideness and the ἄνδρα is sympathetic (cf.372C, 376D10 and n., 408A8 [vs. ἀνθρώπῳ, 407D7], 412D9, 419A3, 425D7, 426D7, 465B6, 556D2, 565E6): Glaucon is somewhere in between.
758
The quotation (Septem, 592-4, the rest of it quoted below, 362A8-9) says, of Amphiaraus,
οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει,βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενοςἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.
The language is from a different time when men watched and waited for the harmony of φύσις and νόμος. Only real goodness would think to plow the deeper furrows and derive from them the truer and more solid plans that burgeon thenceforth into the light. The distinction between seeming and being cannot fail, again, to evoke the trial of Socrates; so that the subsequent ἀφαίρεσις of τὸ δοκεῖν evokes the forensic effort of Socrates’s accusers.
759
ἀφαιρετέον (B8) proposes an absurdity, as if his appearing were “separable” from his being so: the appearance is after all in the eyes of those who watch; but in the experiment these are also the persons who know he is just. The use of the verb undermines Glaucon’s method, since he gave us to believe there would be no ἀφαιρέσεις (36E4-5). Moreover, the ἄδικος had conversely received the supplements of bravery, power, money and friends-from-who-knows-where.
760
εἴη (C3) optative in the secondary sequence of the man’s underlying (and therefore past) intention; but if by hypothesis he was a just man it could only be after he received the accolades that he might come to have an ulterior motive. Glaucon departs from his own method again – but why?
761
ἄδηλον (C2): to whom will it be unclear? We have just now posited him to be good. All that will be unclear is our own motive when we view the statue of the just man, in case at that moment of choice that we have served up to ourselves we should choose him over the unjust man. The lesson of the thought experiment about Gyges was to enable us to think this way; and now Glaucon has us apply it. It is envy that holds the good to an unreasonably high standard.
762
γυμνωτέος (C3), another term that undermines itself, reminiscent of but an inversion of what Socrates envisions at the end of the Gorgias (523A5-E6), where the proper κρίσις in the Final Judgment is assured by judging the souls naked, stripped of their bodies and vestiges of their external goods (cf. its use at 601B2), a provision that would be gratuitous if the soul were good, as this one is hypothesized to be, and necessary only if the soul be provided with external goods, as the hypothetical unjust man has been. At the same time the image is consonant with the notion of torture.
763
βεβασανισμένος (C5) specifies the κρίσις this candidate will be facing, unaccountably quite different from that of the ἄδικος. Only slaves could be tortured (Andoc.Myst.43): implicitly Glaucon’s just man has been degraded to being a slave.
764
τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι (C6), this metaphor of watering or moistening is elsewhere used of moderating the excesses of willful hardness and uncultured intransigence (e.g., Leg.880E3; cf. 853D3 [τήκεσθαι],D4 [ἄτηκτοι]); Aesch.Prom. 2008; Eur.Hipp. 303), just as much as the hardness of adamant serves as a metaphor for a brave resolution to be good (360B5, 618E4; Gorg.509A1). Glaucon inverts the usage: “adamancy” is for him too much to expect from a man (360B5), while the adamancy of the just man is an obduracy that must be tortured by the “mitigating” effect of ill repute and all it can do to a man.
765
ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων (C6-7): ὑπό (alter, unsurprisingly misquoted by Eusebius and Theodoret as ἀπό) adds personification to κακοδοξίας. What a bad reputation can do to a man will presently be seen.
766
εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον (D8: sc. δικαιοσύνης or ἀδικίας): again medaciously neutral: cf. ἐσχάτη, A4. Glaucon may speak of them as if they were symmetrically extreme (cf. ἐπιτήδευμα, 360E6 and n., and παρ’ αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν, B6) but the only thing extreme about the just man is that he does not change.
767
ἵνα … κρίνωνται (D2-3): The passive deflects our awareness away from the fact that it is we that are meant to judge and that we that are being prepared by all this to do so properly (κρῖναι ὀρθῶς, 360E3, active). If the question truly were Which is happier? then we would simply ask them. If we notice what is happening inside us during the preparation, we will see that Glaucon has turned the question into, Which will you envy less even though you should envy him more, and Which will you envy more though you should envy him less?
768
ἐρρωμένως (D4), not ἀκριβῶς vel sim., of an enthusiasm bordering on the obsessive, eliciting the distinctly Socratic ejaculation βαβαί (βαβαῖ), which in all Platonic instances express Socrates's consternation about the task that has suddenly come into view as lying before him (459B; H.Maj.294E7; H.Min.364C8; Lys.218B7; Phdo 84D9; Phlb.23B5; Phdr.236E4 [so it used by the Stranger at Soph.249D9]). The Alc.I, upon the authenticity of which we cannot rely, gives two instances to Socrates uncharacteristic both for their proximity (118B4, 119C2) and for expressing consternation on someone else's behalf.
769
ὡς μάλιστ’ ἔφη δύναμαι (D7) recalls κατατείνας ἐρῶ (358D3) and with it Glaucon’s effort to claim that he is divided, one part believing all this and another not wanting to.
770
οὐδὲν ἔτι … χαλεπόν (D7-8): The judgment is meant to have been made easy by creating images of them in the most extreme versions (D2-3).
771
ἀγροικοτέρως (E1): both formations of the comparative adverb are found (ἀγροικότερον, Phdrs. 260D3). With the comparative and καὶ δὴ καί (E1), Glaucon affects scrupulosity at separating himself from what he is articulating so forcefully, and does right before he reaches its (or his) climax. Despite his disclaimer it is he who is speaking: these feelings are within him, as they are in Polus at Gorg.473C (and within Apollo for that matter, at A.Eum.186-90); and like Thrasymachus – but for different reasons – he wants to arouse these feelings in Socrates.
772
τελευτῶν (362A1) cf. τὸ ἔσχατον, Gorg.473C4, of another coup de grâce.
773
μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τὠφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται (E4-362A2): It is not merely a “traditional list of tortures” (Emlyn-Jones ad loc.). Whereas future middles used with passive sense, perhaps as holdovers from “the earlier language,” tend to show durative aspect, the regular passive form derived from the aorist passive shows a punctual aspect (Gildersleeve SCG §168). After a session of whipping (μαστιγώσεται) and a session of torture (στρεβλώσεται) he gets bound up (future perfect middle-passive, the aspect given by the perfect reduplication), and, held in place thereby, has his eyes burned out and then for finishers gets impaled and put on display (ἐκκαυθέσεται, ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, future passives both punctual). Compare the sequence of abuses envisioned by Polus at Gorg.473C1-5: durative tortures (στρεβλῶται, ἐκτέμνηται) followed by the punctual burning out of eyes (ἐκκάηται, second aorist passive) and a coup de grâce (ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ). In comparison with the well settled list of judicial punishments (e.g., 492D7, 553B; Apol.37BC; Crito 46C5-6; Gorg.466B11-C1, 468B-9C, 480C8-D2, 508D1-3; Leg.847A6-B1, 855C2-6, 890C4-5, 949C6-7; Polit.309A2-3) Glaucon’s striking specificity, persistence and pacing reveal an affect that cannot be ignored. That ἀνασχινδυλεύειν denotes impalement on a sharp stick, not crucifixion or hanging or nailing up, is proven by the sources gathered by Susemihl ad loc. (Platons Werke 25 [Leipzig 1881] bd.1, 336), i.e. the scholiast, Tim.Lex.Plat. (followed by the Souda and Hesychius), and Etym.Mag.100,50. Impalement, recondite and oriental (though mentioned at A.Eum. 189-90 and Eur.Rh.517), is administered after all the other disfiguring tortures, not only to ensure death but also and more importantly to put the victim on display as if it were a proof of his own viciousness or of the fearsome power of the parties that had their way with him, or both.
774
But he will be dead. Glaucon—or the persons whose λόγος this is—will have “taught him to death:” this final statement is therefore a virtual taunt delivered to the dying man on the stick. Clearly, it is out of our sight that he must be put, or better, if he is in our sight, let us see him squirming to death on a pole. Compare the similar blind-spot in Polus’s orgy of tortures in the Gorgias: his victim will be forced to watch (ἐπιδεῖν) his family tortured after he has had his eyes put out (Gorg.473C4).
775
ἄρα (A4) recalls the argument at B7-8 and corrects it.
776
γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται (B3) designate marrying one’s son into a family (i.e., taking a daughter “out of” it) and marrying one’s daughter into a family, respectively. The asyndeton and the homoioteleuton achieved by repetition of βούληται makes this set of benefits sound parallel to the tortures of the good man.
777
καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ (B6) implies the ἀγῶνες are forensic. For the division of cases cf.365D4-5, 549D2-3.
778
θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι (C2-3), the sacrifices measured by size (ἱκανῶς) and the objects by their decorative magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπῶς), an instance of the kind of distributive binary structure in which the modifiers (and also, here, the governing verbs) go with the respective items only, rather than all going with all (that is, [S1+S2][P1+P2][V1+V2] = S1P1V1 + S2P2V2). Cf. Rep.332D5-6, 370E2-3 (chiastic), 430A6-B2, 433E12-4AA1, 462B5-6, 476B4-5, 491D1-2 (chiastic), 515C4-5; also Crito 48D1-2, Leg.945C4-5. Contrast the non-distributive (n.2307).
779
ἄμεινον (C3), as an adverb with παρασκεύασθαι, rather than ἀμείνονα (adjective) with βίον, indicates, without Glaucon noticing, how “external” the account of happiness is.
780
αὖ (D1) indicates Socrates’s sense that it was now his turn, but μέν already suggests that his sense was wrong, as he learned in the event and reports to us today, a day later. Glaucon’s brother (δέ) chimed in, and what he says (οὔ τί που οἴει … ἱκανῶς, D2-3) reveals that he saw that Socrates was ready to speak.
781
ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (cf. Paroem.Gr.1.219, 2.16 for the interpretation: ὅτι προτιμητέον τοὺς οἰκείους). Socrates's reason for citing the proverb is not to approve that brother should help brother but to accept the natural impulse as a sufficient excuse for Adeimantus to interrupt: besides his remarks will enhance the investigation. Polemarchus likewise interrupted on behalf of his father to save the argument, whereas Thrasymachus interrupted, without warrant, to destroy the logos.
782
οὐδὲν λέγεις (E1): He continues (cf. D2-3) to rely on Socrates to recognize that he is joking.
783
καί (E2): To add these opposing arguments will make Glaucon’s meaning more clear (σαφέστερον, E4); but on the face of it making his meaning more clear can hardly constitute “what most needs to be said” (ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, D5). Adeimantus has something else up his sleeve.
784
εὐδοκιμήσεις (363A2), bringing forward Glaucon’s term (358A5).
785
οὐκ αὐτό … ἀλλά (A1-2): Such a generalization cannot but include a confession about Adeimantus’s own upbringing. We had been prepared to consider his family by the emphatic reference to the fact that he and Glaucon are brothers.
786
τῷ δικαίῳ (A5): There is a certain redundancy in Adeimantus's expression (ἀπ’ αὐτῆς [sc. δικαιοσύνης] εὐδοκιμήσεις / δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης / ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. , ultimatly borrowed from Glaucon (358A5: cf.n.690). At first out of (true) justice comes good repute, by the end out of good reputation come good things to the (truly) just man. In the middle, however, from opinion per se come good things to a man only because opined to be just. There is great care in the terminology: the three clauses are brought together for comparison by the repetition of ἀπό; εὐδοκιμήσεις (a complacent generalizing plural) is brought back by εὐδοκιμεῖν (describing an actual event); this notion of good reputation before and after is fleetingly recast as δοκεῖν simpliciter in the middle step, and held there with a figura etymologica (δοκοῦντι δικαίῳδόξης); and γίγνηται plus dative in the second step is replaced by ὄντα plus dative in the last. That good reputation arises from justice (step 1) is less important than that good things arise from good reputation (step 3); and luckily (step 2) the reputation is no less a matter of opinion than than the opinion that the man is just. The transition is effected in the patch of fog around the pregnant circumstantial participle δοκοῦντι, which technically has no antecedent, and at the expense of an extremely awkward juxtaposition of εἶναι and γίγνηται.
787
A satirical tone is introduced by the excess of ἐπὶ πλέον (A5), the arbitrariness of ἐμβάλλοντες (A6), the implicit conception of the gods participating in the world of reputation (εὐδοκιμήσεις, A6), the quaint cornucopiae (ἄφθονα) from Homer and Hesiod, and the characterization of Hesiod as γενναῖος (A8), that Adeimantus with some irony imputes to the κηδόμενοι: the word is no longer innocent (361B7, 348C12, and nn.).
788
τοῖς ὁσίοις (A7) designates the proper relation of man to god, as δικαίῳ (A3) designates that of man to man. Cf. 331A3 and n.
789
Hes.WD 232-4.
790
Od.19.109, 111-13, omitting line 110. Odysseus compares the fame of Penelope to that of a pious king (whence the opening genitive).
791
νεανικώτερα τἀγαθά … διδόασιν (C3-4). The comparative warns us that while the rewards just narrated were ridiculous for their quaintness, those to come are truly beyond the pale; and his colloquial formulation according to which the authors themselves give benefits to their characters rather than write stories in which they receive them (διδόασιν, C4) all with all that follows (ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ, κατακλίναντες, etc.), satirizes a failure in the poet’s verisimilitude by feigning the credulity his account requires if it is to be taken seriously.
792
ἡγησάμενοι (D1) of unconscious and uncritical certainty (334C2 and n.). Adeimantus criticizes both their belief there could be nothing finer and the fact that they believe it unconsciously, without himself saying what he believes or why he believes it.
793
The order in which the rewards are treated (C4-E4) is artfully chiastic: rewards in life to the just (A7-C2) and then in death (C3-D5); then punishments for the unjust in death (D5-7) and then in life (D7-E2).
794
ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν (sc. λέγειν) (E3): This pendant remark, abruptly brief after his elaborate and irrisory smorgasbord of rewards, resembles the critical remark he dropped at D1-2 (ἡγησάμενοι ...) in the way it damns the poets but withholds any attempt to say what is missing in their account. This time he begs the question more acutely. To say οὐκ ἔχουσιν rather than οὐ λέγουσιν is sharper than the indirect criticism of ἡγησάμενοι above: he claims not only that they did not but could not say anything more. Moreover, ἄλλα is ambiguous: is it a supplement or an alternative that he misses? Even the question whether there are any such rewards is begged! Shorey (ad loc.) takes Adeimantus’s bait and supplies an answer—a good answer, indeed (“communion with the good”)—and others may vie to supply others; but in finding such an answer have we supplied what Adeimantus himself wants?
His final remark by its structure (E3-4) perhaps suggests that he is dissatisfied that their praise of justice has nothing more to draw on than the topics of its dispraise, and that the anti-entity is the source for describing the entity, but why doesn’t he say so? Does he prefer an untested boast of superiority over taking the risk of suggesting an answer we might all profit from?
795
The pairing of ἔπαινος and ψόγος (E3-4) had suggested that the range of λόγοι had been exhausted; this announcement of an ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος (E5) catches our attention. Have we reached ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι (362D5)?
796
ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν (363E6-4A1): the λόγοι of the κηδόμενοι had included edifying citations from the poets (γενναῖος, A8); but the passive (λεγόμενοι) allows Adeimantus to make a transition away from the κηδόμενοι to other, unspecified advocates, leaving only the distinction between plain speech and poetry (ἰδίᾳ … ποιητῶν). He uses this passive again, below (λέγονται 364B3), to effect a transition from the unnamed πάντες (364A1) to the strange ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις.
797
γάρ (364A1) is programmatic, as often. Here it warns us that Adeimantus will now be imitating the exponent of this other kind of talk.
798
ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὕμνουσιν (A1): With the metaphor Adeimantus complains of the same saturation his brother did at 358C7 (ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα ἀκούων), though he puts the accent on their unanimity and only implies he believes they are wrong, rather than on his own being overwhelmed by them.
799
δικαιοσύνη (A2) is expanded by σωφροσύνη, which is however placed first; the two are attached by τε καί. The expansion sets up a contrast, unfavorable to justice, between the self-denial that just behavior entails and granting free rein to desire, which in truth the speaker is advocating.
800
καλόν before μέν (A2) already suggests the wise old saw, χαλεπὸν τὸ καλὸν (cf. schol. ad Crat.384B), but since μέν is always concessive, we already sense that things are going in the wrong direction. According to the proverb it is the difficulty that is to be conceded, not the admirability (that is, we need χαλεπὸν μέν not καλὸν μέν)! For the problem of positioning μέν cf. Socrates's amusing analysis at Prot.343C7-D1ff. ὕμνουσιν, which already suggested a criticism of the speakers’ complacency, and even indicated that the universal avowal verges on ὕθλος, the cognate noun (cf. n.58, supra). Nobody will disagree, but will anybody do anything about it?
801
μέντοι (A3), in place of δέ, effectively cancels what has been conceded in the μέν clause; and ἐπίπονον adds condoning and negative tincture to χαλεπόν. It is clear where this argument is going.
802
ἀκολασία δέ (A3): the μέντοι did not answer the μέν after all!
803
δόξῃ δὲ καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν (A4): That the vices are αἰσχρόν only δόξῃ καὶ νόμῳ, suggests that their opposite virtues were καλόν only by convention as well, but it is part of the strategy of this new kind of talking to leave such matters implicit, a strategy not unlike Adeimantus’s own, above. We see again how easily in usage τὸ καλόν can mean merely “the praiseworthy.” (cf. καλλίστῳ, 358A1 and n.).
804
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος (A5): after the argument that beauty is in the eyes of the beholder comes the sober statistical observation.
805
πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας (A6): πλουσίους is a first predicate and is then generalized by the participial phrase which suddenly requires ἔχοντας to have been placed after it. Call it zeugma or syllepsis.
806
In contrast to the persons described by Glaucon at 360C8-D7.
807
τοὺς δέ (A8) succeeds to omit referring to the subject as τοὺς ἀγαθούς or τοὺς δικαίους: baldly to assert that the good are bad is beyond the pale and in the end lip service is conceded to them (ὁμολογοῦντες, B1) and they are called ἀμείνους.
808
οἳ ἄν πῃ ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν (A8-B1): postponement of the protasis and its insidious πῃ indicate that ἀσθενεῖς and πένητες are the excuses (i.e., reasons discovered after the fact) that they give themselves. The logic fails, but only at the end of the sentence; and he moves on.
809
τούτων δὲ πάντων (B2). By referring to the arguments he is about to introduce (the θαυμασιώτατοι) as already included in τούτων πάντων is another of Adeimantus’s ways to presume we know what he is thinking: we are supposed by now to have “gotten the drift” as to the εἶδος of these λόγοι (363E5-6), both their tone and manner.
810
λέγονται (B3): the shift to the passive prepares for his change of subject from “all the poets” (πάντες, A1), who make the arguments about human affairs, to the strange specialists (ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις, B5) he will next introduce as authorities for the surprising statements about the gods. The transition from men as subject matter to gods repeats the transition above (ἐπὶ πλέον ... 363B5ff).
811
περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς (B2-3): the position of τε indicates that the topic is the relation of the gods and virtue.
812
ἄρα and καί (B3) conspire to express, or feign, shock.
813
πολλοῖς (B3): Again a statistical statement postures, or is allowed to qualify, as a universal or essential truth.
814
δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακόν (B4): Illative τε καί draws too strong a conclusion. The very notion of luck with a single stroke grants the reality of undeserved events and restricts them to the status of exceptional in an otherwise orderly world: one such event can indeed ruin what a life has been, but contrary to what Adeimantus is saying, does not thereby become the rule of its future.
815
τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν (sc. ἔνειμαν), B4-5: compare the aposiopesis in Pindar, Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, Isth.5(4)52, and Nausicaa’s remark to Odysseus (6.188-9), which avoid the explicit statement that gods are the cause of bad things.
816
δέ (B5), colorless, as at A5. The rhetoric is cumulative rather than consecutive.
817
εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν (B7-C1): Adeimantus now imitates the “sales language” of the priests: τι and του minimize their prospective client’s sin by avoiding to say whose it is, and γέγονεν finesses out of saying who did it. It is as if one is filling out a form.
818
ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν (C2) echoes θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς with something a little more concrete and a little less liturgical, but at the same time it is a hendiadys: placating the gods is being slanted toward pleasing them and sugaring them up. At the same time that Adeimantus aspires to voice the truth he displays an estimable facility for imitating the liars.
819
ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρόν (C2): the indefinite adjective is again euphemistic.
820
τισιν (C4) again euphemistic and suggestive: what else in involved than the notion of pushing the gods around?
821
τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπερετεῖν (C4-5): The syntax is roundabout but the solicitation is direct. In the end, as they boast (with σφισι), the gods turn out to be servants of men (ὑπερετεῖν, C5)!
822
μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται (C5-6): these μάντεις or ἀγύρται are a strange bunch indeed, quoting poets for corroboration as if they were delivering a brief in court! It is the third time the poets have been adduced for corroboration in Adeimantus’s speech, first by the caregivers (363A7-8), then by Adeimantus himself (363E6-4A1), and now by Adeimantus’s μάντεις.
823
εὐπετείας διδόντες (C6). They cite the poets saying that evil is easily availed not in order to prove it so but to make it so. The citation therefore provides an index of the way in which the poets are taken to be teachers.
824
ὡς (C6): Mr. Morrissey notes that if this ὡς is read as part of Adeimantus's performance of the hexameter, then it scans (ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα, where Hesiod had τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα).
825
Hes.WD 287-9. In the gnomic rhetoric, evil is conceded (μέν) for the sake of highlighting (δέ) the good, quite the reverse of καλὸν μέν … χαλεπὸν μέντοι, above (A2-3). Hesiod will go on to say that the path of virtue becomes easy once you get to the top: the gnomic poet is being misused.
826
τινα (D3) natural in apologizing for the metaphor but carries also a hint of incredulity.
827
οἱ δέ (D3): Adeimantus speaks as if he were drawing a distinction among the μάντεις, but in substance it is the variety of poets (Hesiod and Homer again, and again as witnesses: cf. 363A8) and the range of their arguments that he means to catalogue, as the sequel shows (παρέχονται, E3, making no distinction between or among the παρέχοντες).
828
παραγωγή (D4) revealing what ἐπαγωγαῖς (C3) had succeeded to remain vague about: cf. παράγεται, 359C6. Cf. παρατρωπῶσ’ at E1, infra.
829
Iliad 9.497ff, adapted. Phoenix speaks to Achilles, persuading him to let go his rancor: ‘Even the gods show clemency to a man contrite.’ Again the poet is misused, for Phoenix makes the gods the measure of men not their servants, as in Hesiod good was the measure of toil rather than ease the measure of good. Moreover, ὑπερβαίνειν expresses contrition and even repentence in the aftermath of an error, while for Adeimantus’s argument the sin is contemplated in advance (a perverse interpretation of the subjunctives as anticipatory) and weighed against the uncertainty or manipulabiity of its consequences.
830
δέ (E3): again the cumulative rhetoric. The move from Homer and Hesiod to the more radical claims of Musaeus and Orpheus repeats the escalation in his narration about the caregivers (363C3ff: n.b. νεανικώτερα), and makes more explicit the extravagant claim of the divine authority of those poets.
831
τελευτήσασιν ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν (365A1-2), an etymological connection between τελευτήκασι and τελετάς. I borrow the rendering into English from Shorey.
832
κακῶν (A2): The term now used not of the client’s evil deeds that deserve punishment, but of the punishments they will face unless they hire the μάντεις to ward them off.
833
δεινὰ περιμένει (A3). Cf.330D-331B. Adeimantus’s depiction includes even the scare tactic with which his μάντεις might seek to close the deal. Though his description explicitly distances himself from these assertions (λέγουσι at 364A6, πείθειν at 364B6, C4, E5 and ὥς φασι at 364E4) he does a little too good a job of presenting their brief. One may wonder, moreover, whether a visitor such as the one he has described, has visited the door of Cephalus once or twice (ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες, 364B5-6) or has Cephalus found his frequent private sacrifices sufficient? His fear would presumably decide this for him.
834
νέων ψυχάς (A6): Although the fate of the soul is meant to be the true subject of both the speeches (358B6) the soul has not been mentioned per se within either speech, not even in connection with the psychagogery of Musaeus at 363C and 364E. In turning to it in now, with solicitude, Adeimantus shows a hint of vulnerability; and with the vocative φίλε appeals to Socrates for empathy.
835
ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι (A8). If with J.-C. the image is borrowed from bees (comparing Ion 534B), the metaphor (ἐπιπτόμενοι) is not. The gnomic and encomiastic topic of the bee as exploited for instance in Pindar has the bee moving from flower to flower to extract the honey, as the poet might pass over the details so as to focus on the gist of the matter. The term for harvesting the gist is δρέπεσθαι, but the term used, ἐπιπτόμενοι, connotes mere impetuosity. Likewise, συλλογίσασθαι —“adding it all up”—is likewise a disappointing pis aller for συλλέγειν. Cf. 401C2 where Socrates uses δρέπεσθαι instead, pointing back to this passage.
836
ποῖός τις (A8): he shifts from the plural of the group to the singular of the case—oneself—that each must think about in prospect. The numbers and persons of the pronouns Adeimantus employs in this section are hugely significant of his inner attitude: cf. nn.844, 845, 846, 872, 877, 887, infra.
837
ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων (B2) recalls Glaucon’s εἰκότως at 358C4. In both cases to say that a person “in all likelihood” will adopt an attitude is really no more than an attempt to exonerate him, but now Adeimantus goes further, imagining an inner self canny enough to “get the drift” and endowing it with the sophistication of an argument from likelihood. In truth of course he is arguing against himself; and he already knows he will win, and that in winning he loses.
838
πότερον δίκᾳ ... (B3-4): The passage from Pindar is quoted at greater length by Max.Tyre (12.1 = fr.254 Turyn, 213 Schneider): πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἥ σκολιαῖς ἀπαταῖς ἀναβαίνει | ἐπιχθόνιον γένος ἀνδρῶν, | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν; and by Cicero in a letter to Atticus dubitating how he should treat a certain person; but later, Dion.Helic. can quote only the last line to express uncertainty on a technical question (comp.verb.21). Adeimantus’s truncated version seems to presume the theme of deep dubiety expressed in the fourth line of the fragment. The language of the portion quoted by Plato closely resembles Isth.5(4) 49-50: τετείχισται δὲ πάλαι | πύργος ὑψηλαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀναβαίνειν, which suggests that the wall (there taking [with Dissen] ἀρεταῖς as dative of agent with τετείχισται and ἀναβαίνειν as epexegetical of ὑψηλαῖς) is a metaphor for social eminence. As such Adeimantus’s exegesis, ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ shades the meaning away from eminence in virtue toward the unapproachable security of a battlement.
839
Reading ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ (B5) with F (against ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ with ADM).
840
θεσπέσιος (B7), gratuitously approbatory: cf. the use at Euthyd.289E. It recalls ἰσόθεον in Glaucon’s speech (360C3) and reveals the young man’s “buy in.” Thrasymachus has promised superhappiness with μακάριος, definitively more than mere humans have. The desire is essentially “pleonexic.”
841
τὸ δοκεῖν ... (C1-2): a quote from Simonides according to the attribution of schol. in E.Or.235 (=fr.93Page [PMG 598]): τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται.
842
οὐκοῦν (C1) always has some interrogative force in Plato (Denniston, 436; cf. des Places, Quelques particules de liaison [Paris 1929], 158 and 188). The parts of the self in conversation with each other challenge assent by putting a question: cf. D7 below.
843
ἀλώπεκα (C5): Archilochus (fr.185 West) alludes to the fable of the crafty fox (ἀλώπηξ κερδαλῆ … | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον) that tricked a monkey into a trap, out of envy for his being acclaimed king by the other animals for his prowess dancing – as retold by Aesop (Fab.81, Perry).
844
φησί τις (C6): The objector within has been put outside with the third person, so that the two persons within become a “we” (φήσομεν, D1) that it is addressing.
845
Warming to his task Adeimantus joins the chorus of 364A1-4, and perverts the gnomic wisdom: τὰ καλά become τὰ μεγάλα and χαλεπόν is redone with a litotes, οὐκ εὐπετής, the expression striking a clumsy and false note since εὐπετής had there been used to seduce. Now the taunting counsel is bravery, with γάρ (C7) answering γάρ (C6) tit for tat, and the verbal adjectives ensuing in boastful resolution.
846
φήσομεν (D1): Just as the opponent is cast out into the third person, the part of the self that had opposed the scandalous position now comes on board to hear the exhortations of the other part of the self. It has become idle to ask which one is Adeimantus, but all-important to recognize that he does not notice the shifting reference of his pronouns.
847
τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων (D2) adduces to the devil’s argument even the open faith in reason, a favorite metaphor of Socrates as when he follows the λόγος through a dark thicket or rides it like a raft through waves of paradox in hopes of reaching the harbor of truth. Cf. 394D, etc.). That radical reliance on reason is here perverted into grasping at the merest threads of rationalization.
848
γάρ (D2) immediately supplies reasons supplied by our young man’s cunning fox.
849
συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας (D3): Aristotle quotes a typical club-member’s oath at Pol.5.9: καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅτι ἂν ἔχω κακόν (1310A9-10).
850
εἰσίν τε (D4). Our young man remembers the argument of 361B2 and, with slovenly but serviceable τε, cobbles it together for himself, in reverse order. This is συλλογίζεσθαι instead of συλλέγειν (cf.365A8 and n.). Compare the use of at
851
τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα (D5): Adeimantus expatiates upon the first statement of this pair of solutions (persuasion and force, 361B) by first mentioning the resources available (συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας // πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι, D3-4) and then their employment (τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα) ordered in apodotic chiasm.
852
ὡς (D6) rather than ὥστε, with infinitive for natural result, rare in Plato (e.g.Symp.213B2) but commoner in Xenophon (several passages in Smyth §2263-8), as if to say the young man, following Pindar, keeps his eyes on the goal (ἀεὶ τέλος ὁρᾶν). πλεονεκτοῦντες however lays bare the true motive.
853
ἀλλὰ δὴ θεούς (D6): Adeimantus now dispenses with saying who is speaking, but in his favored manner requires us to buy in and infer who it is (cf.363D1-2, E3 and nn.). Presumably it is the τις again (since again the respondent is “we,” D8), who now makes the transition, a transition we have already seen twice, from the human to the divine level (cf.364B2ff; 363A5ff).
854
οὐκοῦν (D7), again (cf. C1).
855
μέλει (D8) of the gods’ concern for men, stands for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and that is the meaning we give it; but in the next line we see that this reduced term was adduced merely to a foundation for a tit for tat argument (see next note).
856
μελητέον (E1) answering μέλει (D8-E1): note correlative καί presuming that men were on a par with gods the way Euthyphro does when he says (6A5) περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ: cf. also 378B2-4 and n.
857
τοι (E2) Adeimantus adeptly imitates the oleaginous familiarity of the coaxing cynic. Cf. ὦ φίλε below (366A6).
858
οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν (E2). Though the first sense of ἴσμεν is to “know,” its inherent optical sense is brought to the fore by its collocation with ἀκηκόαμεν, so that a statement is being made about the evidence of the eyes and the ears. Adeimantus is applying the statistical empiricism he learned from others 364A5 and B3; and the argument includes a new kind of tendentious sophistication that we can only attribute to himself. But also it is drawn out of the characterization of the poets as “witnesses” to certain assertions, as 364D5.
859
Reading λόγων (E3) on the superior ms. authority of ADM (instead of νόμων with F and edd.): the phrase redoes ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν (363E6-4A1 and cf. n. ad loc.), repeating τε … καί.
860
τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν (E3): i.e., Homer and Hesiod: cf. Hdt.2.53. The characterization explicitly depicts them as authorities about the gods, though they have, twice above, only been presumed to be (364C5-E2; 363A7-8).
861
εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν (E4), quoted (perhaps θυσίαις is, too, θυσίαισι replaced with θυσίαις τε, which preserves the dactyl as well as the caesura) from the passage quoted above from Iliad 9.
862
καὶ ἀναθήμασιν (E5): In one and the same breath he quotes the Iliad and he throws in the pairing of θυσίαι and ἀναθήματα from Glaucon’s speech, 362C2-3.
863
παράγεσθαι (E5): cf.364D4 and παρατρωπῶσ’ in the quote from Homer below it (E1).
864
ἀναπειθόμενοι (E5), as a nominative participle in hyperbaton, recalls λισσόμενοι in the Homer quote, though it is unrelated in sense and different in voice. In everyday speech ἀναπείθειν means to bribe (Ar.Pax 622; Eq.473; V.101), an undermeaning by which our young man now segues into a mercantile analysis.
865
οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον (E5-6): with each question our young man unrelentingly pushes himself (or enables himself) to disown another resource for his own redemption. To decide which it is requires us to know where Adeimantus himself stands, and everything in this long speech indicates that like the young man, he can argue the bad position better than he wants to.
866
δ’ οὖν (E6) dismisses the alternative as if it were not an alternative after all.
867
Reading μόνον (366A1) with FDM (om. A : μὲν ci. Muretus): Adeimantus is virtually quoting Thrasymachus’s καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία at 343E2-3: μηδεμία ἄλλη is tantamount to μόνον.
868
λισσόμενοι (A3) continues the reference to the quotation from Homer, with the two subsequent participles quoting his subsequent protasis, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ, but now the sins and the prayers for forgiveness are slapped together, syntactically coordinate, as if they were all one act culminating in the result, πείθοντες (A4). These “improvements” on Homer are the work of Adeimantus himself.
869
ἀζήμιοι (A4): The moral cost-benefit analysis into debit (ζημία) and credit (κέρδος [A2]) is another innovation of our young man, and again with every advance in his argument he leaves behind a greater mess while his outlook becomes simpler by becoming more empty. By now the only good he can look forward to is κέρδος and the only evil the thinks he has to avoid is ζημία, which by now for him means only monetary debit: τίσις he has left out.
870
Again the objector uses ἀλλὰ γάρ (A4, cf. 365C6), “elliptical” in Denniston’s classification: “But (sc. I can’t agree with what you say) since ...” At each step the imaginary objector remembers what part of the truth the advocate is forgetting, but since his own grasp of the truth is only conventional the advocate continually gainsays him.
871
παῖδες παίδων (A6): The article is often dropped in family relations: cf. 363D3 and 571C9 with n.
872
φήσει (A6): The play with the pronouns continues: the reluctant part of the self has become the “we” (A5), and now the devil’s advocate has shifted into the third person (φήσει, A6), addressing “us” with the singular vocative ὦ φίλε (for which contrast ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, 365A4: cf. n.), to assure us that he does after all have our best interests in mind. He has won.
873
λογιζόμενος (A6) might be taken to resume συλλογίζεσθαι (365A8) in peroration (dropping the prefix being characteristic in repetition), but it is the characteristic of this speech that words tend to slide into crasser meanings. The young man’s λογισμός has usurped his λόγος, his justification for so characterizing the argument being the cost-benefit analysis the young man has just offered. Cf. the immediately suspicious use at Lach.193A4.
874
With his ἀλλά (A6) the young man answers the objector’s ἀλλά (A4), and with αὖ treats this last step as even more ready-made than the previous, though it is the most perfidious step he has taken.
875
The phrasing (366A7-B2) repeats the assertions about the μάντεις (364E3-5) in more confident terms. There the μάντεις sought to persuade the cities πείθοντες, E5), and now the cities testify to it (λέγουσι, B1); there the poets were said to be the offspring of the gods (ἐκγόνων, E4) but only here the insinuation that they qualify thereby to be their spokesmen is made (οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γιγνόμενοι, B1-2).
876
οἵ … μηνύουσιν (B2): restating the content of the ordinate clause in a clause that is subordinate to a subordinate clause is a distinct type of illogical idiom especially useful in closure. Still, the restatement is not innocent: μηνύουσιν is “more than λέγουσι” as Tucker says (ad loc.). It was last used of laying an information against an ἄδικος whereby he no longer λανθάνει ἀδικῶν (362B3): our young man has capped his speech by asserting that the gods’ injustice has not escaped our notice, a claim novel in its content and even more enormous than the remark of Adeimantus’s μάντεις that they can persuade the gods to serve them (364A4-5).
877
κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον (B3), aporizing over the grounds for a contrary view in peroration: cf. 501D (and Shorey ad loc., 2.74 note a), 589B8, 591A5. Adeimantus continues to debate with himself; the paragraph break belongs not here (with edd.) but at B7, where Adeimantus’s vocative announces he is turning to Socrates (on this use of the vocative cf. my nn. to Lach.180B7 and 181B5). His first plural now designates the victor in the argument speaking on behalf of both parts of the soul.
878
μεγίστης (B3): still, and again, injustice per se is unattractive and needs μεγίστη to distract us from the fact.
879
ἣν ἐὰν μὲν ... (B4): this double subordination, followed by the balanced pairs καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις, ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες and πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων, achieves a stately elevation of style—a momentary one.
880
The syntax (B3-7) is telescoped: the initial potential optative (αἱροίμεθ’ ἄν) turns out to be the apodosis (note repeated ἄν, B3 and 4) of a mixed condition whose protasis is presented in a relative clause in the future indicative, itself containing a protasis in the form of a proviso (ἐάν … κτησώμεθα, B4-5). How can there be a reason not to be unjust when practicing such injustice constitutes the intelligent life?
881
ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λόγος (B5-6), a pairing that would be oxymoronic anywhere else in Plato. Our young man has remembered ἄκρος in the meaning it was given 360E7, though in a very different connection, but refers immediately to the widespread belief of the cities alongside the expert testimony of the prophetic poets (B1-3), and brings forward ἰδίᾳ λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν from 363D6-4A1; moreover it recalls Aristotle’s definition of ἔνδοξα as τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις (Top.100B21-3). Insofar as Adeimantus has improved their arguments in this last section he has himself become the man to refute.
882
ὦ Σώκρατες (C1): The vocative along with δή (B7), recalls the plaintive tone Adeimantus momentarily adopted above (ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, 354A4). His shift is sudden but distinct: the optative construction with ἄν is replaced by τίς μηχανή; the mood changes from that of the peroration in which the orator’s case has been made beyond conceivable cavil to that of an interlocutor desperate to find a way to avoid that conclusion. Soon Adeimantus imagines himself forgiven by a wiser man (C3-D1: n.b. συγγνώμην), but then again, only a moment later, he blames Socrates and people like him (i.e. exactly the wise persons he imagines) for failing to have removed his own perplexity before it had a chance to settle into him (366D7-367A4)!
883
τιμᾶν (C3): Honoring justice was the response that Glaucon’s inductive division of “goods” had evoked in Socrates (cf. ἐν τῶ καλλίστῳ, 358A1, with n.). The burden of the brothers’ speeches has been praise and censure, and the results that praise and censure achieve are honor and dishonor.
884
δύναμις (C2, cf. also D2-3 below) brings forward Glaucon’s notion of ἀδυναμία (359B6, cf. ἀρρωστία, B1): Adeimantus begins to bring the points his brother made alongside his own.
885
ψυχῆς ἢ χρώματος ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους (C2-3), again the traditional three categories of good, but in looser array and slanted to correspond with the uses to which one’s storehouse of ὑπάρχοντα had been applied above, the use of the soul being wisdom (365C5, and cf. λογιζόμενος, 366A6) and bravery (implied at C7-D2); the use of money to hire persuaders (D4-5); of family, the συνωμοσίαι τε καὶ ἑταιρίαι (D3); and of body, the readiness to use force (βιασόμεθα, D5). His lexeme δύναμις ψυχῆς, moreover, brings forward the ψυχαί of the εὐφυεῖς from 365A6-7, to which he new returns, slanting εὐφυής toward δυνατός (contrast his use of θεία φύσις, below, C7).
886
γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα (C3): Adeimantus commemorates Glaucon’s ἀθλιώτατος (360D4).
887
With first plural perfect εἰρήκαμεν (C4), Adeimantus treats the position he has articulated as complete (as he did with the perfect εἰρημένων at B7) but also very saliently treats it as a position he has reached in concert with Socrates – a further confusion evinced in the pronouns.
888
ἔχει (C4): With his simple condition in indicatives (C4-D3) Adeimantus expresses neither a hope nor a generalization, but is speaking about Socrates, who, he flatly presumes, will forgive his canny presentation of the bad view and his inadequacy (n.b., ἱκανῶς) to gainsay it, and will declare these arguments to be false.
889
θείᾳ φύσει … ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβών (C7): The distinction invokes the triad φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη (on which cf. Shorey TAPA 40(1909)185-201, Meno init., Phdrs.269D4-6, Rep.374B10-D6, 606A7-8; nn.941, 1475, 1762, 1951, 3595). To say therefore, as here, that only knowledge or a divinely granted nature can enable a person to abstain from injustice unconsciously and unintentially implies that inculcation (μελετή) is impotent, and that nothing less than expert knowledge will suffice to overcome the present state of the young man’s faulty inculcation by praise and blame. Adeimantus also does not notice that the inborn talent he easily assumes his young man possesses (with εὐφυεῖς) is somehow far below the θεία φύσις he here assumes they lack – as when one exonerates himself by saying “I’m no saint.”
890
ἀδικεῖ (D4): repetition of πρῶτος indicates the meaning is that as soon as he acquires the δύναμις he uses it abusively. Understand τοῦ ἀδικεῖν with εἰς δύναμιν. Adeimantus repeats Glaucon’s assertion from 360C7-8.
891
ὅσοι ἐπαινέται (E1): Again, it was the purpose of Glaucon’s epagogic division of goods to lead Socrates to say that the kind of good we love not only for its effects but also in and of itself is the κάλλιστον, and thereby to put him on record as a praiser of justice, enabling Adeimantus now to make it incumbent upon him to answer the challenge. The sudden shift in the vocative from singular to plural mixes prayer with deprecation just as in the Muses’ address to Hesiod Th.26-28: n.b. με, 24). Immediately however Adeimantus will shift to the third singular with his emphatic οὐδεὶς πώποτε (E7).
892
Οὐδεὶς … ἄλλως ἤ (E4): As with πάντων ὑμῶν ὅσοι, prolepsis and self-interruptive frontloading are the leading rhetorical tropes of the complaint Adeimantus herewith impersonates, conferring upon it a boast of indignant recrimination. This manner is extenuated in the prolepses τῇ αὑτοῦ … ἀνθρώπους (E5-7) and οὔτ’ ἐν ποιήσει … λόγοις (E7-8), themselves facilitated by the speaker’s reversion to οὐδεὶς πώποτε at E7. The speaker is that better part of Adeimantus, which had lost the debate within his self just above.
893
δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεάς (E4): The plurals are derogatory. For ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας cf. Glaucon’s τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν (358B5).
894
For δυνάμει and ἐνόν (E5-6) cf. Glaucon at 358B5 and cf. n.698.
895
καὶ λανθάνον (E6): Omit editors’ comma before καί. λανθάνον is complementary to ἐνόν, contrasting the outer appearance to the inner fact, in a chiastic ABBA construction.
896
οὔτ’ ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ’ ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις (E7-8): He repeats his distinction, again, from 365E2-3 and 363E6-4A1 (itself referring back: cf. n. ad loc.), but this time the order is reversed: it is a λόγος after all that Adeimantus and Glaucon want from Socrates.
897
τὸ μέν (E8): The “privative” idea, injustice, which had up to now been an element prerequisite even to defining justice, is finally passed over unnamed as if it were foil, though in the frontloading manner of the speech its predicate is presented in extenso (μέγιστον κακῶν … αὑτῇ); conversely, justice is presented with its longest of names and the predicate is climactically abbreviated, eschewing even the partitive genitive (ἀγαθόν rathe